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Epistemological considerations are at the heart of both understanding and 
developing a deeper perception of the tradecraft of intelligence analysis as 
a field of study and its practice. Ranging from the intelligence fields of 
national security to law enforcement, intelligence analysis as a practice 
and area of study engages a series of fundamental questions, covering 
what we know, how we know such things and the reliability of knowledge 
claims. This thesis situates itself within the sociology of knowledge with 
respect to the discourse on the discipline of intelligence analysis. 
The primary research question guiding this thesis is: How can 
Michael Polanyi’s views of science contribute towards understanding the 
‘process’ and ‘product’ of intelligence analysis? As revealed by intelligence 
literature, a clear and persistent aim for the transformation of intelligence 
analysis as a discipline has been to align the field with scientific principles 
and practices. Within intelligence literature, there are noticeable efforts 
within some quarters to align intelligence analysis, most observably within 
the US Intelligence Community, with generally accepted principles of 
science by requiring analysts to engage in more rigorous standards and 
systematic processes. Such efforts aim towards generating more accurate 
and reliable intelligence assessments, or for better ‘connecting the dots’. 
Michael Polanyi’s arguments regarding the activities of scientists are 
transferable to the field of intelligence analysis, providing a nuanced 
perspective for perceiving epistemological challenges and issues facing 
analysts. Specifically, Polanyi’s concepts of ‘tacit knowing’ and ‘personal 
knowledge’ contributes towards developing a more epistemologically 
robust and complete understanding of some aspects of the process and 
the product of intelligence analysis. 
Keywords:  




Discovery consists of seeing what everyone else has seen and thinking what 
nobody has thought.  
Albert Szent-Györgyi, 1937 Nobel Prize scientist (cited in Lathrop 2008)  
 
The primary research question guiding this thesis is the following: How 
can Michael Polanyi’s views of science contribute towards understanding 
the ‘process’ and ‘product’ of intelligence analysis? This question emerged 
from observations regarding the discernible trend, both within the national 
security and law enforcement literature, of attempts to align intelligence 
analysis to ‘scientific’ principles and practices (Cooper 2005; Gill 2009; 
Innes, Fielding & Cope 2005; Marrin 2011b; Marrin & Clemente 2005, 
2006; Spielmann 2014; Wirtz 2014a). With respect to the goal in the 
intelligence field to become more ‘scientific’, this thesis argues Polanyi’s 
view of science can shed important light on the matter; specifically, his 
understanding of how problems are solved within science, involving the 
practitioner’s ‘tacit knowing’ and practical ‘craft skills’. The thesis argues 
that these insights of Polanyi are transferrable to the intelligence field. 
Similarly, understanding what it means to ‘know’ something as an 
intelligence product can be enhanced by Polanyi’s concept of the knower 
as using his/her ‘personal knowledge’. Polanyi’s understanding of the 
nature of science, covering the ‘tacit’ processes involved in solving 
problems and what it means to ‘know’ something by acknowledging the 
‘personal knowledge’ of the practitioner, provides us with a more nuanced 
way to understand intelligence analysis. Polanyi’s views offer a 
perspective for better understanding fundamental epistemological issues 
facing intelligence analysts, specifically considerations regarding the tacit 
processes involved in solving problems and understanding the personal 
dimension of knowledge claims. The aim of this thesis is to utilise Polanyi’s 
depictions of ‘personal knowledge’, ‘tacit knowing’ and craft skill within the 
discourse of intelligence analysis in order to contribute towards a more 
epistemologically robust account of the analytical processes and products 
of intelligence analysis.  
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Closely related to the primary research question are the questions, 
‘What is the nature of science?’ and ‘What is the nature of intelligence 
analysis?’ We need to understand what constitutes a science, and this is 
no simple matter since science has been defined in many different ways 
(Mehlberg 1955; Moore 2007; Sokal 2001). One of the more influential 
definitions in recent times is that of Karl Popper in terms of scientific 
theories being falsifiable, and the method of science (the method of 
assessing scientific theories) featuring criticism (Popper 1959). The 
approach taken in this thesis to the question ‘What is the nature of 
science?’ will rely on the writings of Polanyi. Besides exercising 
considerable influence on philosophers and sociologists of science, 
Polanyi has the merit of having known science with great intimacy. He was 
an accomplished scientific researcher, working alongside Einstein and 
others in Berlin in the 1920s and the 1930s. 
Moving beyond ways of understanding science, the next task to 
explore is the nature of intelligence analysis. Polanyi’s perspective of 
science, including his views around how discoveries are made, contributes 
toward understanding certain aspects of intelligence analysis. In particular, 
Polanyi’s concepts of tacit and personal knowledge have a strong bearing 
on perceiving the practice of intelligence analysis. Given there has been a 
rekindling of interest in a search for a ‘theory of intelligence’ (Hunter & 
MacDonald 2017; Johnson 2017; Marrin 2007b, pp. 821-846; Phythian 
2013, p. 54; Treverton & Gabbard 2008; Warner 2017; Zohar 2013) one 
can expect epistemological issues to come increasingly to the fore around 
intelligence analysis (Lillbacka 2013, p. 304). Key epistemological 
considerations will be explored in this thesis from a standpoint grounded in 
Polanyi’s writings, including the question, ‘What exactly is ‘knowledge?’ 
This is discussed with reference to intelligence analysis. The study of 
Polanyi’s views regarding epistemological issues in relation to science will 
help us better understand related issues in intelligence analysis. A number 
of scholars have agreed with Polanyi that tacit knowledge is an essential 
part of science (Beckett 2000; Gilbert 2000; Piccini & Kershaw 2004; 
Schön 1995), while others regard the whole idea of tacit knowledge as 
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being irrational mysticism (Popper 1959, p. 8). Polanyi explored the 
subject of tacit knowledge in great depth.  
The dynamics of the contemporary information environment has an 
impact on the activities of analysts. The problems associated with this 
environment is most clearly visible with respect to the ‘information 
overload’ facing modern intelligence analysts – a phenomenon which has 
emerged as a result of the expansion of ‘open source’ material 
(unclassified and freely available information in the public domain) (Flood 
2004, p. 108; Friedman, RS 1998, p. 161; Gaudet, J 2013, p. 169; Zegart, 
AB 2009). 
It is important to acknowledge that there are some limitations with 
Polanyi’s experience and understanding of science. His perspective of 
science itself is not universally agreed on by scientists or scholars in this 
area. For example, Polanyi disagreed with the Positivist perspective of 
science and the idea of a ‘scientific method’. There are some who have 
challenged these positions for characterising science in that way (Kelleher 
2008/2009, p. 8; Creswell & Poth 2017; Johnson, J 2006a, p. 224; 
Mackenzie, JIM 2011, pp. 543-46; Manjikian, M 2013, pp. 563-67; Ryan, P 
2015, pp. 417-31). It is beyond the scope of this thesis to examine these 
criticisms in-depth, but it is nonetheless important to acknowledge that 
Polanyi’s perspective of science is not necessarily the definitive ‘truth’ for 
understanding this field and knowledge more generally. 
This thesis shows that Polanyi’s account of tacit knowledge and 
related issues has direct relevance to understanding the activities of 
analysts, including the nature of their knowledge claims, whether those 
claims are objective, and tradecraft in the processes of intelligence 
analysis.  
Agreeing with commentators who argue that at its core, intelligence 
analysis is a discipline concerned with thinking and knowledge claims 
(Bruce & George 2008; Lillbacka 2013; Marrin 2017; Mole 2012; Waltz 
2014, p. 1; Wheaton & Richey 2015), this thesis is largely concerned with 
matters epistemological. Specifically, it concentrates on ‘intelligence 
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analysis’ in terms of better understanding the processes involved in 
solving problems in this discipline and comprehending the knowledge 
claims or final intelligence products (i.e. the knowledge claims that 
analysts produce at the end of their analysis). Polanyi’s contribution to this 
area is his insights into the practice of science. For example, his 
discussions regarding the art/science aspects of craftsmanship involved in 
making discoveries. Other scholars have examined these matters, 
including Harry Collins and Richard Evan’s treatment around expertise 
(Collins and Evans, 2008), Collins’ work on tacit and explicit 
knowledge (Collins, 2010), and Richard Sennet’s examination of ‘craft’ 
(Sennett, 2008).  Polanyi’s engagement in these topics is arguably more 
detailed and offers sufficient insights. 
Intelligence analysis is a knowledge-building activity, and to 
improve analysis requires an understanding of epistemology or the theory 
of the origin and nature of relevant knowledge (Bruce 2008, p. 171). This 
thesis provides a deeper understanding of the epistemological nature of 
intelligence analysis by examining and analysing salient features of 
Polanyi’s view of science. Using Polanyi to sharpen our understanding of 
the epistemology of intelligence analysis will generate a new way of 
envisaging the discipline of intelligence analysis. 
A number of scholars have observed from a psychological point of 
view the importance of cognitive awareness in helping people avoid errors 
in processes of reasoning (Bar-Joseph 2010; Bruce 2008; Heuer 1999). 
However, comparatively little research has been conducted into the 
theoretical nature of analysis from a more philosophical, or specifically 
epistemological, standpoint (Vrist Rønn 2014). Scholars such as Vrist 
Rønn and Høffding (2012) rightly complain that epistemological 
contributions to intelligence theory are ‘still alarmingly low in number and 
thoroughness’, stating: 
Even though fundamental questions from the domain of epistemology 
are often posed in the field of intelligence (e.g. ‘how do we arrive at 
new knowledge?’ and how robust are our conclusions related to the 
evidence at hand?), there are, to our knowledge, very few attempts to 
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qualify these questions from the perspective of professional 
epistemology (Vrist Rønn & Høffding 2012, pp. 4‒5). 
The Macquarie Dictionary defines epistemology as a branch of 
philosophy which investigates the origin, nature and methods and limits of 
human knowledge (The Concise Macquarie Dictionary 1982, p. 410). 
Knowledge and information are ‘inextricably linked’ to the definition of 
intelligence, so it is clear that epistemology matters to intelligence (Brown 
2007, p. 337; Vandepeer 2011a, p. 106). Epistemology is seen to bear on 
intelligence analysis when we ask questions about when and how 
knowledge can be ascribed to an agent in terms of warrant, methodology, 
and justification of knowledge claims (Vrist Rønn & Høffding 2012, p. 697).  
Examining the literature concerning the epistemological/cognitive 
nature of intelligence analysis, particularly around the issue of whether it is 
an ‘art’ or a ‘science’, will reveal a variety of positions as to how this 
epistemology can be understood (Cooper 2005; Gill 2009; Hall & 
Citrenbaum 2010; Marrin 2011b; Wirtz 2012). Beyond clarifying these 
different views, Polanyi’s theoretical analysis will help us better understand 
the art/science distinction as it applies to the discipline of intelligence 
analysis. Polanyi’s thought will be seen in this thesis to provide an 
alternative way of thinking about the epistemology of intelligence analysis, 
concerning both the process of intelligence analysis and the product; more 
specifically, the ways in which to recognize the epistemological processes 
by which analysts skilfully solve problems, and a clearer understanding of 
what it means to ‘know’ the knowledge as a product. 
An important feature of Polanyi’s epistemology of science consists 
in his view that there is no set method of science. This contrasts the view 
of Karl Popper who believed science has a single defining method, the 
method of scientists striving to falsify their hypotheses. Polanyi does not 
doubt there are methods of science, but he says they change over time 
and they vary from discipline to discipline, being examples of local 
knowledge. There is, for Polanyi, no criterion of sound data or evidence for 
the purposes of judging hypotheses as worthy of adoption or rejection. 
Each scientist has to use his/her trained judgment in order to surmise and 
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make decisions. There is no fixed set of rules for scientists to follow. It is 
the same with the standards for judging what constitutes ‘good science’, 
according to Polanyi. These considerations are discipline-specific and 
subject to change. These and other insights of Polanyi into the nature of 
scientific research and knowledge have obvious relevance to the way 
intelligence analysis is undertaken. This thesis will study his account of 
processes of science as involving scientists’ use of their ‘practical skills’ 
and their ‘tacit’ and ‘personal’ knowledge in solving the problems that their 
theoretical assumptions and expectations have thrown up. 
The justification for choosing Michael Polanyi as our source of 
guidance about the nature of scientific research and the nature of scientific 
knowledge is, as suggested earlier, that he himself was a distinguished 
scientific researcher. After training in, and practicing, medicine for a short 
period of time, he completed his Ph.D. in physical chemistry and devoted 
the next 20 years to research in this field (Jacobs 2009, p. 20). His 
understanding of scientific research has been widely approved of. For 
example, Thomas Kuhn in his highly influential The Structure of Scientific 
Revolutions (Kuhn 1962, p. 47) writes approvingly of Polanyi’s work in the 
context of presenting his own concept of paradigms as being the objects 
of scientists’ unformulated knowledge (Jacobs 2009, p. 20). As the scholar 
Zammito (Zammito 2004, p. 57) noted, Kuhn ‘insists on the essential role 
of the implicit or, in the terminology of Michael Polanyi, the ‘“tacit”… It is 
here, perhaps more than anywhere else, that Kuhn’s work has affected a 
long-term shift of inquiry in the philosophy of science: from logic to 
practice’. Despite fleeting references to some aspects of Polanyi’s ideas 
regarding ‘tacit knowing’, especially in relation to discussions around 
‘know how’, there has not been a sustained engagement of his 
epistemology and its relevance to intelligence analysis (Alschuler 2007; 
Dennis 2013; Margolis et al. 2012, p. 2; Vogel & Dennis 2012; Waltz 
2003).  
Throughout intelligence literature there has not been any sustained 
attention given to describing Polanyi’s views of science in relation to 
intelligence analysis. This was an important reason for deciding to use 
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Polanyi as the main theorist to unpack and examine epistemological 
issues facing intelligence analysts. The researcher fully agrees with 
Maxwell (2005, p. 40) that at times the most productive conceptual 
frameworks are located outside of the traditional field of study (Maxwell 
2005, p. 40), and believes Michael Polanyi’s ideas regarding the nature of 
science can generate valuable insights into the nature of intelligence 
analysis.  
Some intelligence scholars have characterized the discipline as 
being ‘under-theorised’ with respect to epistemological considerations 
(Agrell 2012, p. 130; Betts 2007; Jervis 2010; Johnson 2017; Kreuzer 
2016; Moore 2007; Posner 2006). Given intelligence analysis is a 
‘knowledge-building’ activity (Bruce & George 2008), this lack of 
theoretical reflection and analysis regarding the epistemology of 
intelligence analysis is both striking and telling. This may be partly due to 
limited human and financial resources being made available for this sort of 
research, and it may also owe something to the fact that theoretical 
reflection is located at the end of the ‘intelligence cycle’ – at the end of the 
assembly line (Agrell 2012, p. 129). Others have argued that the neglect is 
largely due to the general acceptance of the underlying logic of what has 
been referred to as the ‘industrialised’ form of knowledge (Herman 1996), 
which assumes ‘reality’ will more or less reveal itself if only more ‘facts’ are 
collected. In this light, reflection and analysis regarding epistemological 
issues have been neglected in intelligence literature (Agrell 2012, p. 129; 
Evans 2009; Hatch 2013). Part of this neglect around the epistemology of 
intelligence analysis can be attributed to the dominance of the discipline of 
psychology in shaping the discourse within intelligence analysis (as a 
practice and field of study), which posits that the latter can only be 
improved marginally (Betts 2009, p. 87) by focusing on the cognitive 
limitations of intelligence analysis: specifically, the cognitive limitations of 
analysts’ efforts to ‘link the dots’ within the process of analysis, or making 
sense of the collected information and data (Bar-Joseph 2010, p. 24; 
Quarmby & Young 2010; Vrist Rønn 2014, p. 352). Although these views 
of managing cognitive aspects of intelligence analysis have some validity, 
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the intelligence discipline could benefit from examining the process and 
product of intelligence beyond the lens of psychology, and expand the 
discussions to include a greater sensitivity and awareness of 
epistemological considerations.  
Method and approach  
This thesis has been sensitive to the view that different methodological 
approaches are based on certain theoretical and philosophical standpoints 
(Ormston et al. 2014) and researchers should maintain consistency 
between their philosophical starting position and the methods that they 
employ (Ritchie et al. 2013, p. 2). A range of methods and approaches 
were considered for this thesis to permit for high quality research (Li & 
Seale 2007; Patton 2005; Seale 1999). This author was aware of some of 
the limitations of this theoretical approach. The absence of empirical 
observations and data limited the capacity of this thesis to ‘test’ the 
accuracy or reliability of Polanyi’s understanding of science, as applied to 
the intelligence field. Yet ‘testing’ with empirical studies was beyond the 
scope of this thesis, which supported the decision to focus on a more 
theoretical exploration within this thesis. In support of this decision 
regarding the methodology, this author was further mindful of the 
importance of maintaining consistency of the research methodology 
throughout this project to generate more ‘valid’ research findings 
(Meadows & Morse 2001). 
There are difficulties with clearly defining qualitative research 
(Silverman 2011). Qualitative research does not contain a universal theory 
or paradigm that is distinctively its own, nor does it possess a core set of 
methods or practices that are entirely or characteristically ‘qualitative’ 
(Denzin & Lincoln 2011, p. 6). Qualitative research can be understood as 
covering a broad church, including a wide range of approaches and 
methods contained within a variety of research disciplines. Despite such 
diversity, some scholars have attempted to outline the defining aspects of 
qualitative research (Barbour 2013; Carter & Little 2007; Denzin & Lincoln 
2011; Nicholls 2009; Silverman 2011). In a broad sense, qualitative 
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research is often described as possessing an interpretive approach, 
focused on examining issues and taking in different views of research 
participants (Flick 2014). Denzin and Lincoln argue that qualitative 
research can be described as a set of interpretive research practices that 
take into account the perspectives of research participants, and attempt to 
represent those findings by making sense of it all (Denzin & Lincoln 2011, 
p. 3). Qualitative research is also often described as involving words or 
images rather than numbers (Ritchie et al. 2013, p. 3). 
Whilst some scholars have stressed that qualitative and quantitative 
research methods should be understood as being complementary 
strategies, (Gilbert 2008; Silverman 2011), this thesis has adopted 
qualitative research largely because intelligence studies research is 
traditionally qualitative (Judge, Colbert & Ilies 2004; Ratcliffe 2014; Waltz 
2014), and there would be limitations to exploring this field through the 
‘lens’ of quantitative methods (Hawley 2008).  
This research approach adopted in this thesis considered the 
function or role of ‘theory’ in relation to qualitative research, and the issues 
around whether the research should be conducted under the banner of a 
specific ‘school’ or theoretical tradition. The interpretivist approach was 
adopted for this thesis, since it was arguably the most pragmatic approach 
to best fit the specific research question (Creswell & Poth 2017). This 
approach allowed for a more flexible treatment of attention towards the 
ideas and concepts examined across a broad range of fields (Carson et al. 
2001). This is unlike positivism, which adopts a more structured approach 
to research, emphasizing that there is a single objective reality 
independent of the researcher’s standpoint (Creswell & Poth 2017).  
The interpretivist position holds that researchers generate meaning 
as they interpret their world (Williamson 2002; Williamson et al. 2002) and 
it is an approach that has enabled the author to meaningfully engage with 
Polanyi’s view of science, especially regarding his ideas regarding the way 
scientists make discoveries and skilfully solve problems. This appreciation 
would have been hindered, indeed prevented, had a positivist approach 
been pursued, particularly since Polanyi’s argument that scientists 
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routinely make discoveries and solve problems using thought-processes 
which are ‘tacit’ and in some sense pre-logical, or extra-logical, is an 
anathema to positivism. The interpretivist approach easily accommodates 
Polanyi’s ideas, whereas the positivist position adopts the restrictive view 
that scientists, social scientists and typically most people are animated by 
rational and logical arguments (Carson et al. 2001; Willis & Jost 2007). 
Adopting the positivist position would have prevented the inquiry of this 
thesis by excluding Polanyi’s pre- or extra-logical arguments as being 
outside of science. As Latour has observed, the methods of scientists 
powerfully affect how problems are identified and characterized (Latour 
1990).  
The goal of the design was to construct a logical sequence of steps 
to conduct the research. The literature review was the principal means for 
the collection of information for the thesis. The review explored a range of 
multi-disciplinary issues, including intelligence studies, theories of 
intelligence and viewpoints on science. The core tasks of this stage were 
to:  
 Review the available literature relating to intelligence studies, 
intelligence analysis developments across law enforcement and 
national security fields  
 Develop a thematic review of the literature in order to identify the 
core issues and drivers for improving intelligence analysis 
 Outline pertinent insights of Polanyi regarding his understanding of 
the nature of science. 
The literature review chapter outlines some of the views around the 
nature of intelligence analysis and ends with situating Polanyi as a 
scientist whose outlook in epistemology can contribute to the discourse 
within intelligence analysis. The literature around intelligence analysis 
outlines definitions of key terms, common challenges facing analysts and 
epistemological arguments and developments in the field. Key authors on 
the subject of intelligence analysis expanded over time as required. 
Articles from the 20th century to the present day were included since this is 
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the period in history in which developments can be observed in some 
areas of intelligence analysis, particularly after the Second World War. A 
reading of the abstract of each article established its pertinence as a 
resource for inclusion. Articles that examined issues around intelligence 
analysis, especially from an epistemological basis, were included along 
with works that were illustrative of pertinent aspects of Polanyi’s 
epistemology.  
An outline of Polanyi’s epistemology and his understanding of 
science specifically a) sketches the contributions of Michael Polanyi in the 
field of knowledge, setting out his main perception of science, and b) 
clarifies how these insights into knowledge and the nature of science can 
contribute to more completely understanding the discipline of intelligence 
analysis. These findings then allowed for the development of a more 
nuanced epistemological understanding of both the process of intelligence 
analysis, along with a clearer perception of the knowledge generated, or 
the product.  
The structure of the thesis is as follows. Chapter 1 presents a 
detailed literature review relating to the core debates around the nature of 
intelligence analysis. ‘Intelligence’ and ‘intelligence analysis’ are 
distinguished from each other and considered in relation to some key 
epistemological considerations. The main focus of this thesis is around 
discussions as to the nature of intelligence analysis and whether Polanyi’s 
insights into science can shed light on this discipline. This will involve 
outlining different perspectives around the activities of intelligence 
analysts. This will help to contextualise the ongoing debate over whether 
intelligence analysis is best understood as an ‘art’ or a ‘science’, or some 
combination of the two. How these features are defined has implications 
for the study and practice of the tradecraft of intelligence analysis.  
Chapter 2 describes a number of important themes of Polanyi’s 
understanding of the nature of science and the activities of scientists 
engaged in solving problems and producing knowledge. The logic of 
discovery, or the processes from which scientists make discoveries, is a 
key feature for how Polanyi understands the nature of science. A central 
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argument of Polanyi is there is no single ‘method’ of science, or a single 
set of rules for how science should be conducted. Developing this view, 
Polanyi posits that the nature of science is not based on falsificationism. 
He presents an alternative way for understanding science, broadly 
applicable to other fields involving knowledge claims and research. 
According to Polanyi’s understanding, a ‘skilful performance’ necessarily 
involves the practitioner’s ‘practical knowledge’, which further engages 
their ‘tacit knowing’ and ‘personal knowledge’. Polanyi explains how the 
‘apprentice’ submits to the ‘master’ within the tradition observing their 
‘practical’ and ‘tacit’ ways of solving problems. These insights are 
transferrable to the field of intelligence analysis, both in terms of better 
understanding the process of solving problems skilfully and more clearly 
recognising what it means to ‘know’ truth-claims as a product.  
Chapter 3 examines in greater depth Polanyi’s arguments regarding 
tacit knowing applied to intelligence analysis, specifically by providing a 
more enriched way of understanding ‘know how’ and by detailing 
epistemologically how we know. The aim is to clarify his characterisation of 
the process of skilfully solving problems, which is transferrable to the field 
of intelligence analysis. To this end, the chapter draws on some aspects of 
Polanyi’s concepts of ‘tacit knowing’, ‘structure of skills’ and a ‘skilful 
performance’. This chapter examines Structured Analytical Techniques 
(SATs) with respect to this discussion of Polanyi’s understanding of the 
skilful use of tools, including his concept of ‘indwelling’. Polanyi’s 
discussions regarding tacit knowing, especially in regard to the skilful use 
of tools, contributes to a deeper appreciation of the process of skilfully 
solving problems for the intelligence analysis profession.  
Chapter 4 examines Polanyi’s concept of personal knowledge as a 
way to better understand what it means to ‘know’ something in intelligence 
analysis as a knowledge product. Polanyi’s theme of learning a tradecraft 
from skilled masters is arguably applicable to intelligence analysts as it is 
to scientists, leading to the development of the practitioner’s personal 
knowledge. Some key epistemological distinctions and ways of knowing 
will be outlined and used to show how Polanyi’s standpoint on how we 
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know things provides a way for considering knowledge claims within 
intelligence analysis.  
The Conclusion summarises the main findings of this thesis in light 
of Polanyi’s understanding of science and the epistemological bearing his 
views have to the profession of intelligence analysis. Polanyi’s concept of 
tacit knowing, with respect to a ‘skilful performance’, illustrates that one of 
the key insights regarding the process of solving problems involves the 
practitioner’s relationship between their tacit and explicit knowledge. 
Polanyi provides a more technical and nuanced accounting of how tacit 
knowing operates within solving problems as a process, involving a ‘from-
to’ orientation by the practitioner. The analyst, like the scientist, learns 
these skills by practice, education and close observation of masters in the 
tradition in their skilful performance of tasks. The analyst ‘dwells’ in the 
problem they are attempting to solve, using tools as an extension of 
themselves, in an effort to tacitly integrate all the pertinent information and 
theories coherently together. According to Polanyi’s outlook, the analyst 
generates knowledge as a product, which is characteristically personal. 
For there to be knowledge there must be a ‘knower’, and such a ‘personal 
coefficient’ within knowledge claims is not an imperfection but an important 
epistemological tenet of knowledge. Taken together, Polanyi’s perspective 
regarding the process of skilfully solving problems, the learning of a 
tradecraft, and the personal dimension to knowledge, contributes to the 





Chapter 1: The ‘Art’ and ‘Science’ of intelligence 
analysis 
Introduction 
There have been perennial attempts to better understand and refine 
intelligence analysis, both in relation to the broad aims of improving the 
practice and the study within this field. Intelligence analysis as a 
profession and a field of study has long wrestled with debates regarding 
defining and universally agreeing on the core nature of the activities of 
analysts. A discernible trend from available literature is the sustained 
interest for aligning intelligence analysis along ‘scientific’ lines with an 
emphasis on the value of explicit knowledge (Cooper 2005; Gill 2009; 
Innes, Fielding & Cope 2005; Marrin 2011b; Marrin & Clemente 2005, 
2006; Spielmann 2014; Wirtz 2014a). Yet comparatively there has been 
less attention towards sufficiently understanding the ‘intuitive’ and ‘tacit’ 
processes and products of knowledge claims within intelligence literature 
(Dennis 2013; Kamarck 2005, p. 12; Margolis et al. 2012, p. 2; Ouagrham-
Gormley 2014; Tang 2017; Vogel 2013a, 2013b). Exploring the arguments 
regarding whether the intelligence analysis profession is an ‘art’ or a 
‘science’, or some combination of both, will reveal that epistemological 
considerations are fundamental within this discourse. Importantly, this 
question has a bearing on how ‘expertise’ is conceptualised, along with 
considerations regarding how the tradecraft is best learned and taught, as 
field of study and as a practice. Within this aspect, the intelligence field 
has identified the medical profession as a model to follow in relation to the 
learning and practice of their tradecraft. A preliminary outline of the 
defining qualities and aims of intelligence analysis will situate the broader 
discussions regarding whether the field is characteristically an ‘art’ or a 
‘science’, or some combination of both. 
Understanding the intelligence field 
For at least half a century, intelligence literature reveals a preoccupation 
with the development of an overarching theory of intelligence (Kahn 2009). 
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Efforts for developing a universal theory of intelligence (Dahl 2012; Marrin 
& Clemente 2006, pp. 642-665) have been motivated out of a sense of 
better understanding and improving the practice of analysis, along with the 
scholarly study of this tradecraft (George 2010; Herbert 2013; Kerbel 
2008; Tan 2014; Treverton 2009; Walsh 2014). There is a variety of 
positions as to how intelligence as a profession can be understood 
(Cooper 2005; Gill 2009; Hall & Citrenbaum 2010; Marrin 2011b; Wirtz 
2012), and the development of a universal theory of intelligence remains 
an open debate (Davis 2002a, pp. 2-4; Gill 2009; Lowenthal 2013, pp. 32-
35; Treverton & Gabbard 2008; Warner 2009, p. 17). A broad 
understanding of the term ‘intelligence’, outlined below, will be adopted for 
the purposes of this thesis, covering the common qualities or 
characteristics contained across the national security and law enforcement 
domains of intelligence.  
Taken from the literature, a discernible way of perceiving the field of 
‘intelligence’ can be distinguished in two fundamental ways (Bang 2017): 
a) the way information is obtained; b) how information can enable 
decision-makers, based on insight from collected and analysed 
information (Mudd 2015; Pherson 2013; Shaw 2007). The school of 
thought that defines intelligence with an emphasis on the former category 
generally includes references to the secret aspect of intelligence. This 
view is captured in the following quotes: 
Intelligence is the official, secret collection and processing of 
information on foreign countries to aid in formulating and implementing 
foreign policy, and the conduct of covert activities abroad to facilitate 
the implementation of foreign policy (Random 1958, p. 76). 
Secret intelligence is intelligence that others are seeking to prevent 
you from knowing, often with formidable security barriers and violent 
sanctions against those who cooperate with intelligence officers 
(Omand 2014, p. 22).  
Advocates of category a) for conceptualizing the nature of 
intelligence place greater emphasis on the involvement of covert 
collection activities (Johnson 2009) and the aspect of secrecy as a 
defining feature (Gill 2009; Hall & Citrenbaum 2013; Lowenthal 2014; 
Phythian 2017; Warner 2009, p. 18). Lowenthal bluntly states this 
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characterisation of intelligence: ‘Secrets are the essence of intelligence’ 
(Lowenthal 2011, p. 61). In a publication from the Office of National 
Assessments (ONA) in 2006, the agency endorsed this view that 
intelligence is fundamentally secret in nature, stating ‘Intelligence is 
covertly obtained information. That is, it is obtained without the 
authority of the government or group that ‘owns’ the information’ 
(Office of National Assessments 2006, p. 3).  
In contrast, ‘intelligence’ can be characterised in terms of category 
b), with an emphasis on assisting decision-makers generate an impact on 
the security environment. Specifically, according to this position, 
‘intelligence’ can be perceived as assisting decision-makers in optimising 
their resources for responding to or shaping the security environment. The 
following formulations captures this view: 
Probably the simplest definition of intelligence is that it is useful 
information (Gyngell 2011).  
Intelligence is information gathered for policy makers in government 
which illuminates the choices open to them and enables them to 
exercise good judgment (Rockefeller Commission 1975).  
The alternative argument is that intelligence can be ‘anything from 
any source’ which can assist the customer (Treverton & Gabbard 2008; 
Warner 2009, pp. 16-17). This position, which places primacy of 
intelligence on information from all sources (covert and overt), can be 
observed from the Flood Report into Australian intelligence. The Report 
stated: 
While intelligence information is important, and often vital, to 
assessment, it is normally not the main source of information used by 
intelligence assessment agencies. Open sources ... provide the greater 
part of the information available to the Australian Government (Flood 
2004, p. 10).  
Interestingly, even though the ONA claimed in 2006 that 
‘Intelligence is covertly obtained information’ (Office of National 
Assessments 2006, p. 3), the Flood Report had already revealed two 
years earlier that the ‘ONA product draws heavily on published or open 
source material – it is the single largest source of material for ONA 
reporting’ (Flood 2004, p. 108). The argument that ‘intelligence’ is limited 
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to or can even be characterised as drawing significantly on covertly 
obtained information appears to be questionable.  
Moving beyond general ways of characterising the intelligence field 
from a national security perspective, the law enforcement profession offers 
its own position and understanding of intelligence. At the outset, it is worth 
acknowledging that one of the most significant developments in the theory 
and practice of policing relates to changing perceptions of ‘intelligence’ 
within law enforcement (Brown 2007; Parliamentary Joint Committee on 
Law Enforcement 2013; Gill 1998; Sheptycki 2009); specifically, the 
appreciation for the importance of intelligence, and the growing recognition 
of the police as ‘knowledge workers’ (Brodeur & Dupont 2006, p. 1). 
Ericson and Haggerty coined the term ‘knowledge workers’ to refer to 
professionals engaging in the collection and analysis of data and 
information, leading to informed action (Ericson & Haggerty 1997, pp. 83-
84). In this sense, police have become increasingly ‘knowledge workers’ 
with respect to the institutional acknowledgement, over the last 35 years, 
of the core value of collecting and analysing pertinent information and data 
for shaping policing methodologies (Ratcliffe 2014). It would be amiss 
though to consider policing as having only recently become interested in 
‘intelligence’, since information collection and analysis has been a 
fundamental aspect of policing in the US, UK, Australia, and Canada well 
before ‘intelligence-led’ policing methodologies emerged (Kelling & Coles 
1997; Peak & Glensor 1999; Walsh 2001, pp. 347-350).  
The idea of police officers operating as ‘knowledge workers’ within 
the so-called ‘intelligence-led’ policing paradigm (beginning in the 1990s) 
does not necessarily re-imagine the role of police, but rather refines 
policing in terms of the allocation of resources and the exercising of their 
duties (Eck, Clarke & Petrossian 2013; Peters & Cohen 2017; Scott 2017; 
Shearing & Wood 2007, p. 55; Townsley 2017). Intelligence-led policing 
has a more objective basis for deciding priorities and resource allocation 
(Ratcliffe 2016, p. 3). This is achieved by design, by applying analytical 
techniques and statistical predictions for identifying likely targets or 
vulnerable areas for police to anticipate and intervene (James 2017; 
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Knutsson 2017; Lewandowski, Carter & Campbell 2017; Perry 2013, p. 
xiii; Townsley, Mann & Garrett 2011).  
This ‘intelligence-led’ paradigm shift within policing can be further 
recognised with respect to perspectives on ‘criminal intelligence’. Findings 
from the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Law Enforcement (2013, p. 6) 
observed that despite ‘criminal intelligence’ escaping a universally agreed 
definition, the Committee concluded the concept is constituted by the 
following key elements: 
 information that has been validated and value-added; 
 information that has been analysed; and  
 not evidence. 
The inquiry further elaborated as to the nature of intelligence by 
citing the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, which outlines 
intelligence as constituted by the following equation: ‘information + 
evaluation = intelligence (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 2011, 
p. 1). 
It is clear that ‘intelligence’ in terms of criminal investigations is less 
preoccupied with whether the information is obtained covertly or overtly, 
but rather with a greater interest in the end product – making an impact on 
the security environment. As previously discussed, this is consistent with 
one of the main ways of characterising intelligence as understood by the 
national security field; namely, information and data collected (covert or 
overt) to ‘…protect your interests or to maintain a valuable advantage in 
advancing your interests over those posing threats to them’ (Cornall & 
Black 2011, p. 6). What matters for intelligence for both law enforcement 
and national security agencies has less to do with whether the information 
was obtained secretly or with publicly available sources, and more with the 
conferring of insight to promote decision-advantage (Cornall & Black 2011, 
p. 6).  
The epistemological foundations of intelligence studies, it can be 
argued, is largely drawn from the ‘national security’ paradigm (O'Malley 
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2016; Sheptycki 2009, pp. 166-168). This paradigm has been shaped by 
the discourse on international relations, with a focus on conflict and the 
use of state power (Lawson 2003, pp. 78-82). In contrast, there is an 
increasingly large body of research from law enforcement intelligence, with 
its own paradigm based on the theory of human security (Coyne 2014; 
Black 2016; Bradford et al. 2016; James et al. 2017; Picciotto 2017; 
Rubenstein 2017; Weber, Fishwick & Marmo 2016). The theory of human 
security posits that intelligence considerations go beyond the use of state 
power (Lawson 2003, pp. 89-91), partly because of the rise of the 
‘pluralisation’ of policing, or the provision of policing services from non-law 
enforcement agencies (Bradley & Sedgwick 2009; Crawford 2005; de 
Maillard & Zagrodzki 2017; Newburn 2003; O’Neill & Fyfe 2017; Terpstra 
2017; van Steden 2017). The paradigm of human security within law 
enforcement holds that ‘intelligence’ is aimed towards proactively seeking 
to better understand the causes of insecurity, with less of a focus of 
reacting to insecurities (Broll 2016; Bullock 2013; Dupont 2017; Phythian 
2012; Sheptycki 2009, p. 171; Wall 2007). 
Whilst there is a discernible agreement within intelligence literature 
regarding the aim of the field being directed to: a) reducing uncertainty and 
b) assisting decision-makers make an informed decision on how to 
respond to or shape the security environment (Bammer 2010; CIA 2009; 
Eck, Clarke & Petrossian 2013; Fingar 2011a; Ratcliffe 2016; Weiss 2007; 
Wheaton & Richey 2015), there has been some challenges in defining the 
profession (Walsh 2011); for example, whether intelligence is a tool to 
explain (a scientific approach) or understand (an interpretive approach) 
the security environment (Walsh 2011, p. 283). These distinct aims stem 
from a bifurcating choice between the ‘positivist’ position and the 
‘interpretivist’ perspective on understanding intelligence. Methodologically, 
the positivist position concentrates on describing and explaining 
phenomena (Johnson 2006a; Lillbacka 2013; Mackenzie 2011; Ryan 
2015; Walsh 2011, p. 283-285; Zohar 2013), whereas the interpretivist 
view focuses on an understanding and interpretation of the objects in 
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question (Carson et al. 2001, p. 6; Grant & Giddings 2002; Moini 2011; 
Xinping 2002).  
The intelligence field is constituted by a broad church of 
practitioners, but in an attempt to satisfy such a diverse tradition, Patrick 
Walsh outlined three core characteristics which arguably represent the 
foundation of the intelligence profession: the ‘intelligence environment’ 
(the focus of the collection and analysis), ‘secrecy’ (covert action and 
collection) and ‘surveillance’ (observing the subjects in question) (Walsh 
2011, p. 29). Other scholars, such as Jerry Ratcliffe, have observed similar 
models for defining the intelligence enterprise, such as his ‘3-I’s model 
covering the following elements: interpret the environment, inform 
decision-making, impact on the environment (Ratcliffe 2004). Kahn, an 
historian in cryptology, emphasises that ‘intelligence’ should have an 
impact on the environment, by accurately perceiving the nature of threats, 
so as to ‘optimize one’s resources’ (cited in Pringle Jr 2015, p. 843). While 
much attention has been devoted to outlining the importance of adequate 
collection – or sufficient information and data on the identified subject – it 
is important to acknowledge that at the heart of ‘intelligence’ is the process 
and product of analysis (Agrell 2002; Bruce & George 2008; Davis 1995; 
Fini 2004; Herbert 2013; Horelick 1964; Pfautz et al. 2006; Phythian 
2017).  
Organizationally, the central role of the analyst within the 
intelligence community was outlined by the former Director of Central 
Intelligence at the CIA, William Colby, who observed that ‘At the center of 
the intelligence machine lies the analyst, and he [sic] is the fellow to whom 
all the information goes so that he can review it and think about it and 
determine what it means’ (Colby 1992, p. 21). As the information and data 
is collected, the analyst then engages in the process of interpreting that 
information and data (Johnson 1996, p. 657). If the intelligence enterprise 
can be characterised as a knowledge-building activity, then analysts can 
be understood as the ‘knowledge workers’ (Brodeur & Dupont 2006). The 
analyst must decide, based on often incomplete, ambiguous or deceptive 
information, whether a threat exists and assess its precise nature (Knorr, 
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1979, p. 70). The intelligence product then allows for the decision-maker 
to optimize their resources (Kahn cited in Pringle Jr 2015, p. 843). The 
focus of the work of the analyst, within the organisation, is shaped by the 
aims set by that organisation. These aims can broadly cover the following 
categories: 1. Prescriptive models require analysts to represent how 
systems could work; for example, engineers use this model to outline how 
a structure could be built; or within political science to provide clarity 
regarding how a political organisation could operate. 2. Descriptive models 
are used to understand a given situation and the way it functions; this 
could involve describing the parts of a system and how they behave 
together. 3. Predictive or exploratory models represent the fashion by 
which a dynamic system could function in the future, under certain 
circumstances (Waltz 2014, pp. 2-3). 
Moving beyond the broad aims of intelligence, it is necessary to 
outline aspects of the activities of analysts – being principally the business 
of analysis itself. Precisely what steps are followed within ‘intelligence 
analysis’ to deliver assessments and judgments is elusive or defies clear 
articulation (Gentry 2016; Herbert 2013; James et al. 2017; Kreuzer 2016; 
Lowenthal & Marks 2015; Zafeirakopoulos 2014). This is arguably 
because publications on this topic do little to provide definitive guidance as 
to what universally accepted actions comprise analysis and the purposes 
these actions are designed to support (Eck, Clarke & Petrossian 2013, p. 
10). In a broad sense, Lord Butler in his 2004 report on Weapons of Mass 
Destruction outlined the aims of ‘intelligence analysis’ in terms of providing 
‘validation’ and ‘assessment’ (Butler 2004, p. 5). The process of 
‘validation’ is aimed towards ensuring the collection of information and 
data is accurate (Barnes 2016; Butler 2004, p. 9; Howis 2015; Jones 1993; 
Pringle Jr 2015; Smith 2014). Following the validation phase is the efforts 
towards providing ‘assessments’, a process generally conducted by 
subject matter experts, involving the assemblage of intelligence reports 
into the meaningful context of the security environment (Butler 2004, p. 10; 
Clarke 2013; Gainor & Bouthillier 2014; Marrin 2016; Pherson & Beebe 
2015). It is widely acknowledged within the intelligence field that ‘analysis’ 
  22
in terms of the aims of ‘validation’ or ‘assessment’ does not impart 
judgments of certainty (Bammer 2010; Butler 2004, p. 15; CIA 2009; 
Fingar 2011a; Phythian 2012; Posner 2006). This acknowledgement is 
based on the recognition that evidence and clues are sometimes 
incomplete, ambiguous, or deceptive and the world of human affairs is 
often contingent on a range of (largely indeterminate) factors (Agrell & 
Treverton 2015; Hicks 2013; Hoffman et al. 2011; Marrin 2013; 
Puvathingal & Hantula 2012; Townsley, Mann & Garrett 2011; Zegart 
2009).  
With respect to navigating the complex security environment, 
intelligence analysis as a field has drawn on a series of disciplines and 
social research methodologies, ranging from how to best understand 
political behaviours to illicit drug markets (Bruce & George 2008; Chauvin 
& Fischhoff 2011; Sinclair 2010; Walsh 2011). The field of intelligence has 
a strong alignment to that of a ‘social science’, an acknowledgement which 
can be observed by Sherman Kent, one of the earliest pioneers in the field 
at the CIA. As Kent observed, ‘…the social sciences are very largely 
constituting the subject matter of strategic intelligence’ (Kent 1949, p. 
156). Whilst there are methods and aspects of intelligence that involve the 
‘hard’ sciences, it is at heart a social science in many of its core 
characteristics (Chauvin & Fischhoff 2011; Dupont 2017; Fingar 2011b; 
Hudson 2009; Phythian 2017; Tang 2017; Walsh 2011, p. 287). To the 
extent to which ‘intelligence analysis’ can be understood as a practice in 
social science, this raises the question whether analytical methods can 
accurately measure variables, and therefore what can really be definitively 
‘known’ in the intelligence context (Hall & Citrenbaum 2010; Phythian 
2017; Walsh 2012, p. 244).  
In relation to the acknowledgement that intelligence analysis is 
largely devoted to exploring epistemological considerations, from what 
is known to that which is not known, it is not surprising that there is a 
strong interest in viewing aspects of analysis psychologically (Heuer 
1999; Hoffman et al. 2011; Kan et al. 2013; Puvathingal & Hantula 
2012; Wastell, Clark & Duncan 2006). This is particularly the case with 
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reference to understanding cognition within analysis (Hudson 2009; 
Manjikian 2013; Waltz 2014, p. 1). Analysts are required to be sensitive 
not just to the conclusions they arrive at, but also to how they reached 
such knowledge claims. As Heuer observed: 
Intelligence analysts should be self-conscious about their reasoning 
processes. They should think about how they make judgments and 
reach conclusions, not just about the judgments and conclusions 
themselves (Heuer 1999, p. 31). 
In this psychological sense, intelligence analysis is an activity which 
engages in ‘meta-cognition’, or as Mark Lowenthal remarks, ‘thinking 
about thinking’ (Lowenthal cited in Moore 2007, p. 8). The psychological 
features of intelligence analysis are one of the most widely accepted 
aspects within this field and are featured prominently in the literature 
(Agrell & Treverton 2015; Bang 2017; Coulthart 2017a; Evans & Kebbell 
2012; Gentry 2014; Hare & Coghill 2016; Kreuzer 2016; Lowenthal 2013; 
Marchio 2014; Pherson & Beebe 2015; Phythian 2017).  
Given that the practice of intelligence analysis is based around 
knowledge claims, evidence, and clues (Agrell 2002; Clare 2012; Johnson 
2010; Ratcliffe 2014), it has been generally acknowledged that the types 
of reasoning employed throughout the analysis process can profoundly 
influence the judgments generated by the analysis (Bruce 2008, p. 135; 
Fingar 2011b; Heuer 1999; Lahneman & Arcos 2017; Lillbacka 2013; 
Lowenthal & Marks 2015; Phythian 2017; Tan 2014; Zohar 2013). The 
intelligence scholar Edward Waltz outlines the broad reasoning processes 
involved in intelligence analysis in terms of the distinctions between 
analysis and synthesis (Waltz 2003, p. 16). Analysis meaning the 
movement from presumed effects (the imagined solution) backwards – by 
searching for antecedent causes which could deliver the effect. This 
process is followed until the causes are known for being responsible for 
the effect. Demonstrating that the effect is caused by the proposed 
process amounts to validating the hypothesis. Synthesis, in contrast, 
proceeds by already knowing the causes, and constructing or assembling 
the cause-to-effect chain which proves the hypothesis (Waltz 2003, p. 
160). The final outcome of this process is the intelligence analysis product 
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which can be the representation of static content or dynamic relationships 
of the objects in question, in relation to the security environment (Coulthart 
2017a; Dunn 2012; Eck, Clarke & Petrossian 2013; Goodman & Omand 
2008; Odom 2008; Prunckun 2015; Vandepeer 2011b; Waltz 2003, p. 3).  
 With respect to more clearly acknowledging the different types of 
‘evidence’ which may be drawn upon within the field of intelligence 
analysis, Pherson and Pherson refer to Schum’s schema (2001), outlining 
six main types of evidence in intelligence analysis (Pherson & Pherson 
2012, pp. 90-92). These types of evidence are as follows: 
1) Tangible evidence: direct observation, and consists of such 
materials as original documents, pictures, or physical objects. 
2) Authoritative evidence: scientific data such as the periodic table of 
elements and tidal charts, government records such as birth and 
death certificates, property records and motor vehicle records. 
3) Testimonial evidence: reports of a development, conversation or 
event by an observer or participant in the activity. 
4) Circumstantial evidence: conclusions that rest on some 
observations plus assumptions that the analyst has made. 
5) Negative Evidence: information that falsifies or is not consistent with 
a hypothesis. 
6) Missing Evidence: information that one would expect if a hypothesis 
were to be verified, but which has not been found (at least 
presently). 
Great expertise is central to clearly identifying the most credible 
clues and evidence, along with making reliable and accurate judgments 
and assessments (Bruce & George 2008; Dahl 2012; Hicks 2013; Kreuzer 
2016; Martin et al. 2011b; Mole 2012; Moore, Krizan & Moore 2005; 
Phythian 2017; Waltz 2014). For example, there was more evidence 
indicating at the time that Saddam Hussein had WMDs (Dahl 2014; Jervis 
2006, p. 14) compared to the meagre evidence that Osama Bin Laden 
was in a hidden compound in Abbottabad (Intelligence analysis in the 21st 
century 2016). As remarked by Robert Jervis, it is sometimes the case 
that, in the intelligence world, scenarios which have the least amount of 
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evidence can turn out to be the closest to the truth (Jervis 2010a). This 
general acknowledgement regarding the difficulties facing analysts in their 
core task of understanding the reliability and credibility of evidence and 
clues is captured by Roberta Wolhstetter’s summary of the failure to 
predict and prevent the Pearl Harbor attack:  
After the event … a signal is always crystal clear; we can now see 
what disaster it was signalling since the disaster has occurred. But 
before the event it is obscure and pregnant with conflicting meanings 
(Wolhstetter 1962, p. 387).  
The goal of intelligence analysis is the provision of reliable and 
credible assessments to demarcate truth from falsehoods and sometimes 
reveal deception (Corkill 2011, p. 8). Whilst this objective is clear, in 
practice this aim has been described by intelligence scholars and 
practitioners as being at times elusive (Dahl 2017; Ellis-Smith 2016; Hicks 
2013; Jensen 2018; Intelligence analysis in the 21st century 2016). 
Government reports and academic articles into ‘failures of intelligence’ 
often refer to analytical shortcomings in terms of not sufficiently making the 
epistemological distinctions between knowledge claims based on 
inferences and belief, in contrast to more objective and credible 
knowledge (Betts 2009; Cooper 2005; Hatch 2013; Lahneman & Arcos 
2017; Marrin 2011a; Pritchard & Goodman 2008; Shelton 2011; Smith 
2014; Vrist Rønn 2014). For example, being mindful of the epistemological 
difference between what one knows and what one believes can test the 
mettle of the best analysts (Agrell 2012; Herbert 2006, p. 667; Westera et 
al. 2013; Puvathingal & Hantula 2012; Smith 2017). The former US 
Secretary of Defence Donald Rumsfeld made the now famous observation 
regarding ‘known unknowns’ and ‘unknown unknowns’. One of the points 
Rumsfeld was making was that for any given intelligence problem there 
are an indefinite quantity of unknown facts, some of which are relevant 
and others which are not. The central task of the analyst is to identify the 
relevant ‘knowns’ and possible ‘unknowns’, whilst also being aware they 
do not know all the unknowns (Evans & Kebbell 2012; Knorr-Cetina 1999; 
Lowenthal 2014; Moore 2007). 
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A core aim of intelligence analysis is an activity of transitioning from 
‘knowing’ to ‘understanding’ (Ellis-Smith 2016, p. 36). ‘Knowing’ refers to 
identifying what pieces of the puzzle are relevant (Trent, Patterson & 
Woods 2007; Hoffman et al. 2011; Lowenthal 2011; Mole 2012; Nolan 
2012); ‘understanding’ involves recognising the most salient pieces of 
information and fixing them in context to the whole picture (Bar-Joseph 
2010; Dahl 2017; Puvathingal & Hantula 2012; Warner 2017; Zohar 2013). 
The merits of discovering new clues or evidence are only valuable in terms 
of contributing to understanding the context of the security environment 
(Brown 2007, p. 339; Marrin 2012b; Martin et al. 2011a; Pherson 2013; 
Ryan 2006; Treverton & Gabbard 2008; Wirtz 2014a). Understanding 
provides a greater perception of the objects, persons or groups, or 
locations within the context of the security environment. Such 
understanding is only valuable if it is communicated effectively and in a 
timely manner (Agrell & Treverton 2015; Bruce & George 2008, p. 10; 
Clarke 2013; Davis et al. 2015; Ellis-Smith 2016; Marrin 2017). 
‘Understanding’ translates to proving decision-makers with either a) insight 
– knowing how and/or why something is happening, and/or b) foresight – 
using gained insights to anticipate what may plausibly occur in the future 
(Ministry of Defence 2010; Hare & Coghill 2016; Westera et al. 2013; 
Wippl 2014). 
 The intelligence analysis discipline is most certainly plural (Evans & 
Kebbell 2012; James et al. 2017; Kreuzer 2016; Lowenthal & Marks 2015; 
Peters & Cohen 2017; Treverton & Gabbard 2008, p. 3). In the military 
context, the aims of analysis could be directed towards penetrating the 
secrets, capabilities, and intentions of states, to short-term tactical analysis 
to support current operations in an effort to protect assets and resources 
on the battlefield (Bang 2017; Coyne 2014; Czerwinski 1998; Evans 2009; 
Mole 2012; van Riper 2006; Wahlert 2012). In the law enforcement field, 
intelligence analysis is oriented towards uncovering, disrupting and 
potentially (or even ultimately) prosecuting criminal behaviour (Evans & 
Kebbell 2012; James et al. 2017; Silverman 2007; Townsley, Mann & 
Garrett 2011; Wall 2007). For national security, intelligence analysis can 
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assist with planning for the future, by identifying emerging trends and the 
nature or levels of risk (real or perceived) posed by threat actors, either of 
state or non-state entities (Fishbein & Traverton 2004; Goodman 2009; 
Hare & Coghill 2016; Howis 2015; Manningham-Buller 2005). Analysts 
may be directed to pierce the shroud of secrecy—and sometimes 
deception—that state and non-state actors use to mislead (Fournie 2004; 
Pherson 2013; Picornell 2013; CIA 2009, p. 1; Smith 2014; Whitney 2005).  
The intelligence cycle 
A common reference made around the discipline of intelligence analysis 
concerns the ‘intelligence cycle’. The intelligence cycle constitutes a 
methodology that is traditionally presented or described as a sequential 
process (George 2011; Hatch 2013; Herman 1996, p. 56; Hulnick 2006; 
Johnson 2009; Phythian 2013). The intelligence cycle is intended to 
present the analyst with a series of steps to guide their analytical activities 
(Quarmby & Young 2010, p. 12). This process is graphically represented 
below. 
 
Figure 1: The Intelligence Cycle 
(Johnson 1986, p. 2) 
The fundamental aim of the intelligence cycle is the process of 
breaking down the information and data to their essential respective 
components, then constructing meaning from those data sets (Baartz 
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2005; Hatch 2013; Holmes 1992; Kreuzer 2016; Mitchell 2005). The cycle 
is partly designed to assist analysts to ‘cope with epistemic complexity’ 
(Herbert 2006, p. 667; Heuer 1999; Richards & Pherson 2010). This model 
or process generally takes the following form: 1) identifying the 
requirements of the customers who will consume the intelligence products; 
2) collecting ‘raw’ information and data as required, potentially via human 
sources, electronic communication signals, imagery and geospatial 
intelligence; 3) processing the collected information and data to further 
assist with the analysis phase; 4) analysis of the raw information and data 
to generate a ‘finished’ intelligence product; 5) dissemination of the 
product to the consumers (Tan 2014, p. 219). The process also includes 
feedback from the policymakers concerning how effective and useful the 
product was for their needs (Evans 2009; Lowenthal 2014, pp. 54-67). As 
observed by the practice of intelligence analysts, the ‘intelligence cycle’ is 
not generally sequential as traditionally articulated or visually represented 
(Corkill 2011; Gill 2009; Hulnick 2006; Johnson 2009; Lowenthal & Marks 
2015; Martinez-Conesa et al. 2017; Waltz 2003). Instead, the analyst is 
constantly in a never-ending conversation with policy makers and 
collectors over events and developments (Dahl 2012; Ellis-Smith 2016; 
Howis 2015; Kreuzer 2016; Marrin 2003a, p. 623; Quarmby & Young 
2010, p. 15).  
The ‘intelligence cycle’ has been recognised by some as 
representing a ‘scientifically founded methodology’ (Lillbacka 2013, p. 305; 
Marrin & Torres 2017; Prunckun 2015). As Prunckun observes, ‘Scientific 
methods of inquiry are founded on the steps of the intelligence cycle – 
problem formulation, data collection, data collation, analysis (including 
hypothesis testing), and dissemination’ (Prunckun 2014, p. 68). On the 
other hand, others have claimed that since the process of accurately 
identifying and perceiving risks cannot be always codified, the ‘intelligence 
cycle’ is best understood as involving both ‘art’ and ‘science’ (Cain 2012, 
p. 137; Evans & Kebbell 2012; George 2010; Hulnick 2006; Johnson 2010; 
Mudd 2015). One of the key observations within the ‘art’ versus ‘science’ 
debates regarding the defining characteristic of ‘intelligence’ and 
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‘intelligence analysis’, is the acknowledgement by some that without a 
universally accepted definition, analysts may fluctuate between the goals 
of science – dedicated to objectivity and rigour – or art – being open to 
possibilities and creativity (Jensen 2018; Kerbel 2008; Lowenthal & Marks 
2015; Moore 2007; Wirtz 2014a). This leads into a broader discussion 
regarding how to best characterise the nature of ‘intelligence’, specifically 
in relation to arguments as to whether it is an ‘art’ or a ‘science’, or some 
combination of both. 
Intelligence analysis as ‘Art’ 
Prominent scholars in the area of intelligence analysis have identified a 
lack of research into the value of non-structured or ‘artistic’ methods and 
ways of understanding and advancing intelligence analysis (Bang 2017; 
Corkill 2011; Coulthart 2016; Dreisbach 2011; Lahneman & Arcos 2017; 
Marrin 2012c, p. 540; Wirtz 2014a). Closely related to this general 
acknowledgment is the underlying question regarding whether intelligence 
analysis should be accepted as an ‘art’, drawing largely on subjective and 
intuitive judgments (Alschuler 2007; Horan 2007; Jensen 2018; Khalsa 
2009; Lahneman & Arcos 2017; Wirtz 2014a), or a ‘science’, characterised 
by largely structured and systematic analytic methods (Coulthart 2016; 
Folker 2000, p. 6; Marrin 2005; Marrin 2017; Prunckun 2015; Random 
1958; Vandepeer 2011b). Advocates of intelligence analysis as an ‘art’ 
(Betts 2009, pp. 9-10; Cain 2012; Gill 2009; Hicks 2013; Jensen 2018; 
Martinez-Conesa et al. 2017; Mudd 2015; Schum 1987) argue that since 
the variables are so complex and indeterminate, analysing them using 
allegedly scientific methods constitutes a pseudoscience (Betts 1987, p. 
338; Innes, Fielding & Cope 2005; Wirtz 2012). For analysts to develop 
and exercise their substantive expertise requires acknowledging that such 
judgments depend to a degree on exercising their intuitive skills (Betts 
2009; Bruce & George 2008; Carson 2009; Evans & Kebbell 2012; 
Lahneman & Arcos 2017; Wastell, Clark & Duncan 2006). Those who 
promote intelligence analysis as an art emphasise the methodological 
value of the logic of induction and empiricism, by paying closer attention to 
changing patterns that enhance or can draw on the intuitive function of the 
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analyst (Czerwinski 1998, p. 139; Dahl 2017; Lahneman & Arcos 2017; 
O’Connor & McDermott 1997a; Wastell, Clark & Duncan 2006).  
In contrast, there are those who view intelligence analysis as more 
of a ‘science’, placing greater emphasis on the logic of deduction, 
particularly regarding the value accorded to subject matter experts and 
their respective theoretical models for understanding and explaining 
aspects of the security environment (Bruce & George 2008; Clarke 2013; 
Johnson 2003; Marrin 2011b; Moore, Krizan & Moore 2005; Warner 2017). 
The ‘artistic’ elements of intelligence analysis refers to more personal or 
localized considerations of the analyst’s instinct, education, and 
experience (Corkill 2011; Czerwinski 1998, p. 139; Dexter, Phythian & 
Strachan-Morris 2017; Mudd 2015; Pherson 2013; Wirtz 2012). This 
acknowledgement of the roles of instinct, education and experience of the 
analyst are recognised as being important for their respective analysis 
because it is these features that constitute the foundations of ‘expertise’, 
particularly regarding ‘skilful’ analytical judgments (Breckenridge 2010; 
Bruce & George 2008; Evans & Kebbell 2012; Goodman & Omand 2008; 
Hegarty 2000; Moran 2016; O’Connor & McDermott 1997a; United Nations 
Office on Drugs and Crime 2011; Wheaton 2011; Wirtz 2014b).  
With respect to the general acknowledgement that intelligence 
analysis is largely a cognitive activity, involving some elements of ‘artistic 
expertise’, the field of cognitive psychology further articulates and 
substantiates this claim. In relation to the nature of perception and pattern 
recognition, this psychological process is more characteristically intuitive 
and ‘artistic’ – a view which is accepted by some intelligence scholars 
(Galotti 2017; Kałamała et al. 2017; Kan et al. 2013; Martin 2012; Steen & 
Kastelle 2012; Varela, Thompson & Rosch 2017; Vrist Rønn 2014; 
Wagemans et al. 2012; Wastell 2010). Studies into decision-making within 
psychology – acknowledged within the intelligence field – further indicate 
that intelligence analysts, involved in making decisions, engage in 
processes that are characteristically non-structured (and therefore non-
scientific) and ‘intuitive’ (Czerwinski 1998; Dexter, Phythian & Strachan-
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Morris 2017; Dreisbach 2011; Folker 2000; Gladwell 2011; Kan et al. 
2013; Lerner 2007; Rosenbaum 2007). 
Pioneers within cognitive science and decision-making processes, 
Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman, revealed in their studies in the 
1970s and 1980s that people routinely use heuristics and intuition to make 
decisions (Coulthart 2016, p. 11; Kahneman 1973, 2003, 2011; Kahneman 
& Tversky 1982; Martin 2012; Tversky & Kahneman 1971, 1973, 1975). 
Structured thinking is not the ‘natural’ way the human mind works 
(Gilovich, Griffin & Kahneman 2002; Jones 2009, p. 8; Martin 2012; Martin 
et al. 2011a). Studies into the decision-making processes of intelligence 
analysts have generally revealed that analysts use a more non-structured 
and ‘intuitive’ style or approach to analysis (Bruce 2008; Coulthart 2016; 
Feltz 2008; Khalsa 2009; Martin et al. 2011a; Phythian 2017). Taken 
together, such acknowledgements indicate there is merit to the position 
that intelligence analysis can be partly characterised as involving ‘artistic’ 
features.  
Intelligence analysis as ‘Science’ 
An understanding of intelligence analysis with a view to make it a more 
scientific enterprise became even more popular after the 9/11 attacks in 
the United States (Agrell & Treverton 2015, pp. 1-15; Bruce 2008, pp. 171-
190; Coulthart 2017a; Marrin & Torres 2017). Gormley captures this 
sentiment by stating that ‘The chief analytic shortcoming… is the decidedly 
unscientific nature of the intelligence community’s approach to analysis’ 
(Gormley 2004, p. 14). The desire to make the ‘tradecraft’ of intelligence 
analysis more ‘scientific’, by adopting so-called scientific principles and 
methods, has a long history. Some of the earliest writings in the field, 
including from Sherman Kent (a seminal figure in the CIA, previously a 
professor in History) advocated scientific methods not only to understand 
certain problems but to make verifiable assessments (Agrell 2012, p. 130; 
Kent 1949). Such early thinkers, such as R.A. Random, strongly 
disapproved of intuition – as Random wrote in 1958 that the rejection of 
the scientific methodology in favour of intuition would be like abandoning 
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rationality in favour of ‘intuitive guesses and unanalysed conjectures’ 
(Random 1958, p. 2). Other intelligence scholars have argued that the 
scientific method provides the underlying method for intelligence analysis 
(Wilcox cited in Laqueur 1983; Marrin 2012c, p. 531). Outlining the popular 
perception of science, as understood broadly speaking by some within 
intelligence, will serve as a useful reference point. The intelligence scholar 
Washington Platt noted in 1957: 
The so-called ‘scientific method’ means different things to different 
people, but the basic features are much the same. These features are: 
collection of data, formation of hypotheses, testing the hypotheses, 
and so arriving at conclusions based on the foregoing which can be 
used as reliable sources of prediction (Platt 1957, p. 75).  
As Stephen Marrin and Jonathan Clemente have observed: 
…the intelligence analysis process, though an approximation of the 
scientific method, does not parallel it exactly because no experiments 
are possible in the international arena. Yet, most writers who focus on 
analytic tradecraft – whether they realise it or not – portray the 
intelligence analysis process as a version of the scientific method 
(Marrin & Clemente 2005, p. 711). 
This view that intelligence analysis can be considered a 
methodology approximating the scientific method (Marrin 2003a, p. 623; 
Schum 1987), is generally considered ‘scientific’ to the degree in which the 
process is ‘systematic’ and ‘logical’ (Agrell & Treverton 2015; Howis 2015; 
Prunckun 2014, p. 68; Wirtz 2014b; Ylikoski 2017). This notion is observed 
by Martin et al.: ‘As a science, intelligence analysis is a systematic 
process, which generates and tests hypotheses objectively. Following the 
scientific method, analysts adhere to rules to develop sound and logical 
judgments’ (Martin et al. 2011b, p. 30).  
 A common argument for making intelligence analysis more 
systematic, and thereby allegedly more scientific, can be found in various 
academic quarters (Agrell & Treverton 2015; Coulthart 2016; Folker 2000; 
Prunckun 2014). According to some, the intelligence analysis field could 
benefit from adopting structured techniques within analysis as a means of 
becoming partly more ‘scientific’ (Artner, Girven & Bruce 2016; CIA 2009; 
Coulthart 2016; Folker 2000, pp. 1-2; Gendron 2012; Pherson 2013; 
Spielmann 2014). The purported benefits of aligning intelligence analysis 
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more closely with ‘scientific’ standards and processes would be the 
transition from a ‘tradecraft’, characterised as ad-hoc processes and 
standards, to a modern ‘profession’, possessing a more disciplined and 
systematic methodology (Agrell 2012; Gentry 2016; Kreuzer 2016; Marrin 
2007a, p. 7; 2017; Prunckun 2015). 
Marrin contrasts the scientific, structured methods with analytic 
techniques which are not structured (Marrin 2007a, p. 7). These non-
structured methods are viewed as being essentially ‘intuitive’, 
characterised broadly as an ‘instinct’ or ‘gut feeling’, which do not 
demonstrate explicit reasoning processes (Brock 2015; Dreisbach 2011; 
Folker 2000; Horan 2007; Kan et al. 2013; Lerner 2007; Martin et al. 
2011b). Importantly, the extent to which the analytical process is made 
explicit or externalised (in writing or graphically) has been observed by 
some as making such analytical methodologies more ‘scientific’ (Coulthart 
2016; Johnson 2005; Marrin 2007a; Spielmann 2014; Townsley, Mann & 
Garrett 2011) – unlike intuitive forms of analysis which are largely non-
explicit. As will be examined in greater depth in Chapter 3 around 
structured analytical techniques, or SATs, such analytical tools are aimed 
towards making the process of analysis more scientific. These techniques 
may include exercises such as Alternative Competing Hypothesis or ACH. 
ACH involves the systematic consideration of different hypotheses 
(Pherson 2005). Other techniques include Devil’s Advocacy, which 
involves imagining plausible counter-arguments which may challenge or 
undermine the main contention, or Key Assumptions Check, an exercise 
engaged in checking the veracity of key assumptions (Pherson 2005). 
These techniques are offered by some intelligence scholars and 
practitioners as ways for developing analysis along more ‘scientific’ 
principles by making the process more transparent and systematic 
(Coulthart 2016; Marrin 2007a; Pherson & Beebe 2015; Prunckun 2015; 
Richards & Pherson 2010). Adding structure or methodological ways for 
explicitly examining issues within intelligence analysis is aimed towards 
making the process and the product more ‘scientific’, which will be 
examined in greater depth in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 respectively.  
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Professional and institutional efforts to improve law enforcement, 
particularly with reference to the broad strategy of ‘intelligence-led’ policing 
–which offers policing units a more systematic approach for understanding 
and responding to the security environment (Ericson & Shearing 1986; 
James et al. 2017; Jerry Ratcliffe & McCullagh 2001; Peters & Cohen 
2017; Ratcliffe 2016; Townsley, Mann & Garrett 2011) – can be 
understood as an aim to align law enforcement work flows and practices 
along ‘scientific’ principles. As intended within the aims of science, 
intelligence analysis has been viewed as a means by which police 
resources can better understand how, when and why crimes are occurring 
(Bradley & Sedgwick 2009; Cope 2004; James et al. 2017; Manning 2001; 
Prunckun 2013). The process of the ‘rationalisation’ of policing (Manning 
2001; O'Malley 2016) has shaped policing services to become more cost-
effective by targeting limited resources towards identified risks (Ericson & 
Haggerty 1997; Knutsson 2017; Lewandowski, Carter & Campbell 2017; 
Maguire 2000; Scott 2017). In a broader historical sense, the development 
around ‘intelligence-led’ policing emerged from a significant shift from 
reactive policing measures to a more proactive approach (Evans & 
Kebbell 2012; Gill 2000; Johnson 2000; Maguire 2000; Sheptycki 2009; 
Wall 2007). This arguably represents an alignment of law enforcement 
practices with the broad aims of science, particularly regarding attempts to 
develop a clearer understanding of the underlying principles (perceived or 
real) to recognise and shape the security environment.  
Education and training 
The ‘art’ vs. ‘science’ debate contains a subset of the more general 
question regarding the type of education and training intelligence analysts 
should receive (Dahl 2012; Gormley 2004; Hart & Simon 2006, pp. 35-60; 
Modern Intelligence Analysis 2011). One of the educational reforms in 
intelligence analysis within the US, specifically within the CIA, was the 
creation of the Sherman Kent School and the Career Analyst Program. 
The School was designed in mid-2002 to teach new analysts methods and 
techniques to improve the production of more accurate analysis (Davis 
2002b; Wheeler 2015). This was the first comprehensive training program 
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for intelligence analysts in the US (Davis 2002b). A core focus of this 
program has been developing more systematic approaches to analysis, 
‘by structuring their analysis more along the lines of the scientific method’ 
(Marchio 2014; Marrin 2003a, p. 609).  
The former Director of the CIA George Tenet described the 
importance of an analyst’s expertise coming down to the right training and 
education, combining rigor and insight to produce sound analysis (Tenet 
2000). The analyst’s insight comes from their capacity to adhere to 
procedural and disciplinary expertise (Kreuzer 2016; Lowenthal & Marks 
2015; Mudd 2015). Analysts are guided by the logic of induction and 
deduction in this process (Marrin 2003a, p. 623).  
With respect to the education and training of analysts and aligning 
such processes with scientific professions, some intelligence scholars 
have argued that intelligence analysis can benefit from learning from the 
medical field and the adoption of similar models of diagnosis (Kerbel 2008; 
Manjikian 2013, p. 1). Richards Heuer, a preeminent figure within the 
intelligence field, pointed towards the medical field as a profession that 
could be emulated. As he states (Heuer 1999, p. 62), the doctor observes 
the symptoms of the patient, and by using their specialised knowledge of 
the body, a hypothesis is generated to explain such observations, followed 
by tests to collect further information to evaluate the hypothesis and make 
a diagnosis. This medical analogy focuses attention on the capacity to 
correctly identify and evaluate all plausible hypotheses. In this sense, 
collection is focused narrowly on information that could reveal alternative 
hypotheses. As Heuer stated, ‘While analysis and collection are both 
important, the medical analogy attributes more value to analysis and less 
to collection than the mosaic metaphor’ (Heuer 1999, p. 62). The rationale 
for large technical collection systems has been explained as being a 
consequence of the ‘mosaic theory of intelligence’, in which a clearer 
picture of reality is derived from the assemblage of pieces of information 
into a ‘mosaic or jigsaw puzzle’ (Marrin 2003b, pp. 40–59). The medical 
analogy attributes more value to analysis and less to collection, compared 
to the mosaic metaphor (Heuer 1999, p. 62). 
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Whilst it has been acknowledged that both the intelligence and 
medical professions hold themselves to high rigorous standards for the 
collection and analysis of information and data (Fingar 2011a, p. 4; 
Manjikian 2013, p. 564), the argument has been made by some 
intelligence scholars that medicine is more of an art than a science 
(Laqueur 1983). Laqueur observes the similarities in the analytical 
processes.  
…the student of intelligence will profit more from contemplating the 
principles of medical diagnosis than immersing himself [sic] in any 
other fields. The doctor and the analyst have to collect and evaluate 
the evidence about phenomena frequently not amenable to direct 
observation. This is done on the basis of indications, science, 
symptoms… The same applies to intelligence (Laqueur 1983, pp. 534-
535)  
The medical diagnostic practice of identifying, collecting, analysing 
and disseminating is arguably similar to the intelligence cycle (Converse & 
Pherson 2008, p. 1). Marrin and Clemente further claimed that both the 
medical and intelligence professionals apply similar general approaches to 
acquire information (Marrin & Clemente 2005, p. 709). Once the analyst 
has collected sufficient data and information this is followed by applying 
relevant disciplines, such as military science, psychology, economics and 
so forth, to better understand the implications of those changes. Such a 
process, according to Marrin and Clemente, is similar to the process 
physicians utilise when diagnosing patients (Marrin & Clemente 2005, p. 
711).  
Another similarity between the medical field and intelligence 
analysis is the challenges both face in integrating the specialists’ specific 
diagnosis or assessment into the broader context (Marrin & Clemente 
2005, p. 713; Oliver 2007; Wirtz 2014a). It has been acknowledged that 
intelligence analysts and medical professionals deal with similar problems, 
ranging from alternative hypotheses to disconfirming evidence (Pherson 
2008, p. 1). Deductive and inductive reasoning are utilised by both fields to 
navigate through such problems, of distinguishing relevant information 
(signals) from irrelevant information (noise) (Marrin & Clemente 2005, p. 
715; Marrin & Torres 2017; Prunckun 2015).  
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Underlying the perceived similarities between intelligence analysis 
and the medical profession is the belief that as more information is 
collected, the practitioner will become more confident in their assessment 
(Treverton 2009, p. 40). Yet even within the medical field, there is an 
acknowledgement from several memoirs and studies that medical 
diagnosis is not necessarily always systematic and the accuracy of 
diagnoses is not necessarily increased with more collected information 
and data (Groopman 2007, p. 36; Mol 2002; Schaler, Lothane & Vatz 
2017). There is some recognition within some quarters of the medical 
profession that the process of diagnosis involves considerations that are 
not characteristically ‘scientific’ or structured, but concern the doctor’s 
bias, craft skills and what Polanyi would refer to as their ‘personal 
knowledge’. The post-structuralist Michael Foucault presented a similar 
argument, that the work of the medical doctor is influenced by their 
surrounding culture, to the extent to which they do not ‘discover’ the truth 
‘out there’ but rather assemble it together in their mind, which is partly a 
product of their environment (Manjikian 2008, p. 335). It is overly simplistic 
to understand the work of the doctor or the intelligence analyst as neutral 
observers who merely collect and analyse the ‘facts’ (Manjikian 2013, p. 
571).  
Those scholars who promote the medical profession as a field to 
emulate refer principally to the perceived way the physician engages in a 
structured approach to their work – which lends itself to making it easier to 
teach others (Coulthart 2016; Folker 2000, p. 14; Hoffman et al. 2011; 
Marrin & Torres 2017; Moore, Krizan & Moore 2005). Polanyi, who 
completed training as a physician, argued against this idea that the 
medical profession is highly structured and the learning of this field can be 
easily or even optimally transmitted by explicit knowledge via rules and 
procedures (Doing 2011; Fennell 2016; Johnson 2016; Nye 2011; Polanyi 
1962a). Polanyi provided examples of this, such as the situation in which 
the physician may be able to distinguish epileptic seizures from other 
types of seizures, but they are not necessarily capable of completely 
articulating how they know this (Polanyi 1961, p. 4). This is akin to the 
  38
dilemma facing the analyst as to deciding which particular analytical 
methods are best suited to solving specific types of problems (Criminal 
Intelligence: Manual for Analysts 2011; Heuer 2005, p. 75; Heuer 2008a, 
pp. 7-10; Rodgers 2006, p. 623). As Stephanie Lawson observed, the 
‘facts do not speak for themselves’, but require the individual’s knowledge 
to make sense of all the pieces of information together in context (Lawson 
2008, p. 584). Cooper’s study into the analytical culture in the US 
intelligence community observed that professions such as medicine and 
law refer to themselves as ‘practices’, indicating that the roots of such 
systems (ethics, ethos, skills) are values and skills best transmitted by 
people and learned from practice (Cooper 2005, p. 28). Even within 
scientific fields, including medicine, there remains the important feature of 
learning from other practitioners in that local tradition. Specifically 
regarding the knowledge and skills which are transmitted and understood 
in a ‘tacit’ or non-explicit fashion, as a path to developing expertise in that 
field (Brock 2015; Henry 2010; Quarmby & Young 2010; Scheffer, Baas & 
Bjordam 2017; Vogel 2013a). 
Conclusion 
Importantly, studies into how scientists perform their activities, from 
research to analysis, is generally characterised as being less ‘systematic’ 
and more of a ‘bricolage’ approach (Beveridge 2017; Garfinkel, Lynch & 
Livingstone 1981; Scheffer, Baas & Bjordam 2017; Smedslund 2016; 
Turpin, Garrett-Jone & Rankin 1996). The ‘bricoleur’, as Lynch and 
Woolgar have argued (1990), essentially improvises with a ‘mixed bag of 
tools’ as a means of dealing with a variety of contingencies and situations 
which make experiments work ‘as they should’. In this sense, even within 
the realms of science there are aspects of ‘art’ or ‘artistic’ judgment. Taken 
together, since the work of the intelligence analyst is at times ‘messy and 
contingent’ (Dahl 2017; Davis et al. 2015; Herbert 2013; Innes, Fielding & 
Cope 2005, p. 51; Lowenthal & Marks 2015), rather than being 
‘systematic’ and ‘logical’, it would be perhaps apt to understand the 
activities of analysts as that of an ‘artistic enterprise’, involving aspects of 
both ‘art’ and ‘science’ (Bang 2017; Beveridge 2017; Corkill 2011, p. 9; 
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Hicks 2013; Jensen 2018; Manjikian 2013; Mudd 2015; Phythian 2017; 
Richards 2010; Walsh 2017; Wirtz 2014a). Whilst there has been a 
sustained interest with regard to exploring the nature of intelligence 
analysis, there is no universal consensus regarding how best to 
comprehend the discipline. In particular, there are gaps in the literature 
with respect to the epistemological dimensions of intelligence analysis, in 
terms of both the process of analysis, and the products, or what it means 
to ‘know’ something. Polanyi’s views regarding how scientists engage in 
solving problems will serve to contribute to ways for epistemologically 
discussing and understanding the process and product of intelligence 
analysis. 
  40
Chapter 2: Exposition of Polanyi 
Introduction 
According to some intelligence practitioners and scholars (Folker 2000, p. 
13; Kerbel 2008; Lahneman 2010b; Marrin 2012a; Moore, Krizan & Moore 
2005, p. 211; Wirtz 2012), ‘intelligence analysis’ can be characterised as 
engaging elements of both ‘art’ and ‘science’. Unfortunately, intelligence 
literature does not represent a rich understanding of science, nor much 
guidance on the optimum mixture of the ‘art’ and ‘science’ features (Artner, 
Girven & Bruce 2016; Coulthart 2016, p. 39; Jensen 2018; Johnson 2003; 
Pherson 2013). Such a formula may or may not exist for science or 
intelligence analysis and this thesis is not concerned with exploring what 
this combination could optimally be. The focus of this thesis is to examine 
the way Polanyi’s standpoint of science can contribute towards the 
discourse within intelligence analysis regarding both the process of solving 
problems and a clearer understanding of what it means to ‘know’ 
something as a knowledge product. This chapter does not aim to describe 
all the features included in Polanyi’s view of science. To do so would 
require a thesis entirely dedicated to his thought (Johnson 2016; Kane 
1982; Kiyimba 2009; Peck 2006). The aim of this chapter is to examine 
Polanyi’s views into the nature of science, in particular his concepts of 
‘personal knowledge’ and ‘tacit knowing’, indicating the bearing this has for 
the intelligence analysis profession. Polanyi’s argument that the skills and 
expertise involved in the process of medical diagnosis is ‘… as much an 
art of doing as it is an art of knowing’ (Polanyi 1962a, p. 54) draws 
attention to the importance of sufficiently acknowledging tacit knowing in 
the problem-solving process. The treatment Polanyi gives to the 
relationship between explicit and tacit knowing, along with considerations 
regarding ‘practical knowledge’ and a ‘skilful performance’, provides a 
position that contributes to the discourse within intelligence analysis 
regarding the process of solving problems. Polanyi’s concept of ‘personal 
knowledge’ contributes towards a more nuanced epistemological 
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framework for explaining what it means for analysts to ‘know’ intelligence 
products.  
Whilst it is not within the scope of this thesis to discuss in depth the 
social aspect of tacit knowledge, as understood by Polanyi, it is worth 
briefly acknowledging this feature. Largely because of its mode of 
acquisition, tacit knowledge is deeply personal. Individuals develop and 
acquire their tacit knowledge from practice and from emulating others, 
such as within a master-apprentice relationship. Beyond the personal 
dimension of tacit knowledge is the communal or local aspect of this form 
of knowledge. Tacit knowledge is not exclusively possessed by 
individuals, but also contained within and across social groups. 
Intelligence products generated by intelligence agencies or law 
enforcement typically involve large teams of people whom contribute to 
the tacit knowledge of the group. The final intelligence product should not 
be understood as an outcome of a sole individual but the group as a 
whole, the function of which is partly the contribution of social tacit 
knowledge. Several studies have outlined the local or social aspect of tacit 
knowledge (Cambrosio & Keating 1988; Collins 2001; Kaiser 2005; 
MacKenzie & Spinardi 1995; McNamara 2001; Ouagrham-Gormley & 
Vogel 2010). The creation and production of social tacit knowledge, along 
with the transferring of such knowledge within a local tradition, is 
dependent on social connections between individuals and groups 
(Ouagrham-Gormley 2014, p. 26). Polanyi does offer some arguments 
regarding the optimum conditions for individuals to develop these social 
connections across groups as a way for practitioners to draw on and 
contribute towards the reservoirs of social tacit knowledge (Fischer & 
Mandell 2009; Gulick 2016; Nye 2011; Polanyi 1962a, 1962b). It has been 
acknowledged within the intelligence field that knowledge itself is partly 
socially/organisationally ‘constructed’, which explains sometimes the 
tensions between how different agencies represent knowledge in diverging 
ways (even when based on the same or similar evidence or knowledge) 
(Hunter and MacDonald, 2017; Ingold, 2000; Jensen, 2018; Jervis, 2010). 
The same can also be observed regarding how knowledge is partly 
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politically/socially/organisationally constructed within the scientific 
community (MacKenzie, D & Spinardi, G 1995; Martin, B 2012; 
Massingham, P 2016; Oliver, WR 2007; Ouagrham-Gormley, SB 2014). 
However, it is beyond the scope of this thesis to elaborate on the socio-
political aspects of tacit knowledge and how Polanyi’s concepts that deal 
with this dynamic have a bearing on aspects of intelligence analysis. 
Discovery as the aim of scientific research 
Within the realm of intelligence, epistemological considerations are a key 
focus regarding the accuracy and reliability of assessments and judgments 
(Bang 2017; Dreisbach 2011, pp. 757-792; Herbert 2006, pp. 666-684; 
2013; Lillbacka 2013; Vrist Rønn 2014). Such considerations include an 
interest in exploring whether intelligence analysis is a science or an art, or 
some combination of the two. Polanyi’s view of science can shed light on 
this discussion. What are the main features of science, according to 
Polanyi? In his view, the aim of scientific research is the discovery of new 
facts and laws in the world. For Polanyi, the truth is an objective condition 
and finding the truth is achieved by the correspondence of a theory to an 
objective reality (Jacobs 2001, p. 464). Polanyi dismisses cognitive 
relativism, or the relativity of reality based on our perception (Polanyi 
1962a, pp. 315–16). Polanyi’s outlook of science should not be 
misconceived as being ‘constructivist’ – the idea that reality is 
meaningless and we ‘construct’ the value for it ourselves. Polanyi was 
convinced that there was an objective reality ‘out there’; yet, in order to 
make it intelligible we must attempt to ‘… establish and make our own’ 
interpretation and meaning (Polanyi 1966b, p. 80). This underlying 
engagement of the personal act within the process and product of knowing 
will become clearer in later discussions of his concept of personal 
knowledge. In Science, Faith and Society (Polanyi 1964, pp. 22-25) he 
explained discovery by way of simple analogy: ‘Suppose you wake up at 
night. Curious noises are noticed; speculations about wind, rats, burglars, 
follow’ (Polanyi 1964, p. 23). Eventually one might decide the best 
speculation/hypothesis is that the sounds are those of a burglar. By 
‘drawing together various indications’ (foot falls, for example) the theory 
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(representing the discovery) of the burglar is confirmed (Polanyi 1964, p. 
23). 
According to Polanyi, the process of discovery gets under way  
the very moment when, certain impressions being felt to be unusual 
and suggestive, a problem is presenting itself to the mind; it continues 
with the collection of clues with an eye to a definite line of solving the 
problem; and it culminates in the guess of a definite solution (Polanyi 
1964, p. 25).  
For Polanyi, the process of discovery is an intimate blend of sense 
experience and imagination, of observing, hearing, touching and 
hypothesizing. There is no pure observation as such. It is important to 
acknowledge that this view of science is not universally shared by 
scientists or philosophers of science, as previously observed in the 
Introduction. Polanyi’s views of the practice of science challenge 
conventional thinking around the Positivist position on science and the 
idea of a ‘scientific method’ (Kelleher 2008/2009, p. 8; Creswell & Poth 
2017; Johnson, 2006a, p. 224; Mackenzie, 2011, pp. 543-46; Manjikian, 
2013, pp. 563-67; Ryan, 2015, pp. 417-31). It is precisely because Polanyi 
offers a provocative approach for understanding these epistemological 
issues which can serve to promote discussion within the discourse of 
intelligence analysis. 
For Polanyi, there is hypothesizing behind the very act of 
observation (Polanyi 1951, p. 19). Polanyi cites examples to illustrate this. 
These examples include that of a child, when presented with a series of 
objects on a tray, will notice only those which they have some previous 
familiarity; another example involves the Fuegians, whom were visited by 
Charles Darwin from the Beagle, who noticed the small boats on the 
shore, but did not pay attention to the large ship (the largeness they were 
unfamiliar with), laying at anchor in front of them (Polanyi 1951, p. 19). 
Because there is hypothesizing behind the act of observation, for an 
observer to see an object in one way, for Polanyi, excludes the possibility 
of them seeing it in another way (Polanyi 1951, p. 19). In this sense, 
Polanyi’s understanding of how we perceive further articulates 
conceptually the acknowledgement within the intelligence field that the 
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function of theorising that goes behind and informs observations is key to 
what is perceived; for example, Wolhstetter’s argument that the Pearl 
Harbor attack was not perceived or anticipated by the American military 
because of the accepted theory that the Japanese would not pursue such 
a course of action (Wolhstetter 1962). In a similar spirit, the 9/11 
Commission found the attacks were not prevented partly because of a 
‘failure of imagination’ (Kean & Hamilton 2004, p. 336; Pherson & Beebe 
2015; Ryan 2006; Wastell, Clark & Duncan 2006).  
According to Polanyi, scientific investigations involve a perennial 
interaction of imagination and observation. Polanyi’s burglar example, 
considered above, serves to illustrate a further feature of discovery, being 
the way they are made. A series of empirical clues is presented such as 
curious noises – until one more clue is noticed, and this one proves to be 
decisive. The burglar theory is now established. The key here is guessing, 
and hopefully correctly, as to what theory best represents the subject in 
question. According to Polanyi’s outlook, this is a fundamental aspect of 
science.  
Law enforcement and security agencies are aware that some 
aspect of guesswork is required in the process of problem-solving, since 
there are generally too many targets and ways of undermining security to 
systematically examine every single possible scenario (Gigerenzer & 
Brighton 2007; Ferguson 2012; Horan 2007; Kerr et al. 2005; Lerner 2007; 
Rosenbaum 2007). Whilst the intelligence field acknowledges that it is 
partly engaged in a game of guessing (Alschuler 2007; Bruce & George 
2008; Colapietro 2011, p. 58; Frank 2012; Zafeirakopoulos 2014), the art 
of inquiry as understood by Polanyi provides a richer language and 
epistemological basis for recognising this aspect within both science and 
intelligence analysis. Polanyi’s perspective will be presently outlined. 
 Polanyi draws a distinction between two types of discoveries. There 
is a) assigning the pertinent clues and evidence to the most suitable 
(already existing) theory; and b) uncovering a new aspect of reality, a 
novel type of entity or law of nature that has previously been unknown. 
The intelligence analyst largely engages in the category (a) of making 
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discoveries (Lillbacka 2013; Manjikian 2014; Marrin 2011b). Aligning 
observations and empirical clues to suitable theories still present complex 
challenges to the analyst, even when the already existing threat type is 
known.  
Importantly, in relation to the key role of making discoveries within 
science, Polanyi emphasises that such acts of ‘illumination’ should be 
viewed as being a ‘tentative discovery’ (Polanyi 1962a, p. 121; emphasis 
added), requiring testing and verification. This is because a discovery, in 
the sense that Polanyi means of such acts, may be shown to be mistaken 
once tested (Fennell 2016, pp. 45-6). Polanyi also noted that verification is 
a formal aspect of discovery (Fennell 2016, p. 47). Polanyi argued that 
‘verification’ is a process which is a ‘commitment’ (Polanyi 1962a, p. 215) 
to developing a defensible case for having one’s own claims accepted by 
others (Polanyi 1962a, p. 181). Verification is building a case, based on 
collected evidence, to prove the truth of a theory. Falsification is using 
evidence (or its absence) to reveal the lack of truth of a theory. Scientists 
propose hypotheses that may explain their observations. Once they are 
generally accepted by the scientific community, the hypothesis becomes a 
‘theory’, having passed sufficient tests and observations (Merriam-Webster 
n.d.). It is accepted in science and the intelligence fields that strictly 
speaking theories are never completely ‘proven’, since new evidence may 
come to hand which presents a more accurate theory (Agrell & Treverton 
2015; Ellis-Smith 2016; Kerr et al. 2005; Prunckun 2013, 2015; Tang 
2017).  
Polanyi clarifies that in relation to the distinction between 
hypotheses and theories, the former being a possible proposition to 
explain a phenomenon, it is the latter which ‘… is the universal intent of a 
scientific discovery’ (Polanyi 1966b, p. 78). This is the fundamental goal of 
science broadly speaking. A similar ‘universal intent’ can be found also in 
the realm of intelligence analysis, which can be observed by the significant 
resources allocated to collecting and analysing data and information, as a 
means for discovering, verifying and understanding the objects in 
question. Such efforts to develop a clearer understanding of aspects of the 
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security landscape will allow for decision-makers to optimise their 
resources (Bammer 2010; CIA 2009; Eck, Clarke & Petrossian 2013; 
Fingar 2011a; Ratcliffe 2016; Weiss 2007; Wheaton & Richey 2015). Yet 
importantly there is the acknowledgement within the intelligence field that 
‘theories’ cannot be ‘tested’ in the same definitive way that the hard 
sciences can (Cain 2012, p. 137; Evans & Kebbell 2012; George 2010; 
Hulnick 2006; Johnson 2010; Mudd 2015). In the realm of intelligence, this 
can be observed by the way the US intelligence community has generally 
used ‘practical experience’ rather than ‘formal validation methods’ for 
selecting and using analytical tools (Agrell & Treverton 2015; Coulthart 
2017a; Johnson 2005, p. 72; Martin et al. 2011a; Wirtz 2012). This is 
partly because there are no universally accepted methods for validating 
such analytical tools and to what extent variables can be known and 
therefore tested in the intelligence context (Coulthart 2016; Folker 2000; 
Pherson & Beebe 2015; Townsley, Mann & Garrett 2011; Walsh 2012, p. 
244).  
On the psychological plane of making discoveries, Polanyi 
comments that most of the time the scientist is engaged in fruitless efforts, 
sustained by a passion that takes beating after beating for months on end. 
After much effort, the contours of shapes are revealed at times, which may 
suddenly reveal themselves to be sharp outlines of certainty, only to 
dissolve again with consideration of further experimental observations 
(Polanyi 1964, p. 16). Polanyi conceptually articulates epistemological and 
psychological challenges that are akin to those acknowledged within 
intelligence analysis. For example, intelligence assessments regarding 
Saddam Hussein’s alleged stockpile of WMDs, which turned out to be 
‘dead wrong’ (United States Department of State 2005, p. 2), is illustrative 
of what Polanyi means by the challenges facing scientists 
epistemologically and psychologically. Such a view further articulates the 
extent to which, in relation to psychological considerations, the difficulties 
facing the scientist are similar to those facing the intelligence analyst, as 
has been generally acknowledged within the intelligence field (Agrell & 
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Treverton 2015; Corkill 2011; Hicks 2013; Manjikian 2013; Puvathingal & 
Hantula 2012; Tang 2017; Legrand & Vogel 2012). 
No overarching ‘scientific method’ 
Drusilla Scott’s book Everyman revived: The common sense of Michael 
Polanyi (Scott 1985, p. 30) captured Polanyi’s argument that scientists 
‘cannot work to rule’. To what aspect(s) of Polanyi’s view was she 
referring? Polanyi denies there is any such thing as ‘the scientific method’, 
which is to say there is no single set of method rules that scientists have to 
follow in order to do proper scientific research. Scientific theories (Polanyi 
1952, pp. 218-219) cannot, says Polanyi, be discovered by scientists 
following any set rules and nor can they ‘be verified nor falsified by 
experience according to any definite rule’. According to Polanyi’s view, 
‘Discovery, verification and falsification proceed [according to certain] 
…maxims which cannot be precisely formulated’, and their application 
‘relies in every case’ on the scientist, who decides which maxims to follow, 
being something they have to work out for themselves (Polanyi 1964, p. 
28). There are no definite rules for deriving the truth of a scientific 
proposition from observational data via a process of verification (Polanyi 
1964, p. 29 ).  
In The Logic of Liberty, Polanyi (1951, p. 26) observed that the 
transmission of ideas and concepts is mostly not by precept but by 
example. As Polanyi observed, ‘The whole practice of research and 
verification is transmitted by example and its standards are upheld by a 
continuous interplay of criticism within the scientific community’ (Polanyi 
1951, p. 26). Even in science, Polanyi claims, there is no textbook that 
even attempts to teach the way discoveries are made, nor what evidence 
should become accepted as substantiating a discovery.  
Polanyi's account of science contrasts that of Karl Popper, an 
important figure in the philosophy of science. Popper’s firm belief is that 
scientists are distinguished by their rigorous use of criticism and self-
criticism (Popper 1959). This is the view known as falsificationism (Polanyi 
1962a, pp. 63, 64, 167). The scientist’s task, according to Popper, is to 
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use criticism against a hypothesis, looking for evidence that can falsify the 
hypothesis. Polanyi rejected Popper’s view of science, and he seems to 
have had Popper’s view in mind when he wrote in his 1952 essay The 
Stability of Beliefs (Polanyi 1952, p. 227) that the scientific method is often 
discussed in terms of ‘caution’, which Polanyi takes to be another name 
for scientists’ use of criticism and self-criticism. That scientists use caution, 
proceed cautiously and critically, is a widespread view, Polanyi suggested, 
but he insisted caution is not unique to science. It does not distinguish 
science from other disciplines. As Polanyi observes,  
But the exercise of special caution is not peculiar to the scientist. The 
practice of every art must be restrained by its own form of caution. The 
precision of the lawyer, the poet's fastidiousness, the sculptor’s touch, 
are as many restraints by which these various professions are guided 
(Polanyi 1964, p. 227).  
Furthermore, there is no rule to tell scientists ‘the moment of 
deciding the next step in research of what is truly bold and what is merely 
reckless’ (Polanyi 1964, p. 227). The dilemma facing the scientist, Polanyi 
contends, is that they cannot rely on any set ‘scientific method’ for 
necessarily guiding them in their investigations.  
Whilst it is acknowledged by both Polanyi and Popper (Polanyi 
1952, pp. 15-16), along with the intelligence field generally, that ‘science’ 
as an enterprise involves more than the accumulation of ‘facts’ 
(Intelligence analysis in the 21st century 2016; Modern Intelligence 
Analysis 2011; Phythian 2017; Picornell 2013; Townsley, Mann & Garrett 
2011), Polanyi offers an alternative way for representing the activities of 
scientists. It is in this manner that Polanyi’s view of science contributes to 
the discourse on understanding the process and product of intelligence 
analysis. The intelligence field acknowledges that the aim of intelligence 
analysis is to provide assessments, which should not be confused with 
‘facts’ (Cook & Smallman 2008; Coulthart 2017a; Parliamentary Joint 
Committee on Law Enforcement 2013, p. 22; Hare & Coghill 2016; Pfautz 
et al. 2006; Stohl 2012; Warner 2017), especially since assessments 
cannot impart certainty (Butler 2004, p. 15; Parliamentary Joint Committee 
on Law Enforcement 2013; Kean & Hamilton 2004; Ryan 2006; Wastell, 
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Clark & Duncan 2006). Polanyi emphasises that what is not sufficiently 
acknowledged within knowledge claims more generally (beyond science 
itself) is the key role of the personal participation of the practitioner in the 
act of making judgments within their research and analysis (Polanyi 
1962a, p. 20). Polanyi explains this by way of examining how scientists 
routinely dismiss evidence and facts as ‘anomalies’ if such observations 
contradict their hypothesis.  
Polanyi argued that, despite the traditional view of science, it is not 
the case that theories are invalidated by discrepancies with observed data 
and theoretical prediction. Such discrepancies are often classed as 
‘anomalies’. As Polanyi observed, variations to planetary motions, as 
noted over 60 years preceding the discovery of Neptune, were 
disregarded as anomalies by most astronomers, with the hope that in the 
future there would be a theory that could accommodate these variations 
without the need to significantly revise Newtonian gravitation. Polanyi 
claims that the reverse can also be true, namely that a series of 
observations which at one time were considered important facts may later 
be discredited ‘without ever having been disproved or indeed newly tested, 
simply because the conceptual basis of science had meanwhile so altered 
that the facts no longer appeared credible’ (Polanyi 1962a, p. 309). The 
personal act of judgment forms an essential aspect of science (Polanyi 
1962a, p. 20). This view of science contributes towards the discourse 
within intelligence analysis by drawing attention to the important aspect of 
the personal dimension concerning knowledge claims.  
As outlined in Chapter 1, the intelligence enterprise has clearly 
indicated a sustained interest for aligning itself professionally with the 
ideals of science (Cooper 2005; Coulthart 2017a; Gill 2009; Innes, Fielding 
& Cope 2005; Kent 1949; Marrin 2011b, 2017; Marrin & Clemente 2005; 
Pherson & Beebe 2015; Prunckun 2015; Spielmann 2014; Wirtz 2014a). 
Importantly, this includes the ideal within science of ‘falsificationism’, along 
with the role of empiricism and the logic of induction involved in the 
process of making discoveries and solving problems. Polanyi challenges 
the extent to which these ideals of falsificationism, empiricism and 
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induction play in the process of making discoveries and solving problems. 
This will be examined in greater detail both in Chapter 3 in terms of 
understanding the process of solving problems with respect to intelligence 
analysis, and Chapter 4 with regards to the intelligence product or 
knowledge claims. A more in-depth explanation of Polanyi’s understanding 
of tacit knowing will clarify precisely what epistemological considerations 
are involved in the process of solving problems facing the scientist and 
intelligence analyst alike.  
Tacit knowing 
Polanyi argues that to account for the process of solving problems and 
making discoveries there needs to be sufficient recognition of the 
important role of tacit knowing and the relationship this knowledge has 
with explicit knowledge. According to Polanyi, this form of tacit knowledge 
is less testable than is explicit, propositional, formulated knowledge. Yet it 
is this tacit knowledge that serves as a guide to help the practitioner, even 
if only in an unclear fashion, with skilfully performing tasks. Popper refers 
to this knowledge as a 'faith in quite hazy ideas' (Popper 1959, p. 16) and, 
like other philosophers of science have, he omitted it from his analysis of 
science (Scott 1985, p. 46). In contrast, Polanyi locates this form of 
knowledge, what he refers to as ‘tacit knowing’, as an essential element of 
science and his epistemology. It has been recognised by some that the 
intelligence profession has largely adopted Popper’s characterization of 
science (Agrell & Treverton 2015; Coulthart 2017a; Manjikian 2013; 
Prunckun 2015; Tang 2017, p. 666; Townsley, Mann & Garrett 2011). 
Arguably, this partly explains the lack of acknowledgement and depth of 
discussion regarding the tacit aspects of knowledge within the intelligence 
domain.  
Polanyi builds part of his argument for tacit knowledge as a 
legitimate form of knowledge by extending upon some aspects of Gestalt 
psychology, of the notion that the habit of the mind is to integrate parts of 
the visual field into a whole in order to understand the order of the world 
(Burley & Freier 2004, p. 324; Kałamała et al. 2017, p. 1; Wagemans 
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2013, p. 1219). In an epistemological sense, Polanyi presents an 
alternative argument to the conventional view that to ‘know’ can only be 
defensible if it is explicit or propositional knowledge (Doing 2011; Fennell 
2016; Fothe 2012; Nye 2011; Turner 2014). Tacit knowledge does not 
conform to the traditional definition of ‘knowledge’ as being ‘justified true 
belief’ (Turner 2014, p. 33). This is because for ‘knowledge’ to be 
considered ‘justified knowledge’, such knowledge claims must be made 
articulate by reason (Bang 2017; Marrin & Torres 2017; Prunckun 2015; 
Turner 2014, p. 35; Wirtz 2014b). Polanyi argued that ‘tact knowledge’ 
can still be a valid form of knowledge and can extend beyond the explicit, 
without needing to unnecessarily privilege propositional knowledge 
(Apczynski 2014, p. 21; Grant 2007; Tebble 2016; Turner 2012). 
A cornerstone of Polanyi’s theory of knowledge in general, and 
scientific knowledge in particular, is what he referred to as tacit knowing. 
In the words of one scholar, tacit knowing comprises ‘a range of 
conceptual and sensory information and images that can be brought to 
bear in an attempt to make sense of something’ (Hodgkin 1992, p. 15). 
Polanyi explored this topic of tacit knowledge to a significant degree. His 
most detailed and clearest analysis of this form of knowing occurs in his 
book, The Tacit Dimension, where he epitomised in the idea of tacit 
knowing and knowledge in the epigram, ‘We can know more than we can 
tell’ (Polanyi 1966b, p. 4). By this, Polanyi means that there are two types 
of knowledge, being explicit and tacit. Explicit knowledge, or propositional 
knowledge, covers facts about ourselves and the world that we are fully 
conscious of, such as the capital of Australia being Canberra, red being a 
colour, and gravitation being a theory that explains why objects fall to the 
ground when released from above. Yet propositional knowledge does not 
exhaust all the knowledge that we possess. While we can easily 
communicate this type of knowledge, which is one of its aspects, we also 
know things tacitly, which is knowledge we cannot (at least not 
completely) articulate (Jha 2011; Johnson 2016; Kiyimba 2009; Ray 2008; 
Tebble 2016, p. 20). Such knowledge includes how we use a language or 
understand a mathematical equation, which is at times difficult or 
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impossible to communicate it to others and codify (Ouagrham-Gormley 
2014, p. 36). This discussion of tacit knowledge may appear somewhat 
arcane – but it is not. The tacit-explicit dimension of knowledge is 
considered one of the most widely explored topics in the field of 
Knowledge Management (Garrick & Chan 2017; Giurgiu, Barsan & 
Mosteanu 2015; Grant 2007, p. 174; Martinez-Conesa et al. 2017; 
Mohajan 2016; Turner 2012), and this area of study can be observed 
within intelligence literature (Fishbein & Traverton 2004; Lahneman 
2010a, p. 616; Ouagrham-Gormley 2014, p. 36; Tang 2017; Taylor et al. 
2013; Vogel 2013b). When the tacit-explicit dimension is explored within 
the intelligence field, it is largely related to discussions regarding the 
development and transfer of ‘know how’ knowledge, (Alschuler 2007; 
Cooper 2005; De Franco & Meyer 2011; Dennis 2013; Margolis et al. 
2012; Ouagrham-Gormley 2014; Taylor et al. 2013; Turner 2012; Vogel & 
Dennis 2012). Despite these discussions regarding the tacit-explicit 
dynamic, the intelligence field does not sufficiently acknowledge ‘tacit’ 
knowledge in the process of analysis (Dennis 2013; Kamarck 2005, p. 12; 
Margolis et al. 2012, p. 2; Ouagrham-Gormley 2014; Tang 2017; Vogel 
2013a, 2013b).  
Polanyi is not claiming all knowledge is tacit knowledge. He 
acknowledges the distinct character of explicit or propositional knowledge. 
Explicit knowledge, Polanyi argues, can be observed in the formulation of 
scientific theories, experiments, laws of nature in science textbooks. It may 
be possible to express partly what was previously tacit knowledge (Garrick 
& Chan 2017; Grant 2007; Jones 2009; Von Krogh, Ichijo & Nonaka 
2000). But Polanyi emphasises that tacit knowledge can never be fully 
expressible in words or diagrams. Polanyi argues that this is 
acknowledged implicitly by the fact that universities devote much effort to 
teach students in practical classes to identify various specimens of rocks, 
plants and animals, because propositional knowledge is limited in this 
regard to some degree (Polanyi 1966b, p. 5). A glance at contemporary 
university courses in medicine clearly reveals this acknowledged 
understanding in the value of practical classes for developing expertise. 
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Such claims are supported by the widespread recognition within the 
discipline of psychology that most of what we know we cannot articulate 
with words (Galotti 2017; Keil & Wilson 2000; Kingstone, Smilek & 
Eastwood 2008; Varela, Thompson & Rosch 2017). The efforts by 
universities to teach practical classes, Polanyi argued, partly accounts for 
this important aspect of tacit knowing, despite the fact such knowledge 
cannot be fully expressed or codified. Polanyi highlighted the somewhat 
paradoxical nature of the relationship between reason on the one hand 
and tacit ways of knowing on the other (Aligica & Tarko 2012; Fennell 
2016; Kiyimba 2009; Meek 2011; Mullins 2013; Tebble 2016, p. 22). As 
will become clearer in discussing his understanding of tacit knowledge, 
this acknowledgement importantly becomes further clarified in his 
exposition of ‘practical knowledge’.  
The historian Mary Jo Nye outlined the way Polanyi emphasised 
the practice of science. For example, Polanyi highlighted considerations 
regarding the building of laboratories, developing new techniques, 
amongst other issues confronting scientists of a practical nature within 
their activities (Nye 2011). Nye provides some historical context to this 
contribution of Polanyi to the field of science, stating that most scientists 
who reflected on the philosophy of science in the 19th and 20th centuries 
generally described the fundamentals of scientific knowledge, specifically 
in regarding ideas and theory. As Nye observed, ‘They did not emphasize 
practical skills and laboratory routines’ (Nye 2011, p. 43). Polanyi differed 
significantly in this regard, focusing much of his attention on the practical 
skills of the scientist in their pursuit to make discoveries and solve 
problems. Polanyi was not interested in promoting an idealist outlook of 
science, rather a more grounded view of the activities of scientists. These 
views of Polanyi regarding tacit knowing, conjoined with his ideas of 
‘practical knowledge’, formed the basis for understanding the process of 
perception and the logic of making discoveries. The fashion by which 
discoveries are made, along with how problems are solved, according to 
Polanyi, was a telling indication or clue for the nature of how we perceive 
in general. As Polanyi stated, ‘The logic of perceptual integration may 
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serve therefore as a model for the logic of discovery’ (Polanyi 1969, p. 
139). Polanyi builds upon this argument around the nature of perception 
and the process of solving problems, by discussing in-depth 
epistemological considerations around ‘practical knowledge’ and ‘skilful 
practice’.  
Practical knowledge and skilful practice 
To better understand this bridge Polanyi viewed between the logic of 
discovery and that of perception, it is necessary to explore his way of 
understanding the skilled practitioner and the role of ‘practical knowledge’. 
The practitioner, according to Polanyi, possesses ‘practical knowledge’ of 
a tacit nature, which allows them to perform skilfully in their field. Yet, 
agents with knowledge of these practices would agree that many 
particulars of the skills involved in these practices are unspecifiable. The 
agents may have forgotten them, or they may never have been conscious 
of them (Polanyi 1958, p. 52). Polanyi states that there are many 
traditional industries and professions, including medicine, in which the 
agents have made judgments ‘without any clear knowledge of the 
constituent detailed operations’ engaged in the practice (Polanyi 1958, p. 
52). Polanyi writes:  
To percuss a lung, is as much a muscular feat as a delicate 
discrimination of the sounds thus elicited. The palpation of a spleen or 
a kidney combines a skilful kneading of the region with a trained sense 
for the peculiar feeling of the organ’s resistance (Polanyi 1969, p. 126).  
In other practices, such as wine tasting, there is less of a 
requirement to know how to create such goods involving ‘skilful practice’, 
and more of an emphasis on connoisseurship, for judging the quality of 
such products. In either type of practice, of skilfully performing a medical 
procedure (the act of doing), or of skilfully judging a wine 
(connoisseurship), there is the engagement of tacit knowledge, according 
to Polanyi. For either the wine connoisseur or the surgeon, the practitioner 
observes a set of rules that the agent may not be consciously aware of 
(Polanyi 1958, p. 49). Importantly, the practitioner observes rules and 
maxims in the tradition, but such rules do not determine the correct 
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performance of that activity or the mastery of that practice (Polanyi 1958, 
p. 50). The practitioner who can carry out such practices embodies the 
‘practical knowledge’ Polanyi refers to. Such knowledge is akin to what 
Aristotle referred to as phronesis or ‘practical knowledge’, referring to the 
ability to apply a given rule to the correct situation (Lowney 2011, p. 31). 
Similar to Polanyi’s concept of ‘practical knowledge’, phronesis constitutes 
a bottom-up ‘practical’ knowledge, the exercising of which cannot be 
reduced to propositional rules.  
With respect to Polanyi’s argument that the practitioner can engage 
in a ‘skilful performance’ without being aware of the precise rules for doing 
so, does not necessarily mean there are no such rules. Polanyi is 
emphasising that the practitioner does not need such propositional 
knowledge in order to perform the skilful actions (Jones 2009, p. 5). 
Recognising the face of a person we are familiar with generally occurs 
without our conscious explicit knowledge of how we come to such 
recognition, because it largely escapes verbal articulation (Polanyi 1966b, 
p. 4). Polanyi also cited the case of a psychiatrist who revealed to his 
students a patient who was having a fit, later discussing in class whether it 
had been an epileptic or a hysteron-epileptic seizure. The physician noted, 
‘Gentlemen,’ he said, ‘you have seen a true epileptic seizure. I cannot tell 
you how to recognize it; you will learn this by more extensive experience’. 
As Polanyi observed regarding this exchange, the psychiatrist understood 
how to recognise the disease, but he could not communicate precisely 
how he knew such things. The psychiatrist recognised the disease by 
attending to the entity as a whole, and doing so by relying on a variety of 
clues which he could not clearly speak of or specify with propositional or 
explicit knowledge (Polanyi 1961, p. 4). Yet this lack of articulation does 
not prevent or interfere with the skilful performance (Polanyi 1962a, p. 51). 
Examples from the medical profession are particularly pertinent, given the 
acknowledgement within the intelligence field by some that ‘medical 
diagnosis is similar to intelligence analysis’ (Cook & Smallman 2008; 
Corkill 2011; Kent 1949, p. vii; Laqueur 1983; Marrin 2017, p. 543; Oliver 
2007; Rodgers 2006; Wirtz 2014a). This acknowledgment of the way we 
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may know things but cannot clearly articulate them, along with how we 
perceive things tacitly, is extended by Polanyi in his treatment of the two 
main ‘terms’ of understanding tacit knowing; broadly speaking, what he 
described as ‘from-to’ epistemological orientation, involving the tacit 
powers of integration.  
According to Polanyi, tacit knowing can be understood more clearly 
with reference to ‘the two terms of tacit knowing’ which invariably conjoin 
together in the act (Polanyi 1966b, p. 9). There is a) ‘proximal’ knowing, 
which is perceiving something in isolation, or ‘knowing by relying on’ 
(which is a subsidiary awareness), and b) ‘distal’ knowing or ‘knowing by 
attending to’ (which is a focal awareness), by attending to or integrating 
particulars of which they contribute to the whole. The ‘proximal’ term 
consists of observing objects in isolation, and the ‘distal’ term refers to 
seeing those same things as a coherent entity (Polanyi 1969, p. 140). In 
tacit knowing, according to Polanyi, we are always attending from the 
proximal to the distal (Polanyi 1969, p. 141). This process of ‘from-to’ 
amounts to revealing the meaning of the object(s) in question. According 
to Polanyi, ‘We may say that a scientific discovery reduces our focal 
awareness of observations into a subsidiary awareness of them, by 
shifting our attention from them to their theoretical coherence’ (Polanyi 
1969, p. 140). A person trains their attention on one thing, as for example 
the scholar trying to make sense of a difficult paragraph of text or an 
investigator developing an understanding of some evidence and clues. In 
each case, Polanyi would say, the subject is relying on ‘particulars’ 
(particular sounds, sensations, movements) ‘… for the purpose of 
attending to the…’ interpretation as a whole. Knowing the ‘main drivers’ or 
the key aspects of a problem is an important aspect of intelligence 
analysis (Cain 2012; Dahl 2012; Ellis-Smith 2016; Gentry 2016; Herbert 
2013; Mudd 2015; Vandepeer 2016). But how these pieces of the puzzle 
are brought to bear on the overall meaning is Polanyi’s contribution to the 
discourse on intelligence analysis. Polanyi elaborated on this as a 
dynamic process, known as tacit knowing, involving these two ‘terms’: 
moving from the proximal to the distal, the latter of which ‘is specifiably 
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known’ (Polanyi 1966b, p. 9). It is precisely Polanyi’s concept of tacit 
knowledge and how it relates to skilful practice that has a bearing on 
understanding similar processes and considerations of the intelligence 
analyst. 
Polanyi’s concept of tacit knowledge is expanded upon in his 
treatment of the ‘dynamic structure’ of this form of knowing involved in a 
skilful practice (Polanyi 1962a, p. 63). We perform a skill by relying on the 
coordination of elementary muscular acts, and we are aware of having 
exercised these correctly by accomplishing our skilful performance. We 
are aware of them in terms of this performance, and not (or only partially) 
aware of them in themselves (Polanyi 1962c, p. 601). In terms of the 
‘dynamic quality’ of a performance (involving skilful practice), such a 
quality is lost if it is studied by its separate constituent parts (Polanyi 1969, 
p. 126). When we focus all of our attention on the proximal, we observe 
that object in isolation. According to Polanyi, the ‘dynamic structure’ of 
tacit knowing becomes apparent in the operations and interactions of the 
individual using their tools. The tool becomes operationally an extension of 
the individual. Within this ‘dynamic structure’, Polanyi claimed it is not 
feasible for the individual to focus simultaneously on the operations of the 
mind and the observations the mind generates. These two fundamentally 
different types of foci are mutually exclusive. It is not possible to attend 
simultaneously to the object of the action and the action itself, according to 
Polanyi. ‘This fact’, according to Polanyi, can be widely generalized.  
Returning to the argument that we can know things without being 
able to communicate them completely (as to how we know them), Polanyi 
explains the relationship between our tacit and explicit knowledge with 
respect to how tacit coherence operates. According to Polanyi, we are 
able to impart what we know by attending to them proximally, but we are 
either uncertain or not conscious of those aspects we know distally. It is 
this latter form of knowledge which we rely on for attending to something 
else, which is the meaning of that knowledge (Polanyi 1962c, p. 601). For 
example, as I read the words on a page I am attending to something else, 
being the intended meaning of that knowledge. These two types of 
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awareness – of proximal and distal – are both fundamental in relation to 
the tacit coherence of an entity (Polanyi 1969, p. 140). The latter is 
characteristically tacit, since we cannot precisely specify what particulars 
are being relied on (since we are only subsidiarily aware of them) to attend 
to an entity as a whole (Polanyi 1962c, p. 601). This act of integration is 
what Polanyi means by tacit knowing (Polanyi 1969, p. 140; italics 
original). 
Taken together, Polanyi’s concept of tacit knowing serves to bridge 
the link between perceptual coherence, involving ‘practical knowledge’. 
This relationship is fundamental to Polanyi’s contribution to science. In 
terms of understanding tacit knowledge with respect to the act of 
‘illumination’ involved in making discoveries, Polanyi presents the 
argument in Personal Knowledge that such a process can be 
characterised as crossing a logical gap (Apczynski 2014; Fennell 2016, p. 
46; Johnson 2016; Rutledge 2015). Yet in the later work of Polanyi in the 
Tacit Dimension, he downplays this notion of crossing a gap, emphasising 
instead the role of ‘tacit integration’. At the core of tacit knowing, involving 
an ‘informal logic of science’ (Polanyi 1966a, p. 155; original emphasis) is 
the exercising of our ‘powers of perceiving coherence’ (Polanyi 1966a, p. 
139), which is an act of integrating an inference from proximally known 
clues to a distally known object as a whole (Fennell 2016, p. 46). Even 
Polanyi’s treatment of logic in the act of making a discovery is further 
illustrative of the practical processes involved by scientists, processes 
which are elusive and belie efforts to formalise or codify the so-called 
‘scientific method’ (Agler 2011; Meek 2011; Nye 2011; Rutledge 2015, p. 
12; Turner 2014).  
Polanyi argued that tacit knowledge was an important feature 
involved in the ‘structure of skills’, clarifying how a skilful performance or 
task within a field can be conceptualised. Polanyi’s concept of the 
‘structure of skills’ has three main epistemological implications: a) the 
practitioner, in the performance of their duties, is exercising skills based on 
rules or methods that they are not entirely aware of; b) the accepted ‘rules’ 
within the tradition, considered to be valuable for the skilful performance of 
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a task, do not determine the skilful performance necessarily within the 
individual practitioner; c) the ‘rules’ within the tradition can only be 
integrated with the ‘practical knowledge’ by way of the student practicing 
and submitting, observing and emulating the skilful performance of a 
skilled master.  
As Polanyi makes clear regarding the structure of skills, ‘Science is 
operated by the skill of the scientist’ (Polanyi 1962a, p. 51), representing 
the reality that it is from exercising their skill that they shape their scientific 
knowledge. As Polanyi observes, ‘We may grasp, therefore, the nature of 
the scientist’s personal participation by examining the structure of skills’ 
(Polanyi 1962a, p. 51). The underlying clue to this recognition of the 
‘structure of skills’, as Polanyi understands it, is the concept that ‘the aim 
of a skilful performance is achieved by the observance of a set of rules 
which are not known as such to the person following them’ (Polanyi 
1962a, p. 51). Polanyi gives the example of the cyclist and swimmer who 
generally are not aware of how they cycle or swim respectively (Polanyi 
1962a, p. 51). On the other hand, it has been observed within policing 
studies, for example, that competencies for successfully reading deceptive 
behaviour, to perceiving how all the clues cohere together, involve a 
skillset beyond propositional knowledge (Carson 2009; Evans & Kebbell 
2012; Lerner 2007; Taylor et al. 2013; Legrand & Vogel 2012). Polanyi’s 
in-depth treatment of tacit knowing provides a more detailed language for 
sufficiently explaining and understanding this important epistemological 
feature within such skilful tasks.  
Tacit knowing and learning 
Closely related to Polanyi’s acknowledgment that the rules of an art do not 
determine the correct practice of that art, is his recognition and treatment 
of the tacit process of learning within a discipline. As Polanyi stated 
regarding scientific research, the rules of an art never  
…determine [its] practice … they are maxims, which can serve as a 
guide to an art only if they can be integrated into the practical 
knowledge of the art. They cannot replace this knowledge (Polanyi 
1962a, p. 52).  
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This is because the formulation of rules cannot completely list the types of 
situations, timing and correct application for all scenarios, as the actions 
require. Since the ‘skilful performance’ draws on the tacit knowing of the 
practitioner, such knowledge can only in part be learnt from masters in the 
field, according to Polanyi. Whilst this notion of the importance of learning 
from (ideally gifted) masters in the field has been acknowledged within the 
realm of intelligence analysis (Bruce & George 2008; Devine & Loeb 2014; 
Lillbacka 2013; Marrin 2017; Sinclair 2010; Walsh 2017; Wastell, Clark & 
Duncan 2006), Polanyi’s concept of tacit knowing provides an enriched 
way for the intelligence field to discuss and understand various 
epistemological considerations.  
This acknowledgement regarding how the practitioner perceives 
things, of tacitly cohering all the pieces of the puzzle together, hints 
towards the important role of tacit knowing in this process of cognition. An 
important implication of this acknowledgement, according to Polanyi, was 
the primacy of students learning such tacit skills from a gifted master in the 
respective tradition. Polanyi’s understanding of a ‘master’ in a craft does 
not differ substantively with the view of a ‘master’ within intelligence 
analysis. The general understanding of the ‘master’ in the intelligence field 
is captured by David Shaw in his article Managing Analysis, writing that 
the ‘master’ is one who has been recognised by other masters in the field, 
principally by demonstrating an accomplished set of skills of a high 
standard (Cooper 2005, p. 6; Shaw 2007, pp. 39-40). Polanyi argued that 
some skills can only be communicated by example, not precept, requiring 
years of training under the tutelage of a skilled master (Polanyi 1962a, p. 
54). It is pointless for the physician to be simply reading about descriptions 
of syndromes without learning how to clearly identify the correlated 
symptoms in a patient (Polanyi 1962a, p. 54). The significant periods of 
time students of medicine, biology and chemistry spend in practical 
courses demonstrates the degree to which the transmission of skills is 
communicated from master to student (Polanyi 1962a, p. 55). It further 
demonstrates the art of knowing remains unspecifiable at the heart of the 
sciences (Polanyi 1962a, p. 55). Such arguments have a bearing on 
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intelligence analysis by emphasising the need to sufficiently acknowledge 
that cognition involves tacit knowing and such a process of perception can 
be assisted by learning from gifted masters in the tradition. 
Any skilled activity, Polanyi points out, is partly learned and 
acquired by training within a tradition. Whilst there is a place for textbook-
based or formalised learning for a profession, such methods of 
communicating the ‘practical knowledge’ have limitations, since such tacit 
knowledge defies formulation. Polanyi emphasised that the student must 
submit to the teacher to learn the correct performance, but ultimately, the 
student must develop the ‘right feel’ for the performance by gaining the 
‘knack of it’ (Polanyi 1969, p. 126). The ‘practical knowledge’, which is key 
to the skilful performance within a field, is not only self-acquired but also 
learned from, ideally, accomplished practitioners. The learning of this 
knowledge is partly gained by way of observation and emulation/imitation. 
Says Polanyi in Personal Knowledge:  
To learn by example is to submit to authority. You follow your master 
because you trust his manner of doing things even when you cannot 
analyse and account in detail for its effectiveness. (Polanyi 1962a, p. 
55) 
The student learns by observing the master, emulating their efforts 
by their example, unconsciously picking up the rules of the art – some of 
which are not explicitly known to the master. The same can be applied to 
the intelligence analyst. For example, James Wirtz, in his review of Heuer 
and Pherson’s published methodological handbook, Structured Analytic 
Techniques for Intelligence Analysis, states that despite the valuable 
recipes contained in the handbook for analysis, ‘…certain rudimentary 
skills are necessary to cook a soufflé. The novice also is unlikely to get the 
soufflé to rise without having first watched the chef bake one’ (Wirtz 
2014b, p. 425). Such learning of these rules, according to Polanyi, can 
only be assimilated by the individuals who surrender themselves 
uncritically to one who has mastered the field. Polanyi states:  
A society which wants to preserve a fund of personal knowledge must 
submit to tradition. In effect, to the extent to which our intelligence falls 
short of the ideal of precise formalization, we act and see by the light of 
unspecifiable knowledge and must acknowledge that we accept the 
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verdict of our personal appraisal, be it at first hand by relying on our 
own judgment, or at second hand by submitting to the authority of a 
personal example as carrier of a tradition (Polanyi 1962a, p. 55). 
According to Polanyi, tacit knowing constitutes an important feature 
of the knowledge contained within a tradition and as practiced within it. 
This has important implications for the teaching and learning in that 
respective tradition. Polanyi was convinced that the personal aspect of 
knowing and of skilful performance illustrates this. Scientific research, 
Polanyi observed, is a profession that contains some knowledge that 
cannot be formulated and described in diagrams, or verbally in detail in 
writing or speech. Elements of a tradecraft cannot be communicated in 
detail by prescription because there are no explicit rules and knowledge as 
such. As Polanyi argued, ‘The aim of a skilful performance is achieved by 
the observance of a set of rules which are not known to the person 
following them’ (Polanyi 1962a, p. 51). This can find support in Einstein, 
who stated  
If you want to find out anything from the theoretical physicists about the 
methods they use, I advise you to stick closely to one principle: Don't 
listen to their words, fix your attention on their deeds (Einstein 1934, p. 
12).  
The implications of this recognition are that since the sort of 
knowledge for the performance of some complex processes defy 
formulation or codification they cannot be transferred by prescription, since 
no prescription exists. Such knowledge, Polanyi observes, ‘…can be 
passed on only by example from master to apprentice. This restricts the 
range of diffusion to that of personal contacts’ (Polanyi 1962a, p. 55). 
Therefore, within a tradition, tacit knowledge features as a central 
component both for understanding the ‘practical knowledge’ involved for 
skilful practice, and epistemological considerations regarding learning 
within the tradition.  
Polanyi emphasised that by submitting to authority the apprentice 
learns by emulation. The apprentice submits to the master because they 
trust their manner of practicing the art within the tradition. They 
unconsciously pick up the hidden rules of the art, even those rules the 
masters themselves are not explicitly aware of. A society which desires to 
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preserve personal knowledge, according to Polanyi, must sufficiently 
acknowledge this within the tradition (Polanyi 1962a, p. 55).  
Personal knowledge 
Polanyi places the ‘knower’ at the centre of his concept of personal 
knowledge (Fennell 2016; Jha 2011; Johnson 2016; Meek 2011; Schmitt 
2011-2012, p. 18). An important reason for this being, according to 
Polanyi, is that true knowledge necessarily depends on our capacity to use 
it (Aligica & Tarko 2012; Apczynski 2014; Fothe 2012; Narvaez 2012, p. 
26). This holds a striking similarity with intelligence analysis, which 
generally refers to both the process and product of knowledge as being 
valuable only in terms of how well it can be used to assist decision-makers 
by reducing ignorance (Chang & Tetlock 2016; Corkill 2011, p. 4; Coulthart 
2017a; Defence 2010; Mudd 2015; Omand 2014, p. 22; Pherson 2013; 
Smith 2017). 
Personal knowledge is a central concept of Polanyi, reflected in the 
fact it is the title of his major book. Yet in some respects, the concept 
remains elusive. One question arising in relation to it is whether Polanyi is 
saying the scientific researcher is using personal knowledge in their 
research, or whether the scientist actually produces personal knowledge, 
or whether the discovery at which the scientist is aiming is personal 
knowledge, or some combination of these. Before outlining personal 
knowledge in detail, it should be distinguished from tacit knowing. The 
clearest distinction between the two is the function of the 
knowing/knowledge in terms of intent. In this sense, it would be best to 
understand tacit knowing as a process and personal knowledge as a 
product. In this respect, the function of tacit knowing refers to the process 
of perception, or more precisely how objects are perceived. The way the 
practitioner engages in their ‘practical knowledge’, by moving beyond the 
proximal focus to a distal awareness of how all the pieces of the puzzle 
cohere together, is an act of tacit integration. This is the functional 
characteristic of tacit knowing as a process. The ‘practical knowledge’ 
involved in the use of tools and the ‘skilful performance’ of a task can be 
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understood in this ‘tacit’ way of knowing. Personal knowledge, in terms of 
intent, is directed towards a responsibility of knowing, a commitment to the 
universal standards and principles of science as the individual scientist 
understands them within the tradition. Polanyi’s conception of personal 
knowledge, involving a ‘from-to’ (tacit) relation, locates responsibility at the 
centre of his epistemology. If all knowing requires a form of orientation, as 
Polanyi argues there must be, then there must be a knower. Personal 
knowledge acknowledges the key role of the knowing individual with 
respect to knowledge itself as a product. In this sense, the knowledge 
produced is my personal knowledge, which is achieved partly by way of 
tacit integration of perception, or tacit knowing as a process.  
Scientific research, for Polanyi, involves much knowledge of the 
kind he describes as ‘personal’. To describe knowledge as ‘personal’ 
means it is ‘my knowledge’ – knowledge that in certain respects is 
uniquely my own, which cannot be obtained by following method-rules that 
are set down in a science textbook. Importantly, the use of knowledge that 
includes personal elements and colours the knowledge that the 
investigator or problem solver produces as a solution seems to be true for 
Polanyi of virtually any professional discipline. Polanyi uses the term 
‘personal knowledge’ to describe situations in which the scientist (or 
thinker in some discipline outside science) is having to make their own 
judgement about how to proceed. Personal knowledge is involved in the 
exercising of skills (Polanyi 1962a, pp. 31-2). As suggested above, 
scientific research in Polanyi's view cannot be conducted by scientists 
mechanically applying certain rules. The maxims of research, which 
change over time and which are somewhat vague, have to be interpreted 
and cautiously followed by scientists, making use of their trained and 
experienced judgment. He speaks of the ‘personal participation of the 
scientist even in the most exact operations of science’ (Polanyi 1962a, p. 
22). Polanyi writes in Personal Knowledge that the knowledge of the 
scientist, the scientific researcher in other words, is ‘personal in the sense 
of involving the personality of him who holds … [the belief that what he is 
aiming to discover through his research actually exists], and [it is also 
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personal] in the sense of being, as a rule, solitary’ in the spirit of being a 
conviction of a particular scientist. The scientist’s ‘act of knowing’ involves 
them exercising their ‘personal judgement in relating evidence to an 
external reality, an aspect of which he is seeking to apprehend’ (Polanyi 
1962a, pp. 24-25). Personal knowledge engages aspects of tacit knowing, 
or unformulated ways of knowing that cannot be rigorously specified or set 
down on paper or in detail. 
In the Preface of Personal Knowledge Polanyi noted how he 
regarded knowing as an active and skilful understanding of whatever it is a 
scientific researcher has attained knowledge. Knowing, for Polanyi, 
involves the subordination of specific details in the process of producing a 
‘skilful achievement, whether practical or theoretical’ (Polanyi 1962a, p. iv). 
At the same time, as the scientist draws on their personal knowledge and 
talents for how to conduct research, such levels of perception enters and 
colours their pursuit of discovery. As stated in Chapter 1, this is also 
recognised within the intelligence realm regarding the acknowledgement 
that different forms of reasoning profoundly influence the judgments 
arrived at (Bruce 2008, p. 135; Heuer 1999; Jervis 2010; Kerr et al. 2005; 
Pherson & Beebe 2015; Walsh 2017; Waltz 2014; Wirtz 2014a).  
One aspect of scientific work as involving personal knowledge 
concerns the points discussed above, of scientists deciding whether 
positive evidence verifies a hypothesis, and when negative evidence 
falsifies a hypothesis. According to Polanyi (1952, p. 219), ‘Discovery, 
verification and falsification proceed according to’ vague maxims which 
scientists apply, using their ‘personal judgment’. The ‘maxims and the art 
of interpreting them’ are scientific premises or beliefs that are incorporated 
in the unwritten ‘tradition of science’.  
Following this dismissal of a method of science that can be 
formulated and codified, Polanyi’s concept of personal knowledge 
constitutes an alternative view for understanding the enterprise of science. 
By extension, some aspects of this view of science relate to 
considerations facing the intelligence analyst. Whilst Polanyi did 
emphasise the importance of the verification of theories and hypotheses, 
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underpinning such considerations was what he understood as being even 
more characteristic of the nature of science – the pursuit of worthwhile 
problems, coming from the individual’s personal knowledge. Polanyi 
states: ‘It is of the essence of the scientific method to select for verification 
hypotheses having a high chance of being true’ (Polanyi 1962a, p. 30). 
Such decisions, Polanyi argued, ultimately spring from the scientist’s 
personal knowledge. The philosopher Feyerabend came to a similar 
conclusion, stating, ‘This is how modern physics started: Not as an 
observational enterprise but as an unsupported speculation that was 
inconsistent with highly confirmed laws’ (Feyerabend 1970, p. 120). In this 
sense, Polanyi’s concept of personal knowledge contains the basis from 
which to reconsider important aspects of the enterprise of science itself. 
This is especially in relation to epistemological considerations, or the 
understanding of the nature of the knowledge produced by scientists. 
Polanyi argued that it would be a more accurate picture of science to 
describe such an enterprise, as guided by personal knowledge, as a 
pursuit in the face of and despite contradictory evidence and clues (Kessel 
1969, p. 1000; Picornell 2013; Townsley, Mann & Garrett 2011). This has 
a bearing on intelligence analysis with respect to efforts and challenges 
facing the analyst in developing a theory that explains a subject that is 
against the dominant view. The email from Glenn Carle1 (see Appendix 1) 
to the author explores a series of interrelated issue around the difficulties 
facing intelligence practitioners who present their assessments which are 
inconsistent with or challenge the orthodox position.  
As previously discussed regarding ‘proximal’ and ‘distal’ ways of 
knowing, such an awareness of these relations can be understood as 
being deliberately directed by the intention of the investigator’s personal 
knowledge; specifically, their ‘responsible act claiming universal validity’ 
(Polanyi 1962a, p. iv). The scientist’s understanding springs from their 
                                            
1 Glenn Carle provided permission to have this email published in this thesis. Glenn Carle 
had a career in the CIA for 23 years, working in a number of posts around the world 
across several issues. Some of these issues included transnational threats, including 
organised crime, terrorism and narcotics. He is the author of The Interrogator: An 
Education (2011), which provides an account of his experiences of being involved in 
conducting interrogations in the post 9/11 U.S. Global War on Terrorism.  
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‘contact with a hidden reality’, which represents the basis for expecting 
further unknown true discoveries, anticipating indeterminate ‘true 
implications’ of the understanding that has been attained to this point 
(Polanyi 1962a, p. iv). Such a process of perception, involving tacit 
knowing, is driven by an aspect of the investigator’s personal knowledge, 
which Polanyi referred to as their ‘intellectual commitment’. These 
arguments have a bearing on intelligence analysis by articulating the 
difficulties associated within the process of solving problems. The 
commitment and the knowledge itself are ‘inherently hazardous’, which is 
to say they can never be definitively proven correct – a maxim which is 
similarly acknowledged within the intelligence profession (Chauvin & 
Fischhoff 2011; Eck, Clarke & Petrossian 2013; Lowenthal & Marks 2015; 
Moore 2007; Prunckun 2013). According to Polanyi’s view, knowledge 
involves a skilful construction by the scientist in their attempt to 
responsibly represent aspects of reality (Polanyi 1962a). Importantly, 
Polanyi stressed that in ‘every act of knowing’ there is present an affective 
element, which he referred to as being a ‘personal coefficient’. This 
‘personal coefficient’, Polanyi argued, can be understood as the 
‘passionate contribution of the person knowing what is being known’, 
which is ‘no mere imperfection but a vital component of his knowledge’ 
(Polanyi 1962a, p. v). The bearing this notion of personal knowledge has 
for the analyst is that it provides a conceptual foundation for 
acknowledging the importance of the analyst’s own knowledge as a core 
component to their knowledge claims. Polanyi’s concept of personal 
knowledge contributes to this discourse within the field of intelligence 
analysis especially since the core function of intelligence analysis is 
epistemological, regarding what it means to ‘know’ something.  
Conclusion  
This chapter has explored Polanyi’s conceptualization of the nature of 
science and the activities of scientists. Polanyi emphasised the ‘practical 
knowledge’ of scientists regarding how he understood the processes of a 
‘skilful performance’, being illustrative of the instrumental function of tacit 
knowing. It is here that one of the most significant features of Polanyi’s 
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nuanced understanding of tacit knowing is made clear. The significance of 
Polanyi’s concept of tacit knowing goes beyond the recognition that ‘We 
can know more than we can tell’ (Polanyi 1966b, p. 4). It is the relationship 
between tacit and explicit knowledge that is the key to understanding the 
value of Polanyi’s treatment of this concept. Polanyi argued that there was 
a strong nexus between tacit knowing and personal knowledge, which 
convinced him that the logic of perception (made possible partly by tacit 
knowing) was the same as the logic of discovery, and therefore of the 
knowledge produced – involving the investigator’s personal knowledge. 
Polanyi’s nuanced language of covering ‘proximal’ and ‘distal’ awareness, 
and how these relate to perception, provide the intelligence field with a 
novel intellectual landscape for considering a range of conceptual and 
practical issues in an epistemological sense. Chapter 3 will expand upon 
the discussion of tacit knowing as a process by further examining 
Polanyi’s understanding of perception and problem-solving as aspects of a 
‘skilful practice’. These discussions, applied to epistemological 
considerations facing the intelligence analyst – particularly in relation to 
the process of problem-solving and the use of Structured Analytic 
Techniques (SATs) – will enrichen the language and logic for 
understanding these issues facing the analyst. Chapter 4 will expand upon 
Polanyi’s theory of personal knowledge, applying such arguments in 
relation to intelligence analysis as a product. Polanyi’s concept of personal 
knowledge posits that the personal coefficient of the ‘knower’ is central to 
understanding knowledge claims, particularly in relation to what it means 
to ‘know’ something. This has a bearing on the intelligence analyst in 
relation to contributing to a detailed and novel way for perceiving the 
discipline itself.   
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Chapter 3: Tacit knowing 
Introduction 
The logician Keith Devlin, in writing about the 13th century mathematician 
Leonardo Pisano – famous for communicating to the West the Fibonacci 
principles, remarkable new ways for writing numbers and calculating with 
them – observed that it often takes true genius to ‘see the greatness in the 
commonplace, and to recognize the potential to change the world in what 
seems to most people to be a mundane or obscure idea’ (Devlin 2017, p. 
21). Polanyi’s position springs from the mundane acknowledgement that 
‘We can know more than we can tell’ (Polanyi 1966b, p. 4). Moving 
beyond this claim, Polanyi discerns the importance of tacit knowing within 
a ‘skilful performance’, which contributes towards a better understanding 
of problem-solving within intelligence analysis. Specifically, his arguments 
regarding the ‘structure of skills’ involving tacit knowing and ‘practical 
skills’ provide a more detailed and technical account of the process of 
solving problems, which is transferrable to intelligence analysis.  
It has been recognised within the national security field, as 
observed within various government reports and commissions into the 
intelligence failures of the 9/11 attacks (Kean & Hamilton 2004) and the 
WMD scandal (United States Department of State 2005), that such 
mistakes are partly attributed to poor analytical tradecraft, along with poor 
information sharing across intelligence and law enforcement agencies. 
The substandard analysis partly led to impoverished intelligence 
assessments, captured in a statement made within the 9/11 Commission 
Report of the identified problem for not sufficiently ‘connecting the dots’ 
(Kean & Hamilton 2004, p. 400). One of the responses to this problem, 
demonstrably observed in the United States’ Intelligence Community, has 
been the institutionalization and legal requirement, via the Office of the 
Director of National Intelligence (ODNI), of Intelligence Community 
Directive 203 Analytic Standards, requiring analysts to use Structured 
Analytic Techniques, or SATs (Gentry 2015). These analytical tools, 
designed to better manage and standardize the performance of analysis, 
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are an attempt to align the profession with scientific principles. 
Epistemologically, it can be argued that SATs elevate propositional 
knowledge and insufficiently recognise the value of ‘tacit’ or non-
propositional ways of knowing within the process of solving problems in 
intelligence analysis. Polanyi’s emphasis on the tacit aspect of making 
discoveries and solving problems raises questions regarding the 
epistemological utility of some SATs that emphasise explicit knowledge for 
solving problems.  
Since tacit knowing defies complete articulation, either through 
words or graphically (Vandepeer 2014, p. 31), Polanyi argued that one of 
the best ways to recognise this way of knowing is from observing skilful 
performances and discussing the related epistemological considerations of 
such activities. In this regard, the aim of this chapter is to explore Polanyi’s 
understanding of a ‘skilful performance’, which serves to contribute a 
clearer and nuanced epistemological understanding of tacit knowing within 
the process of solving problems within intelligence analysis. Polanyi’s 
understanding of the nature of perception, involving the practitioner’s tacit 
skilful powers of integration, provides a language and logic for detailing the 
process of solving problems. These insights are transferrable to the 
tradecraft of intelligence analysis. These discussions will then lead to 
exploring the logic underpinning the use of SATs within intelligence 
analysis, which will be examined with respect to Polanyi’s arguments 
regarding tacit knowing and the skilful usefulness of tools within the 
process of solving problems. Polanyi’s concept of ‘destructive analysis’ 
provides a technical epistemological warning regarding the use of 
analytical tools or methods, such as SATs within intelligence analysis, 
which may lead to the over-compartmentalization of the process of solving 
problems.  
Tacit knowing and the use of tools 
Polanyi’s concept of tacit knowing amounts to a more complete 
epistemological account of what is precisely meant by ‘know how’, or that 
form of knowledge drawn on by the practitioner to skilfully perform tasks. 
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Discussions within intelligence literature regarding what is required for 
reliable and accurate analysis amounts to the acknowledgement that 
‘know how’ is key to understanding and defining the ‘skilful’ performance 
of analysis (Alschuler 2007; Cooper 2005; De Franco & Meyer 2011; 
Dennis 2013; Margolis et al. 2012; Ouagrham-Gormley 2014; Taylor et al. 
2013; Turner 2012; Vogel & Dennis 2012). Acknowledgements within 
intelligence literature of the importance of ‘know how’ range from the 
national security sphere, such as correctly assessing the existence of 
WMD programs (Godson & Wirtz 2000; Kay 1995; Phythian 2009; Vogel & 
Dennis 2012), to law enforcement, for example accurately identifying 
deception within written witness statements (Ekman 2009; Kang & Lee 
2014; Picornell 2013). Polanyi’s concept of tacit knowing, particularly with 
respect to the skilful use of tools, posits a more nuanced understanding of 
the recognition within the intelligence field that ‘know how’ is involved 
within analysis. Taken together, Polanyi’s treatment of the concept of tacit 
knowing expands upon the precise meaning of ‘know how’ and by 
extension develops a more epistemologically rich understanding for the 
process of analysis, particularly in relation to the skilful use of tools.  
Polanyi’s epistemology acknowledges the function of tacit knowing 
in all knowledge (Grene 1977, p. 165), and that knowledge is an activity 
best ‘… described as a process of knowing’ (Polanyi 1969, p. 132). With 
respect to better understanding the ‘usefulness’ of analytical tools within 
intelligence analysis as a process, it is necessary to briefly return to the 
recognition that the key to tacit knowing is the relation of the tacit to the 
explicit (Grene 1977, p. 165). That is, the recognition that the process of 
knowing involves a transition from our powers of tacit integration (involving 
perception and skill) to explicit knowledge. In this sense, the ‘usefulness’ 
of tools, according to Polanyi, should assist this process of tacit 
integration, allowing or assisting the ‘skilful performance’ as intended by 
the practitioner.  
The understanding offered by Polanyi in relation to the usefulness 
of tools can contribute towards developing a more epistemologically robust 
account for discussing some of the strengths and limitations of SATs as 
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analytical tools; specifically, with reference to Polanyi’s broad claim that a 
tool is not useful if it does not assist the process of problem-solving it was 
intended for. In Polanyi’s words,  
An object alleged to be a tool is not a tool if our conception of its 
alleged use is altogether mistaken… or if it otherwise fails to serve its 
alleged purpose; it is an error to rely on a tool in such a case (Polanyi 
1962a, p. 249).  
This has a bearing on intelligence analysis with respect to 
recognising, broadly speaking, that the usefulness of a tool should be 
judged with respect to its intended aim.  
One of the ways that Polanyi examines how tacit knowing operates 
in the function of a task is in relation to how we visually and 
psychologically perceive objects. Polanyi’s understanding of the tacit 
operations involved in the process of solving problems springs from 
Gestalt psychology, specifically regarding the way a figure within a 
background is identified (Burley & Freier 2004; Hamlyn 2017; Kałamała et 
al. 2017; Wagemans 2013). In outlining Gestalt psychology, Polanyi refers 
to Rubin’s ‘vase or faces’, which is an image that at one moment can 
reveal two faces in profile, with a space in between, or a vase with space 
on the outside. For Polanyi, this principle of visual perception 
demonstrates that we perceive the object by virtue of its surroundings 
(Polanyi 1969, p. 111). In this sense, Polanyi emphasises that perception 
of an object takes place by sufficiently contextualizing the subject. Polanyi 
concludes that such visual illusions represent how our attention is directed 
both subsidiarily on the clues around the object, but also on the figure 
itself (Polanyi 1969, pp. 112-3). As Polanyi states,  
This interplay of background and figure illustrates a general principle: 
the principle that whenever we are focusing our attention on a 
particular object, we are relying for doing so on our awareness of many 
things to which we are not attending directly at the moment, but which 
are yet functioning as compelling clues for the way the object of our 
attention will appear to the senses (Polanyi 1969, p. 113).  
For Polanyi, this general principle is key to understanding the 
nature of tacit knowing within the operations of a task. He observes that 
the perception of the subject under investigation derives from a mutual 
stimulus between their tacit knowledge and observation throughout this 
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entire process (Polanyi 1964, pp. 29-30). The practitioner, according to 
Polanyi, tacitly integrates these observations throughout the process of 
analysis. This understanding of perception, involving the tacit operations of 
the observer switching between their focal and subsidiary awareness, 
provides a nuanced way for recognising the nature of perception in the 
process of intelligence analysts solving problems.  
The Knowledge Management field, dealing with a range of 
epistemological considerations (particularly from an organisational or 
institutional perspective) has been drawn on by some intelligence scholars 
regarding ways for overcoming information and data management issues 
facing intelligence analysts (Bhaskar & Zhang 2007; Glomseth & 
Gottschalk 2009; Gottschalk 2007; Jones 2007; Phythian 2017; Tang 
2017). The Knowledge Management field has addressed some of the 
challenges facing intelligence analysis (Phythian 2017), such as the 
relationship between knowledge and time (‘temporal convergence’) 
(Martin, Philp & Hall 2009) and strategy-making processes for modelling 
knowledge (Massingham 2004). Tellingly, the intelligence field 
acknowledges that ‘tacit’ or ‘intuitive’ ways of knowing have not been 
sufficiently recognised within the process of analysis (Dennis 2013; 
Kamarck 2005, p. 12; Margolis et al. 2012, p.2; Ouagrham-Gormley 2014; 
Tang 2017; Vogel 2013a, 2013b). This is despite the fact that the 
intelligence analysis field has drawn on aspects of the Knowledge 
Management literature (Fishbein & Traverton 2004; Lahneman 2010a, p. 
616), which devotes sustained attention towards the exchange between 
tacit and explicit knowledge (Garrick & Chan 2017; Martinez-Conesa et al. 
2017; Nonaka & Takeuchi 1995; Rothberg et al. 2017; Turner 2012; Von 
Krogh, Ichijo & Nonaka 2000). The implication of this lack of engagement 
or discussion within intelligence analysis around the tacit-explicit dynamic 
or dimension of knowing amounts to a restricted understanding of the 
process of analysis. A limited understanding of the process of analysis 
was observed by Charles Allen, previously the Associate Director of 
Intelligence at the CIA, who stated: ‘We’re not very good at evaluating the 
quality of intelligence analysis independent of the outcome. We’re 
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outcome oriented, rather than process oriented’ (Allen 2000). Therefore, if 
the policy succeeds and the outcome is desirable, then there is not much 
attention devoted to understanding the process of intelligence. This can 
undermine the very essence of intelligence analysis cumulatively (Allen 
2000), principally by having an incomplete or impoverished understanding 
of the process of analysis (Cooper 2005, p. 38). Polanyi’s discussions 
regarding the operations of tacit knowing within the problem-solving 
process contributes towards an expanded way to understand this process 
within intelligence analysis, specifically by providing a detailed account for 
how a ‘skilful performance’, involving the tacit knowing of the practitioner, 
is key.  
As explored in Chapter 2 within the sub-section Tacit knowing, 
perception is an activity and it normally involves some degree of skill.2 As 
acknowledged within the field of psychology, what we perceive and the 
degree or depth of our perception is an outcome of some engagement in 
skill (Chase & Simon 1973; Chi, Glaser & Farr 2014; Hamlyn 2017; Ingold 
2000; Kristiansen, Jensen & Trabjerg 2014). For example, the 
sportsperson in reading the ‘play’ of a game, anticipating where to be in a 
moment’s time; or the musician performing an instrument, creating 
harmonies and melodies. Polanyi adds to this acknowledgement, 
particularly by taking inspiration from findings within Gestalt psychology 
(Burley & Freier 2004; Kałamała et al. 2017; Wagemans 2013), that the 
process of perception is achieved by the ‘tacit powers’ of the practitioner, 
specifically involving the switching between ‘distal’ and ‘proximal’ 
awareness. In this sense, the ‘tacit integration’ of ‘particulars’ within the 
practitioner’s ‘subsidiary awareness’ offers a more complete and technical 
understanding of the process of using ‘tools’. The tool should assist this 
process of perception, according to Polanyi. He gives an example of the 
process of perception in this sense as the way a tune can be recognised, 
by comprehending how all the notes come together as a whole. To focus 
one’s attention on single notes within the tune is to lose the 
                                            
2 There are exceptions to the general rule that perception involves some level of ‘skill’. For example, the 
perception of danger or some kind of immediate threat to one’s safety could be perceived by instinct, requiring 
no prior learning, practice or refinement for recognising the threat.  
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comprehension of the tune overall (Polanyi 1962a, p. 59). This is 
illustrative, Polanyi argued, of how our attention can hold only one focus at 
a time, of ‘proximal’ or ‘distal’ awareness. Polanyi argued this scheme can 
be applied and expanded with respect to the ‘usefulness’ of tools. As 
Polanyi claims, ‘If we discredit the usefulness of a tool, its meaning as a 
tool is gone. All particulars become meaningless if we lose sight of the 
pattern which they jointly constitute’ (Polanyi 1962a, p. 59). Importantly, 
according to Polanyi, there is cause for concern if a so-called ‘tool’ 
diminishes or potentially undermines the process of tacit knowing: 
specifically, by confusing the epistemological ‘from-to’ orientation, moving 
from ‘particulars’ to ‘subsidiary awareness’. As will become clearer later in 
this chapter, particularly around the discussions regarding ‘destructive 
analysis’, this warning of Polanyi regarding the use of tools has a bearing 
on some of the potential dangers of using some SATs within the process 
of analysis. Before exploring Polanyi’s discussions of tacit knowing in 
relation to a ‘skilful performance’ for solving problems, it will be necessary 
to outline and contextualize the logic underpinning the use of SATs within 
intelligence analysis.  
SATs: an outline 
The reason for choosing to explore SATs within intelligence analysis is 
that these techniques form in part the foundation for contemporary analytic 
tradecraft practices (United States Marine Corp, 2011, p. 2; Coulthart 
2016; Frank 2012, p. 91; Heuer 2008b; Wirtz 2014b). In this regard, SATs 
represent a way for thinking about analytic practices, processes and ‘skill’ 
within this field. SATs have emerged partly in response to the broad 
recognition that despite some efforts being devoted to some aspects of 
analysis (presentation and outcomes), disproportionately less has been 
focused on what occurs intellectually in the process of thinking (Martin et 
al. 2011a; Moore 2007, p. x; Pherson 2013, p. 54).  
 Providing some historical context of the emergence of SATs, with a 
particular focus on the US, will clarify the motivation behind the 
introduction of these techniques. At the outset, for the purposes of this 
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thesis, it is important to acknowledge that SATs may serve a beneficial 
function within the overall process of intelligence analysis. The aim of this 
chapter is not to discredit the potential value of SATs, but rather to discuss 
Polanyi’s arguments regarding how problems are skilfully solved and the 
centrality of tacit knowing within this process. These discussions will 
include Polanyi’s epistemological considerations in relation to the use of 
SATs within intelligence analysis. 
The motivation for improving the accuracy and tradecraft of 
intelligence analysis within the national security field has largely been the 
result of intelligence failures, notably the 9/11 attacks and the war with Iraq 
over Saddam Hussein’s alleged possession of WMDs. Various 
Commissions and government reports into intelligence failures have cited 
poor critical thinking as a weak link contributing to such intelligence 
mistakes (Betts 2009; Bruce & George 2008; Butler 2004; Flood 2004; 
Hatch 2013; Kean & Hamilton 2004; Smith 2014; Wastell 2010). As 
Pherson and Pherson observed: 
Almost every post-mortem of past intelligence failures concludes that 
analysts were working from outdated or flawed mental mindsets and 
had failed to consider alternative explanations. Most recently, the Iraq 
WMD commission’s indictment of ‘poor tradecraft’ (critical thinking) and 
the 9/11 Commission’s judgment that analysis suffered from a ‘failure 
of imagination’ signalled the need to incorporate more rigour and 
creativity into the analytic process (Pherson & Pherson 2012, p. xxi). 
The Silbermann-Robb WMD Commission, in criticizing US 
intelligence analysis, reported a lack of rigorous analysis within the 
intelligence community and that the conclusions of analysts were based 
not so much on knowledge but on inferences and assumptions (United 
States Department of State 2005). It is clear that basing analysis on 
inferences and assumptions rather than reliable knowledge can lead to 
mistakes (Betts 2009; Lefebvre 2004; Lowenthal 2008; Pritchard & 
Goodman 2008; Vrist Rønn 2014).3  
Following US government investigations into the intelligence 
failures of Iraq and the 9/11 attacks, in 2004 the US implemented the 
                                            
3 The distinctions between knowledge and assumptions or beliefs is explored in greater depth in Chapter 4, 
within the section Genuine knowledge and belief.  
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Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act. A standout feature of 
this Act is how it aims to reform the daily tasks of analytic performance, 
what Betts refers to as the ‘enemy’ of intelligence analysis – particularly 
around inherent cognitive limitations of intelligence analysis (Betts 2007). 
This Act and the Directives which followed have been referred to as 
‘analytic transformation’ (Fingar 2011a; Immerman 2011). The Act legally 
requires that analysts are trained in and apply Structured Analytic 
Techniques (SATs) (section 1017, sub-section A).4 By 2004 a series of 
techniques came to be termed under the umbrella Structured Analytic 
Techniques, or SATs (Walsh 2012). The US government in 2004 also 
issued an Intelligence Community Directive that stipulated Analytic 
Standards for intelligence analysis and production, largely adopting SATs 
as the principal logic and methodology. An indication of the widening 
acceptance of the need and alleged value of SATs for the intelligence 
analysis process can be partly witnessed in the introduction of a new 
intelligence journal, created in 2016, entitled the International Journal of 
Intelligence, Security, and Public Affairs, which calls for contributions in 
the ‘form of analyses that make transparent and explicit their analytic 
methods/techniques used.’5 Taken together, the legal requirement for 
analysts within the US Intelligence Community to utilise SATs, coupled 
with the growing scholarly attention towards unpacking the potential value 
of such analytical tools (Borg 2017; Coulthart 2017b; Marrin 2012b; 
Pherson & Beebe 2015; Prunckun 2015; Heuer 2005, 2008b; Spielmann 
2014; Townsley, Mann & Garrett 2011), signals a strong institutional and 
intellectual interest for examining SATs within the discipline of intelligence 
analysis.  
The theoretical basis for SATs came from psychology research 
conducted by Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman in the 1970s and 
1980s (Coulthart 2016, p. 11; Kahneman 1973, 2003, 2011; Kahneman & 
Tversky 1982; Martin 2012; Tversky & Kahneman 1971, 1973, 1975). The 
key finding from their research was that people use heuristics to make 
                                            
4 For details of the Directive see https://fas.org/irp/dni/icd/icd-203.pdf. 
5 For more details see http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/usip20#.VuXXbUely-d. Date accessed 13.09.16 
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quick judgments, and such processes lead to predictable mistakes and 
errors (Coulthart 2016, p. 11). Richards Heuer then adopted these findings 
into intelligence analysis with his classic book The Psychology of 
Intelligence Analysis (1999), which became the justification or foundation 
for SATs (Coulthart 2016, p. 11). Heuer claimed that the subjects in 
Tversky and Kahneman’s study were comparable to intelligence analysts, 
who also use heuristics that can lead to errors (Heuer 1999). Heuer and 
Pherson posited the argument that analysts should transition from using 
quick-thinking and intuitive techniques, which engage heuristics, to those 
involving slower and more effortful or rigorous consideration (Richards & 
Pherson 2010).  
SATs are techniques designed to lay bare the thoughts of the 
analyst, by externalising their thinking and thereby increasing the 
transparency of the evidentiary basis of claims (Coulthart 2016, p. 937). 
These techniques are designed to potentially reveal any bias and 
misleading logic or hypotheses within the analysis, by increasing the 
transparency of the thought-processes or knowledge claims, and thereby 
increasing the accountability of the analytical process (CIA 2009; Marrin 
2007a; Martin et al. 2011a; Richards & Pherson 2010). Such techniques 
are designed to engage ‘meta-cognition’, or in the words of Mark 
Lowenthal, ‘…thinking about thinking’, to be mindful not just of the 
conclusions reached but how one reasons in this process (Lowenthal cited 
in Moore 2007, p. 8). SATs provide an ‘audit trail’, allowing outside 
observers to better understand the analytic basis of conclusions reached 
(Schwartz cited in Marrin 2007a, p. 7). The notion is that such processes 
will make it easier for analysts and co-workers to identify mistakes in their 
thinking, facilitating productivity and strengthening the reliability of the 
knowledge-base.  
The fundamental goals of SATs are to a) decompose the data and 
information for clearer analysis and b) reveal how the analyst arrived at 
their conclusions (ideally reducing bias in the process). This process is 
designed to assist analysts deal with what has been described as an 
increasingly more complex security landscape (Fingar 2011b, p. 7). 
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Heuer’s seminal work The Psychology of Intelligence Analysis (1999), 
covering cognitive limitations such as bias and mindsets, trumpeted the 
value of structured ways of analysing issues, to minimize but not entirely 
overcome these limitations facing the analyst.  
A useful document that provides an overview of SATs is the 
publication A Tradecraft Primer: Structured Analytic Techniques for 
Improving Intelligence Analysis, prepared by the US Government (CIA 
2009). This document characterises the various SATs according to their 
purpose. Diagnostic techniques are characterised in their aim for making 
analytical arguments, assumptions, or gaps of intelligence more 
transparent; contrarian techniques challenge current thinking; and 
imaginative techniques are designed to develop new insights, form new 
perspectives or create new outcomes (Primer 2009, p. 5).  
Many of these techniques can have a cross-over effect, possibly 
achieving a combination of these functions. At the foundation of SATs is 
‘Making analytic arguments more transparent by articulating them and 
challenging key assumptions’ (Primer 2009, p. 2). Importantly, it can be 
argued that SATs are deliberately designed to emphasise explicit 
knowledge and limit or reduce tacit knowing within the process of solving 
problems within intelligence analysis. With respect to Polanyi’s 
understanding of a ‘skilful performance’, in which tacit knowing is central to 
this process, SATs may epistemologically undermine the process of 
solving problems within intelligence analysis.  
Tools, objectivity and bias 
At the core of intelligence analysis remains the capacity to read and 
critically consider the information, which is a process subject to fallibility 
(Dahl 2017; Jervis 2010; Lowenthal & Marks 2015, p. 665; Warner 2017). 
SATs have been promoted by some as a means of reducing fallibility by 
increasing the analyst’s objectivity (Quarmby & Young 2010; Tan 2014, p. 
221). This idea is derived from the belief that analysts are both the 
cornerstone of fulfilling the intelligence capability and ‘the weakest link in 
any intelligence process’ (Quarmby & Young 2010, p. 221). This is due to 
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a variety of reasons, from the inability to deal with complexity to resistance 
to change (Pherson & Beebe 2015; Quarmby & Young 2010, p. 221; 
Heuer, Pherson & Beebe 2009; Wirtz 2012). These tools are intended to 
promote objectivity, since they are deliberately designed to be disruptive of 
‘natural’ (principally unstructured) thought processes, by guiding the 
analyst to systematically consider and externalise their thoughts and the 
basis of their knowledge claims (Kan et al. 2013; Pherson & Beebe 2015, 
p. xxxv; Prunckun 2015). 
In this respect, a principal aim of SATs is the exposing of the 
analyst’s mental ‘mindset’ (Frank 2012; Marrin 2016, 2017; Pherson & 
Beebe 2015; Heuer 2008b). The term ‘mindset’ refers to the 
representations of the analyst’s thinking within their analysis (Waltz 2014, 
p. 1). ‘Mindsets’ are the set of expectations that shape how people see the 
world, built upon conceptual models, or epistemological foundations for 
ways of thinking about what we know and our confidence in knowledge 
claims (Muller 2007; Pherson & Beebe 2015; Richards & Pherson 2010; 
Wirtz 2012, 2014a). As the analyst makes their thoughts more explicit in 
words or graphics, they render the basis of their thoughts more clearly 
intelligible to others (Waltz 2014, p. 1). Analytical tools therefore aim to re-
present the analyst’s understanding of observations and their reasoning 
process in an explicit fashion. The goal of SATs is therefore to generate 
reliable analysis, in terms of revealing uncertainties, ambiguities and flaws 
in understanding evidence, assumptions or inferences that can be hidden 
or ignored if they remained implicit (Waltz 2014, p. 2). Waltz notes 
Polanyi’s concept of tacit knowing, specifically that such forms of knowing 
serve as a precursor to discovery and logical forms of reasoning (Waltz 
2014, p. 46). Waltz adds that tacit knowing constitutes the ‘formative’ 
stages of the mind’s mindset, or ways for knowing things (Waltz 2014, p. 
46). A more accurate representation of Polanyi’s understanding of tacit 
knowing is that such tacit mental operations are integral to the whole 
cognitive process – they are not limited to being ‘formative’ to the mind’s 
‘mindset’ (Polanyi 1966b, pp. 4-6). We come to perceive precisely 
because of our mental powers of tacit integration, according to Polanyi. 
  81
Tacitly integrating pieces of the puzzle together to form a whole is not 
‘formative’, but essential for the entire process of cognition, according to 
Polanyi (Polanyi 1966b). In this sense, Polanyi re-casts epistemological 
considerations of tacit knowing with respect to efforts to use SATs to 
represent the analyst’s mental ‘mindset’. Specifically, according to 
Polanyi’s view, sufficient acknowledgment of tacit knowing is fundamental 
for more completely and accurately recognising the process of solving 
problems. It is precisely because of the practitioner’s tacit powers of 
integration that the process of solving problems is possible (Apczynski 
2014; Mullins 2013; Polanyi 1957, 1966b).  
The popularly recognised ideal for the scientist to reduce the 
personal elements from their work is captured in the character Sherlock 
Holmes as he instructs Doctor Watson, ‘It is of the first importance not to 
allow your judgment to be biased by personal qualities’ (Conan Doyle cited 
in Lathrop 2008, p. 328). This fictional character can even be found 
referenced as the embodiment of the ideals of intelligence, such as: ‘The 
real intelligence hero is Sherlock Holmes, not James Bond’ (Friedman 
1998, p. 159). This sentiment can be found echoed in Heuer and 
Pherson’s discussion of the allegedly problematic nature of relying on 
intuitive and non-scientific analysis (Richards & Pherson 2010). Other 
studies into the decision-making process of intelligence analysts have 
called for more accountability, or even that they should ‘take responsibility’ 
(Martin et al. 2011b, p. 16) by revealing how they arrived at conclusions 
with propositional or explicit knowledge.  
Polanyi challenges this aim of improving ‘objectivity’ and reducing 
‘bias’, where possible, since according to his view such goals 
misrepresent the importance of the personal ‘tacit’ engagement of the 
practitioner in the process of solving problems and making discoveries 
(Polanyi 1962a, p. 1). A prominent argument Polanyi articulates regarding 
this view is that the scientist must draw on their personal ‘tacit knowledge’ 
and avoid detachment, in order to solve problems (Polanyi 1962a). 
According to Polanyi, since all knowledge and perception contains to 
varying degrees a personal affirmation (Polanyi 1962a, pp. 64-75), 
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Polanyi’s view offers an alternative way for considering the aims within the 
intelligence field: specifically, another way for considering the process of 
solving problems in contrast to the conventional goal for improving 
objectivity of knowledge by removing the ‘personal’ aspect within the 
process of analysis.  
As O’Connor and McDermott argue, the problem-solving process 
can be understood as a progression from ‘analysis’, involving the 
interrogation of sources and ideas, to ‘synthesis’, or the cohering together 
of all the pertinent information, data and theories to provide an explanation 
(O’Connor & McDermott 1997a, p. 12). Such a view of problem-solving is 
consistent with the general view of intelligence analysis regarding the 
importance of contextualizing the information with respect to the security 
environment (Eck, Clarke & Petrossian 2013; Evans & Kebbell 2012; 
Wood et al. 2017; Zegart 2009). Polanyi adds to this by emphasising that 
the individual practitioner as a ‘knower’ is key to the process of solving 
problems in general. As he argues, the individual knower skilfully 
integrates their ‘focal’ attention within their ‘subsidiary awareness’, in order 
to solve problems (Polanyi 1966b, 1969). This skilful integration does not 
occur naturally or automatically, but as a result of the wilful act of the 
knower. Polanyi is not claiming that the practitioner should fail to be critical 
of their thinking, or mindful of how they reached certain conclusions. 
Polanyi’s understanding of the nature of perception, of the ‘knower’ being 
centre-stage, emphasises that the epistemological basis of removing the 
individual as much as possible to reduce bias and improve objectivity is 
misguided for solving problems and recognising knowledge claims.  
Skilful performance 
Polanyi’s discussions regarding a ‘skilful performance’, involving the 
practitioner’s tacit knowing, offers a more detailed epistemological account 
of the process of solving problems with regards to intelligence analysis. 
Whilst some intelligence scholars have touched on the tacit-explicit 
interaction (Dennis 2013; Margolis et al. 2012; Vogel 2013a; Waltz 2014, 
p. 62), Polanyi’s detailed examination of this topic can develop a more 
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robust understanding of this area within intelligence analysis. According to 
Polanyi, the process of solving problems requires the practitioner to take 
account of the complementary relationship between their explicit and tacit 
knowledge. As Polanyi states, ‘These two aspects of knowing have a 
similar structure and neither is ever present without the other’ (Polanyi 
1966b, p. 7). The practitioner is able to solve problems skilfully by drawing 
on their trained judgment and combining tacit relations which are 
indefinable (Polanyi 1962c, p. 8). With respect to the acknowledgement 
that human judgment is key within the process of intelligence analysis, 
including the (algorithm-rich) field of Big Data (Ahmadi, Dileepan & 
Wheatley 2016; Strang & Sun 2017; Van Puyvelde, Coulthart & Hossain 
2017a, p. 1400; Van Puyvelde, Coulthart & Hossain 2017b), Polanyi adds 
to this recognition that such analytic judgments should take account of the 
dynamic relationship between explicit and tacit knowledge. 
This dynamic relationship plays a significant role for understanding 
the process of a ‘skilful performance’ in solving problems with regards to 
the practitioner’s decisions as to what evidence or clues to collect and the 
meaning of such sources of information and data. Decisions regarding 
what evidence to accept or reject is a key concern of both the scientist 
(Devlin 2017; Laqueur 1983; Polanyi 1964; Sokal 2001) and the analyst 
(Betts 2009; Coulthart 2017a; Gill 2009; James et al. 2017; Marrin 2017; 
Phythian 2013). To better understand the nature of these decisions and 
appreciate the ‘skilful practice’ involved in this process requires a clearer 
epistemological picture of the distinction of these choices. Professor of 
philosophy Chris Mole, writing on the key philosophical lessons for the 
criminal and military intelligence analyst, outlines that there are two 
categories of evidence or clues – those that are ‘reliable’ and those that 
are ‘resilient’ (Mole 2012). According to Mole, evidence is ‘reliable’ if it is 
usually true, all things being equal. But what if other things are not equal? 
What if a different piece of evidence or clue offers alternative ways for 
interpreting the subject? What to believe in, or what the clues or evidence 
amount to in terms of significance, is a question of ‘resilience’. Two 
sources may be highly reliable, but differ in their resilience. In various 
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intelligence and science contexts, this is very difficult to identify and 
requires, according to Polanyi, a ‘skilful practice’ to make such distinctions 
around the weighting of evidence and clues. The resilience of claims is of 
a higher value for better understanding the topic or situation in question, 
because it more completely represents the context of the security 
environment (Mole 2012).  
Unlike the more exact sciences, in which, for example, ‘Pure gold is 
recognised by testing’ (Leonardo da Vinci cited in Bramly 1994, p. 303), it 
is not possible to consistently and definitively ‘test’ whether a hypothesis 
or evidence is ‘reliable’ or ‘resilient’ within intelligence analysis, like the 
social sciences more generally (Bruce & George 2008; Marrin 2017; 
Phythian 2017; Pringle Jr 2015; Townsley, Mann & Garrett 2011). 
Polanyi’s understanding of a ‘skilful performance’, involving the 
practitioner’s ‘tacit powers’ of integration, epistemologically articulates the 
need to sufficiently acknowledge the importance of tacit knowing within the 
process of analysis. Polanyi’s concepts of tacit knowing with respect to a 
‘skilful performance’ provides an expanded way for epistemologically 
recognising more completely the way the practitioner tacitly decides on the 
‘reliability’ and ‘resilience’ of evidence and clues. As will be presently 
examined, Polanyi’s concept of ‘indwelling’, which further expands on the 
concept of a ‘skilful performance’, provides a more in-depth and detailed 
epistemological understanding of the skilful use of tools, such as SATs, 
within the process of intelligence analysis. 
The concept of ‘indwelling’ ranges in meaning from the use of tools 
(Polanyi 1962a, p. 58), to the transmission of culture (Polanyi 1962a, p. 
219) to the appreciation of art (Polanyi 1962a, p. 234). ‘Indwelling’ is, 
according to Polanyi, expressed in the scientist exercising their selection 
and skilful use of tools. It occurs within the act of the practitioner making 
the tool form a part of their own body and mind (Polanyi 1962a, p. 61). As 
Polanyi stated, ‘when we accept a certain set of pre-suppositions and use 
them as our interpretive framework, we may be said to dwell in them as we 
do in our own body’ (1958, p. 60). According to Polanyi, the scientists 
pours themselves into the tool, assimilating the tool as parts of their own 
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existence (Polanyi 1962a, p. 61). This process occurs by the scientist 
merging their ‘subsidiary’ and ‘focal’ awareness. As Polanyi observes, ‘we 
can say that for the knower the subsidiaries have a meaning which fills the 
center of his focal attention’ (Prosch & Polanyi 1975, p. 38). As outlined in 
Chapter 2, within the section Tacit knowing, the act of knowing is the 
culmination of the process of orientation between the practitioner’s 
subsidiary and focal awareness. With respect to the use of tools, this 
process of orientation – the ‘from-to’ relationship of knowing – is assisted 
by the skilful engagement of tools, in which the practitioner ‘dwells’ in the 
exercising of those tools (Polanyi 1962a, p. iv).  
Polanyi further elaborates that the skilful performance is achieved 
by a deliberate effort of ‘indwelling’, which involves the expansion and 
interiorisation of the inquirer within the topic and tools within their use 
(Polanyi 1969, p. 148). Indwelling involves the acquiring of a new 
consciousness, the outcome of a repeated mental effort for the ‘service of 
some purpose’ (Polanyi 1962a, p. 62). The purpose of indwelling is 
reaching an understanding of the joint meaning of the ‘particulars’ (Polanyi 
1966b, p. 18), or how all the pieces of the puzzle cohere together to form a 
holistic picture. Throughout this process there is always the personal 
participation of the researcher, as Polanyi states: ‘Into every act of 
knowing enters the ‘personal coefficient’ (Polanyi 1962a, p. 17). The 
implication is that, according to Polanyi, all knowing amounts to the 
involvement of personal knowledge – a process in which the individual 
participates through indwelling (Prosch & Polanyi 1975, p. 44). The skilful 
navigation of a problem depends on the appropriate blending of the 
practitioner’s focal and subsidiary awareness. As Polanyi observes, ‘We 
are attending from these elementary movements to the achievement of 
their joint purpose’ (Polanyi 1962c, p. 10). This joint purpose is the tacit 
integration of subsidiaries into the focal awareness of the researcher, as a 
means for solving the set problems. Polanyi’s concept of ‘indwelling’ 
provides a more detailed and robust epistemological understanding of the 
use of tools within the process of solving problems. In this sense, Polanyi’s 
concept of indwelling presents a way for epistemologically considering the 
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use of SATs within intelligence analysis. These discussions contribute to 
this discourse by moving beyond the general acknowledgment within the 
intelligence field of the importance of ‘know how’, to more precisely 
understanding how we know, particularly in relation to the skilful use of 
tools.  
Related to the recognition of the importance of ‘know how’ within 
the intelligence field is the acknowledged value of inquisitiveness within 
the analyst. This acknowledgement of the importance of inquisitiveness as 
a quality for the analyst to possess is partly captured by an analyst in Rob 
Johnson’s study Analytic Culture in the US Intelligence Community: An 
Ethnographic Study, who observes: ‘I’m looking for links and patterns. 
Once I figure out the pattern, I can figure out where to look next’ (Johnson 
2005, p. 19). This value of inquisitiveness has been broadly recognised 
within the intelligence field (Bruce & George 2008; Carson 2009; Evans & 
Kebbell 2012; Hoffman et al. 2011). As the intelligence scholar Thomas 
Fingar observed regarding the inquisitive virtue within the intelligence 
analyst, ‘One of the most important parts of an analyst’s job is to formulate 
questions that will provide timely insight and can be answered with 
available or obtainable information’ (Fingar 2011a, p. 41). Richards Heuer 
observed the importance of analysts raising new questions, out of their 
own curiosity, that may lead to ‘previously unrecognized relationships’ 
(Heuer 1999, p. 75). In a similar spirit to inquisitiveness, ‘hunches’ have 
been acknowledged within the process of solving problems within the 
intelligence field (Jha 2011, p. 337; Lerner 2007; Silverman 2007; Smith 
2017), including law enforcement (Ferguson 2012; Horan 2007; 
Rosenbaum 2007; Silverman 2007, p. 134). Polanyi adds to this 
acknowledgement of the importance of inquisitiveness within the process 
of solving problems by emphasising the way the practitioner’s tacit 
knowing is key to asking the right questions and sensing proximity to the 
solution (Polanyi 1957, p. 93). According to Polanyi, it is these 
considerations in relation to the process of solving problems that tacit 
knowing is central to, of sensing a suitable line of inquiry that could bear 
fruit in the future. 
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Polanyi added to the importance of inquisitiveness within the 
process of solving problems is the skill involved in choosing and using 
suitable heuristics. As Polanyi argued, ‘systematic’ analysis is often too 
laborious, of checking every single possible outcome methodically, 
compared to the use of suitable heuristics that are not systematic (Polanyi 
1957, p. 97). Heuristics are key to progressing the process of solving 
problems since the premises of science cannot be explicitly formulated 
(Polanyi 1964, p. 85). The implications of this means that observations can 
lead to ‘… an infinite number of possible future observations’ (Polanyi 
1962, p. 23). Without the practitioner utilising suitable heuristics, according 
to Polanyi, investigations could spread out into a ‘desert of trivialities’ 
(Polanyi 1962a, p. 135). Polanyi emphasises the heuristic model of 
discovery based on ‘intelligent effort’, involving the ‘skilful’ talent of the 
scientist (Polanyi 1957, p. 90).  
Heuristics are involved in making comparisons from observations 
regarding whether deviations are entirely random or show a significant 
trend (Polanyi 1969, p. 106). According to Polanyi, in using heuristics the 
practitioner directs their attention towards a) highlighting suggestive 
features and b) remaining mindful of similar problems of which the solution 
is already known (Polanyi 1957, p. 99). Throughout this process the 
practitioner must draw on their mental powers of tacit knowing for solving 
problems (Polanyi 1962a). This would include assembling the facts 
together (Wastell, Clark & Duncan 2006, p. 36) and epistemological 
considerations regarding what evidence or clues are resilient and reliable, 
in the sense Mole makes of such distinctions within intelligence analysis 
(Mole 2012). The practitioner then anticipates a hidden potential solution, 
which will enable them to perceive deeper aspects of the problem (Polanyi 
1957, p. 99). Polanyi gives the example of the astronomer, who must 
decide whether the observed deviations from the theoretical path of a 
planet demonstrate any regularity, and if so, what precisely the presence 
or absence of such deviations amounts to (Polanyi 1969, p. 107). These 
arguments provide a more detailed epistemological account of what is 
meant by ‘know how’ with respect to the analyst solving problems within 
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their work flows, by utilising their inquisitiveness and pairing this with 
suitable heuristics. This process of solving problems, according to Polanyi, 
is akin to the act of placing stones in an arch, whose stability depends on 
the stones’ placement (Polanyi 1962a, p. 136). Throughout this process 
the scientist reduces the logical gap, leading to the discovery; the final 
stages of this process are at an accelerated pace (Polanyi 1957, p. 100). 
The solution to the problem confirms the validity of the heuristic process 
(Polanyi 1957, p. 101).  
Polanyi’s concepts of tacit knowing, including his discussions 
regarding the anticipation of solutions and sensing proximity to the 
answer, contributes to a more in-depth understanding of the generally 
recognised value of ‘know how’ required within intelligence analysis (Bruce 
& George 2008; Evans & Kebbell 2012; Kreuzer 2016; Lahneman & Arcos 
2017; Vogel 2013a). Similarly, such discussions by Polanyi further 
contribute towards more completely recognising the role of ‘hunches’ in 
the process of analysis, particularly with his observations regarding the 
switching between intuitive and computational (more systematic) thinking 
(Polanyi 1957, p. 102). In this sense, the acknowledged value of ‘hunches’ 
can be recognised more completely as the prefiguring of potential 
solutions, followed by efforts to ‘prove’ such hypotheses (Hadamard 1945, 
p. 49), involving the ‘tacit powers’ of integration of the practitioner. In 
relation to the acknowledged need to find ways for testing the 
effectiveness and validity of SATs (Johnson 2005, p. 20; Walsh 2012, p. 
253), Polanyi’s epistemological discussions regarding the practitioner 
solving problems highlights the need for recognising the role of tacit 
knowing within such tests.  
Destructive analysis 
The general aim of some SATs, being to provide an audit-trail of analytical 
thought processes and explicitly revealing the logic behind knowledge 
claims, may generate some potential epistemological challenges to the 
process of analysis, according to Polanyi’s understanding of the process 
of skilfully solving problems. Polanyi’s treatment of his concept of 
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‘destructive analysis’ offers a critical examination for discussing 
epistemological aspects of the broad aims of SATs. Polanyi argues that 
compartmentalization (or the breaking down of issues into their constituent 
parts, which is involved in what he refers to as ‘destructive analysis’) is 
valuable for some aspects of analysis, but the practitioner should not 
overly depend on this form of knowing and the knowledge produced (Meek 
2011, p. 240). This is because, according to Polanyi, the practitioner may 
fail to perceive the theory or object sufficiently as a whole. In a more 
technical sense, Polanyi warns that ‘destructive analysis’ can lead to the 
misguided focusing of attention wholly on the ‘particulars’, without 
sufficient recognition of ‘subsidiary awareness’, resulting in the ‘destruction 
of meaning’ (Polanyi 1962c, p. 601). The ‘meaning’ comes from a process 
of representing how all the pieces of the puzzle cohere together, involving 
the practitioner’s tacit powers of integration. As previously observed in the 
outline of SATs, the general aim of SATs is to externalise the thinking 
process, which arguably reveals the goal of privileging explicit knowledge 
within an epistemological hierarchy. The intelligence scholar Gregory 
Treverton made a similar warning to Polanyi’s ‘destructive analysis’, 
suggesting that analysts could be reduced to middle-weights if they were 
asked to become overly occupied with their methods and explicit regarding 
their logic, in the same way that chess masters can be reduced to middle-
weights if asked to explain their moves (Treverton cited in Moore 2007, p. 
xviii). Epistemologically such techniques, which aim to be more ‘rigorous’ 
by elevating propositional knowledge (Agrell & Treverton 2015; Jervis 
2010; Marrin 2017; Sinclair 2010, p. 5; Tang 2017), may undermine the 
analytical process itself by not sufficiently allowing the integration of tacit 
ways of knowing in this process. According to Polanyi, this would be a 
poor use of ‘rigour’ within a process of skilfully solving problems (Scott 
1985, p. 24).  
The intelligence scholar Amy Zegart drew attention to the perils of 
intelligence analysis as a process that does not sufficiently relate 
observations within the broader security environment. As Zegart observed 
regarding the risk assessments of Al Qaeda by the CIA before 11 
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September 2001, such reports ‘pointed out the trees but never provided a 
picture of the forest’ (Zegart 2009, p. 115). The fundamental lesson of this 
intelligence failure Zegart and other intelligence scholars draw attention to 
(Eck, Clarke & Petrossian 2013; Ellis-Smith 2016; Evans & Kebbell 2012; 
Hoffman et al. 2011; Wirtz 2014a) is that an improvement to the process of 
intelligence analysis needs to move beyond the assemblage of data and 
evidence towards an emphasis on skilfully integrating the observations 
within the security environment. Polanyi’s discussions around tacit 
knowing and personal knowledge contribute towards better understanding 
how such examples of ‘intelligence failures’, such as 9/11, can occur. 
According to Polanyi’s framework, such mistakes can occur because of 
the process and product of analysis inadequately cohering together the 
analysts’ tacit and personal knowledge within their assessments. This 
observation within the intelligence field highlights that any attempts to 
augment the value of intelligence analysis as a process and a product 
must sufficiently acknowledge and engage the tacit and personal 
knowledge of the respective analysts to assist with forming an accurate 
representation of the security environment.  
It has been acknowledged within the intelligence field that since 
some SATs require the analyst to explicitly reveal their thought-processes, 
this may potentially carry certain risks of confounding the clarity of the 
practitioner’s thinking (Lillbacka 2013, p. 322; Vrist Rønn & Høffding 
2012). Yet Polanyi’s discussion of ‘destructive analysis’ provides a more 
nuanced and detailed understanding of some of the specific risks of over-
compartmentalisation within the process of analysis. Polanyi’s discussion 
of ‘destructive analysis’ offers a more in-depth treatment of the generally 
acknowledged observation within intelligence literature that intelligence 
analysis as a process should sufficiently locate the observations within the 
broader security environment (Margolis et al. 2012; Ouagrham-Gormley 
2014; Smith 2017; Warner 2017; Zegart 2009). In this sense, Polanyi’s 
concept of ‘destructive analysis’ contributes towards a more nuanced 
understanding of epistemological considerations within the process of 
analysis and articulates some of the potential limitations of the use of 
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SATs. Specifically, Polanyi’s discussion regarding tacit knowing, involving 
a ‘from-to’ relation between ‘focal’ and ‘subsidiary’ awareness, articulates 
more precisely the aim of the process of the practitioner tacitly integrating 
and cohering the observations and information within the broader security 
environment.  
Polanyi’s detailed understanding of the nature of perception, 
specifically that we perceive the object due to its context or environment 
(Polanyi 1969, p. 111), articulates the way the perils of ‘destructive 
analysis’, particularly over-compartmentalization, can undermine the 
process of intelligence analysis. Since SATs are generally intended to 
identify and externalise the basis of knowledge claims, this necessarily 
involves a system of categorizing and compartmentalizing knowledge, 
ranging from the type of information and data collected to the reliability of 
the knowledge or source. Such a process, as Polanyi recognises, can 
contribute to a clearer understanding of the issues. The problem of 
‘destructive analysis’ occurs when this process of breaking down the 
issues into their constituent parts can lead to over-compartmentalization, 
which may undermine the capacity of the analyst to reconfigure all the 
information together again, to see the whole picture coherently. 
Wordsworth captures this sentiment of the dangers of 
compartmentalization within the process of analysis and understanding a 
subject: 
Sweet is the lore which Nature brings;  
Our meddling intellect 
Misshapes the beauteous forms of things: - 
We murder to dissect (Wordsworth 2000, p. 131)  
 
Since the broad epistemological logic and aim of SATs is largely 
devoted to promoting explicit knowledge, such an aim may undermine the 
process of tacit knowing, which may ‘murder’ the thinking process in order 
to ‘dissect’ it. This was Zegart’s key criticism of the CIA’s assessment of 
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the threat posed by Al Qaeda before the 9/11 attacks, namely, the report 
pointing out the trees but not a picture of the forest (Zegart 2009, p. 115).6  
The general aim of SATs is partly to make the analyst aware of their 
‘mindset’ (Muller 2007; Pherson & Beebe 2015; Richards & Pherson 2010; 
Wirtz 2012, 2014a), as a means for developing more objective analysis 
(George 2004, p. 312). SATs represent or are expressions of conceptual 
models, which serve to shape the mindsets of those who use such models 
for understanding knowledge. Conceptual models influence what is 
observed and how those observations are made intelligible. SATs in this 
regard privileges explicit or propositional knowledge, whilst simultaneously 
diminishing the significance of tacit ways of knowing. Such an approach to 
solving problems, without sufficiently acknowledging the primacy of tacit 
knowing within this process, may undermine not only the process but also 
the product of intelligence analysis. Specifically, what knowledge is 
generated and whether it is considered credible and acceptable. The 
intelligence scholar Graham Allison outlined how conceptual models 
shape analysis in terms of both the process and the product:  
Conceptual models not only fix the mesh of the nets that the analyst 
drags through the material in order to explain a particular action, but 
they also direct the analyst to cast nets in selected ponds, at certain 
depths, in order to catch the fish he/she is after (Allison 1969, p. 273). 
The following historical analogy can serve to illustrate how 
conceptual models shape or sometimes dominate how problems are 
perceived and solved. 
London in the mid-nineteenth century was in the throes of a cholera 
epidemic. The victim who suffers from cholera experiences extreme 
diarrhoea, losing many litres of water over several hours. The victim of this 
disease expires essentially from dehydration, as the organs of the body, 
which require sufficient levels of water, shut down. Despite the medical 
field during this period understanding the importance of hydration for 
healthy functioning bodies, and the observable effects of victims of cholera 
                                            
6 The complete quote by Zegart is as follows: ‘Between 1998 and 2001, the CIA produced hundreds of analyses 
about Osama bin Laden and Al Qaeda… Not one of them provided a broad overview of Al Qaeda’s involvement 
in past terrorist activities, a comprehensive view of Al Qaeda strategy, or its relationships with other 
governments. And none assessed the nature or scale of the threat that Osama bin Laden’s terrorist network 
posed to the United States. CIA assessments pointed out the trees but never provided a picture of the forest.’ 
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losing substantial volumes of water, it did not occur to them as a 
professional community that what was needed the most was rehydration 
for the victim (Johnson 2006b). Instead, what was offered was a whole 
range of cures that exacerbated the symptoms and accelerated the 
patient’s death. Solutions offered included leeching and the consumption 
of brandy. The medical field at the time was aware that these solutions 
further dehydrated the individual (Johnson 2006b).  
This historical analogy from the medical field is apt, since Polanyi 
was himself qualified as a physician and well-versed within science, and 
the intelligence field has shown a keen interest in aligning itself with the 
medical profession and science more generally. Whilst the medical field 
during this time was not of the same standard of today, without adequate 
specialisation or sophisticated tools and methods for scientifically 
observing and testing hypotheses, there remains an important 
epistemological lesson that has a bearing on intelligence analysis. 
Specifically, this lesson highlights the dangers of over-
compartmentalisation, which leads to inadequately integrating 
observations together, along with how dominant conceptual models shape 
(sometimes erroneously) how the problem should be perceived. The logic 
underpinning the use of SATs is to promote more ‘rigour’ within the 
problem-solving process (Chang et al. 2017, p. 4), which may lead 
potentially to the perils of ‘destructive analysis’, the outcome of which 
could be the exacerbation of the problem by not sufficiently integrating the 
information and data together to generate a coherent picture overall of the 
security environment. SATs in this sense may be akin to the solutions 
offered to those who suffered from cholera in London in the 19th century, 
i.e. remedies that (knowingly) exacerbated the symptoms rather than 
address them.  
As Polanyi observed, our ‘interpretative framework’ is deeply 
implicated not just in how we discover but also what we perceive (Fennell 
2016, p. 47). The logic underpinning the use of SATs may represent a 
broader conceptual model in this sense, which privileges analytical 
processes that are externalised whilst also diminishing the value of non-
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externalised tacit knowing. The lack of research to demonstrate empirically 
that SATs improve the process or product of analysis should raise some 
scepticism around such techniques (Artner, Girven & Bruce 2016, p. 4; 
Borg 2017; Chang et al. 2017, p. 4; Gentry 2015; Heuer Jr 2009). With 
respect to Polanyi’s discussions regarding a skilful performance, this lack 
of demonstrating the effectiveness of SATs for improving intelligence 
analysis could be because such techniques fail to sufficiently acknowledge 
or engage tacit ways of knowing within the process of solving problems. 
Polanyi’s perspective of how the practitioner skilfully solves problems re-
casts considerations around the tacit operations of the practitioner in the 
process of solving problems, and highlights some of the issues of over-
compartmentalisation in this process. These views in relation to 
intelligence analysis and SATs in particular shed light on some of the 
epistemological problems some analytical techniques may pose for the 
analyst as they attempt to solve problems.  
Conclusion 
As Polanyi makes clear, tacit knowing is central to the process of solving 
problems, the contents of which are indeterminate, and some of which can 
only be known ‘tacitly’ (Polanyi 1969, p. 140), defying complete 
propositional or explicit articulation. Because of this, Polanyi argued the 
best way to recognise the centrality of tacit knowing within the process of 
solving problems is in relation to examining epistemological considerations 
regarding a ‘skilful performance’. Polanyi’s discussions in this regard, 
which involves the practitioner engaging their tacit knowing (Mullins 2002, 
p. 206), provide an enriched outlook for similarly understanding the 
process of analysis within intelligence analysis. Polanyi provides a way for 
understanding the epistemological process of solving problems with tacit 
knowing being fundamental to this position (Polanyi 1969, p. 140). The key 
to Polanyi’s argument of the centrality of tacit knowing within the process 
of solving problems is not just that there are things ‘we know but cannot 
say’ (Polanyi 1969, p. 195), but the relationship between tacit and explicit 
knowledge. Specifically, the process of solving problems involves an 
epistemological orientation of what Polanyi describes as a ‘from-to’ 
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relation. The practitioner moves ‘from’ their focal awareness ‘to’ their 
subsidiary awareness within the process of solving problems. For 
example, in the process of reading a text, we move from the words to their 
intended meaning. Polanyi expands upon this discussion of the ‘from-to’ 
relation of tacit knowing within the process of a ‘skilful performance’ with 
his concept of ‘indwelling’. This involves the practitioner skilfully 
assimilating the tools and methodologies selected so they form a part of 
their being, as an extension of an awareness of themselves (Prosch & 
Polanyi 1975, p. 38). For example, the investigator ‘dwells’ in the case 
they are pursuing, by assimilating the collection of evidence, clues and 
theories for explaining how it relates together. Polanyi’s discussions 
regarding this relationship between the practitioner’s ‘focal’ and 
‘subsidiary’ awareness, along with his concept of ‘indwelling’, provides a 
more nuanced understanding of ‘know how’ within the process of 
intelligence analysts solving problems.  
Polanyi casts some doubt towards systems of thinking, or tools that 
promote certain ways of thinking, which insufficiently engage or undermine 
tacit knowing within the process of solving problems. Since the general 
aim of SATs is arguably to promote explicit knowledge over tacit knowing 
(George 2010; Khalsa 2009; Marrin 2008, 2017; Martin et al. 2011a; 
Richards & Pherson 2010, p. 5), Polanyi’s epistemology raises some 
questions around such analytical tools. SATs may hold some value for 
unpacking certain issues for analysis (see Appendix 2)7 (Miller 1956; 
Rasanen & Nyce 2013; Heuer 2008b; Varela, Thompson & Rosch 2017), 
and in this sense these analytical tools may provide assistance from a 
cognitive point of view (CIA 2009; Trent, Patterson & Woods 2007; Folker 
2000, pp. 1-2; Moore 2007). Yet Polanyi’s concept of ‘destructive analysis’ 
contributes a detailed epistemological warning regarding the perils of 
methodologies or tools, potentially some SATs, which can lead to the 
over-compartmentalization of the constituent elements being examined.  
                                            
7 Philip Mudd provided permission to use this email in the thesis. His career included being the Deputy Director 
of the CIA Counterterrorist Centre. Transitioning to the FBI, he became the first Deputy Director for the National 
Security Branch in 2005, later adopting the role as a Senior Intelligence Advisor.  
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The warning of destructive analysis does not apply to all SATs 
equally. For example techniques like ACH or Devils’ Advocate are 
principally designed to imagine other ways of understanding issues or 
possible scenarios. On the other hand, SATs which are designed to have 
the analyst make their methods and logic explicit, by providing more 
‘rigour’ via an audit trail of the analyst’s thought processes, possess a 
greater propensity (by design) to lead to the negative aspects of 
destructive analysis. 
Such analytical tools may undermine the capacity of the practitioner 
to reconstitute these compartmentalized elements, reducing their capacity 
to cohere their ‘focal’ with their ‘subsidiary awareness’ (Polanyi 1962a, pp. 
52-4). In this sense, Polanyi’s technical account for recognising the 
potential dangers of ‘destructive analysis’ sheds some critical light on the 
use of SATs, specifically with respect to tools that may undermine the 
process of analysis – by pointing out the ‘trees’ but not a complete picture 
of the ‘forest’ (Zegart 2009, p. 115). Sufficiently integrating and 
synthesising all the information and data together to develop a coherent 
picture of the security landscape is the defining characteristic of ‘quality 
analysis’ as a process both within the national security and law 
enforcement fields (Eck, Clarke & Petrossian 2013; Evans & Kebbell 2012; 
Nolte 2012; Wood et al. 2017; Zegart 2009). Taken together, Polanyi re-
casts a perspective for more precisely understanding the epistemological 
primacy of tacit knowing with respect to the process of a ‘skilful 
performance’ for solving problems. Whilst the national security and law 
enforcement fields acknowledge that the process of solving problems 
within intelligence analysis involves ‘know how’, Polanyi contributes to this 
acknowledgement by providing a more in-depth epistemological account 
for the process of how we know.  
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Chapter 4: Personal knowledge 
Introduction 
Taking a synoptic or broader view of the discipline of intelligence analysis, 
which can be characterised as a ‘knowledge-building’ activity (Bruce 2008, 
p. 171), it can be observed that the heart of the field is driven by 
epistemological considerations. The previous chapter focused on 
exploring Polanyi’s concept of a ‘skilful performance’, particularly in 
relation to developing a more nuanced understanding of skilfully solving 
problems, including the use of tools within the process of analysis. The 
aim of this chapter is to explore Polanyi’s concept of personal knowledge 
with respect to more completely perceiving what it means for the 
intelligence analyst to ‘know’ something as a knowledge product. Polanyi’s 
concept of personal knowledge contributes towards developing a more 
epistemologically robust comprehension of knowledge claims. The bearing 
this has for intelligence analysis is in relation to discussions regarding the 
‘tradecraft’ or the discipline of this field. To examine this, a discussion of 
some key epistemoligies will be outlined, providing some context to 
Polanyi’s concept of personal knowledge and what this standpoint means 
in relation to what an intelligence analyst may claim to ‘know’. This will 
include exploring Polanyi’s arguments regarding the traditional distinctions 
within epistemology of ‘genuine knowledge’ and ‘belief’. Polanyi’s concept 
of personal knowledge will be further examined in relation to better 
understanding the education and training within the intelligence 
profession, by highlighting the primacy of the analyst, like the scientist, 
and of learning from their own practice and ideally under gifted masters in 
the field. Especially with respect to the general aim within the intelligence 
analysis field to become more closely aligned with ‘scientific’ principles, 
Polanyi’s concept of personal knowledge contributes towards this 
discourse by his re-casting of what it means to ‘know’ something, with the 
‘knower’ being centre-stage for such knowledge products.  
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The School of Athens – Ways of Knowing 
The keen interest within intelligence analysis for understanding precisely 
what it means to ‘know’ something in terms of the intelligence ‘product’ is 
captured by former Secretary of State and U.S. Army Chief of Staff 
General Colin Powell, in the lead up to the 1991 Gulf War, directing the 
Intelligence Community to: ‘Tell me what you know, tell me what you don’t 
know, tell me what you think, and make sure you clearly distinguish cases’ 
(Powell cited in Whitney 2005, p. 204).  
John Hamre, former US deputy Secretary of Defence, echoed this 
view of making these important epistemological distinctions, with reference 
to the incorrect estimate of Iraq’s WMD program:  
Another observation I would make concerns what philosophers call 
epistemological questions: How do we know what we know, and how 
good is the information that comprises this knowledge? Is it reliable? Is 
it true? This is the core of the intelligence community’s problem (Hamre 
cited in George & Bruce 2008, p. 135).  
Some policy experts and political scientists routinely claim that, 
particularly in relation to the development of WMDs, such scientific 
knowledge is explicit (Ouagrham-Gormley 2014, p. 17). Acknowledging 
Polanyi’s concept of tacit knowing, Sonia Ouagrham-Gormley, in her study 
into the acquisition and use of specialised knowledge in relation to the 
development and identification of biological weapons, clearly indicates that 
what it means to ‘know’ something goes beyond ‘explicit’ knowledge 
(Ouagrham-Gormley 2014, pp. 17-36). Polanyi’s concept of personal 
knowledge, involving ‘tacit’ knowledge, provides a more robust 
epistemological account for understanding what it means to ‘know’ 
something, which necessarily goes beyond propositional or ‘explicit’ 
knowledge claims.  
Since intelligence analysis is designed to reduce ignorance (Omand 
2014, p. 22) with respect to what it means to ‘know’ something, exploring 
some of these broader concepts epistemologically will help with 
understanding intelligence analysis as a product. As acknowledged within 
the intelligence field, making these epistemological distinctions as outlined 
by Powell springs from meaningful analysis, achieved not simply by the 
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ability to recall or arrange the facts, but developing patterns that relate 
those facts to the broader concepts, and to engage procedures that 
facilitate this process (Elstein 1978, p. 276; Mathams 1988, p. 16). 
Polanyi’s concept of personal knowledge articulates the importance of the 
‘knower’ within knowledge claims, which emphasises that the manner by 
which the ‘broader concepts’ are synthesised into understanding 
knowledge as a product should sufficiently acknowledge the ‘knower’ 
within such acts. Polanyi’s concept of personal knowledge serves to better 
understand what it means to ‘know’ something epistemologically as a 
knowledge product.  
Intelligence analysis as a field shares many important 
epistemological similarities with science (problem-solving, making 
discoveries, skilful use of tools, verification of knowledge claims) and holds 
greater interest in a posteriori knowledge, rather than a priori knowledge 
(Agrell & Treverton 2015; Dexter, Phythian & Strachan-Morris 2017; 
Lahneman & Arcos 2017; Lillbacka 2013; Manjikian 2013; Vrist Rønn & 
Høffding 2012). Both a priori and a posteriori refer mainly to how, or on 
what basis, a proposition may be known (Greco & Sosa 2002, pp. 243-70). 
Both intelligence analysis and science alike focus on knowledge acquired 
from empirical observations, of knowledge that is characteristically a 
posteriori. In contrast, a priori knowledge develops knowledge not from 
relying on observations, but instead by reasoning about aspects of reality 
and developing maxims or principles to better understand reality. 
Examples of knowledge claims that are characteristically a priori include: 
cubes have six sides; blue is a colour; water is composed of H2O. These 
claims are true, but the truthfulness of such claims does not depend on 
empirical observations. These claims can be justified independent of 
observations (Audi 2010). These epistemological considerations, for what 
it means ‘to know’ something, carry implications both for understanding 
knowledge-processes but also for knowledge-products. With respect to 
intelligence analysis, these considerations are at times implicitly 
considered, regarding managing bias and uncertainties within complex 
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information systems (Bammer 2010; Duvenage 2010; Hoffman et al. 2011; 
Lowenthal & Marks 2015; Smith 2017). 
It is fitting to use some aspects of Raphael’s masterpiece The 
School of Athens to explore some distinctions between the two 
fundamentally different forms of logic, being ‘induction’ and ‘deduction’, 
since Aristotle (featured prominently in this artwork) is perhaps the first 
philosopher in the West to have developed a rudimentary theory of tacit 
knowledge (Mohajan 2016, p. 8). 
 
Figure 2: The School of Athens 
Raphael (Winner 2012, p. 290) 
For the purposes of this thesis, this artwork contains a visual 
representation capturing the two main philosophical views of gaining 
knowledge,  
featuring the philosophers Plato and Aristotle in the centre. Plato is 
pointing towards the heavens, emphasising the rationalist mode of thinking 
– of logic and reason as the golden standard for generating knowledge. In 
contrast, Aristotle is pointing downwards towards the earth, emphasising 
empiricism, or insight generated from observations, as the most suitable 
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path to gaining knowledge. These two broad modes of thinking hold 
diverging views regarding what it means to ‘know’ something. As will 
become clear, the standpoint characterised by Plato emphasises the 
rational form of knowledge, in contrast to Aristotle who emphasises 
observable evidentiary content of knowledge. Polanyi’s concept of 
personal knowledge, like science in general, sits between these two broad 
schools of thought. According to Polanyi’s concept, knowledge claims 
involve elements of both rationalism and empiricism. Yet importantly, in 
relation to intelligence analysis, the analyst should sufficiently recognise 
that knowledge claims should be understood and guided by the ‘knower’. 
This framework emphasises, in terms of forms of logic, engaging in both 
deduction and induction – along with appreciating their own personal 
knowledge. Knowledge claims also require, according to Polanyi, 
adequately taking into account the validation or acceptance of the 
community of practitioners within the respective tradition. Turning to some 
broader philosophies around what it means to ‘know’ something will 
provide greater context to Polanyi’s concept of personal knowledge and 
the bearing this has for understanding the discipline of intelligence 
analysis.  
Plato’s emphasis on form places the primacy of logic and reason as 
the best means for gaining knowledge. Knowledge claims and knowledge 
processes are ‘correct’ as a product insofar as the process is adequately 
reasonable or logical. In terms of formal logic distinctions, this standpoint 
emphasises ‘deduction’. If the premises are correct, the answer must 
follow. With reference to intelligence analysis, efforts for generating 
universal standards and ‘rational’ processes for analysis could be 
characterised as being philosophically aligned to the position of Plato in 
this sense – of what could be described as a ‘top down’ approach. Efforts 
by some scholars to develop or discuss a universal intelligence analysis 
model (Dahl 2012; Marrin & Clemente 2006, pp. 642-665) are akin to this 
broader epistemological ‘top down’ approach. Such efforts for developing 
a ‘cohesive analytical identity’ (Kerbel 2008, p. 107), have been likened to 
an aim which is arguably a desire for artificial precision (Herbert 2013, p. 
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654). Polanyi’s concept of personal knowledge and his broader 
discussions regarding the absence of ‘rules’ within science articulate more 
precisely why efforts for imposing ‘universal’ views or standards of science 
are misguided (Polanyi 1962a).  
In contrast to the Platonic ‘top-down’ approach to understanding 
knowledge claims, there is the ‘bottom-up’ foundation as represented by 
Aristotle. Aristotle placed greater emphasis on empirically making 
observations, guided by the logic of induction for developing knowledge 
claims. The Canadian philosopher Louis Groarke explains Aristotle’s 
reasoning regarding why he advocated empiricism and induction as a 
means for generating knowledge claims and making discoveries: 
On the Aristotelean account, induction is not a matter of proof but of 
discernment. We observe this or that instance and come to see the 
underlying principle at work… We do not prove through tabulation; we 
recognize, in a flash of illumination, what must always be the case 
(Groarke 2009, pp. 366-67). 
What this means in relation to intelligence analysis, to the extent to 
which analysts engage in empirical observations and utilise the logic of 
induction (Agrell & Treverton 2015; Lahneman & Arcos 2017; Marrin 2016; 
Mole 2012; Prunckun 2015), is that empiricism and induction operate as a 
heuristic method. Furthermore, there is the more recent addition of 
‘abduction’ as a form of reasoning which has been acknowledged within 
the intelligence literature. Abduction refers to the best reasoning based on 
limited observations (Moore, 2007; Mullins, 2002; Fennell, 2016). 
Epistemologically, this is consistent with the claim that analysts operate as 
a ‘bricoleur’ (Innes, Fielding & Cope 2005, p. 50; Lynch 1993), specifically 
by recognising that they work with what analytical tools and data and 
information is available to them. This form of reasoning has become 
particularly relevant given the expansion of ‘open source’ material as 
engaged by intelligence agencies (Gaudet, 2013 , pp. 169; Zegart, 2009; 
Van Puyvelde, Coulthart, & Hossain,  2017b; Lowenthal, 2008). Polanyi’s 
understanding of knowledge more generally, of making decisions on 
incomplete information, is consistent with the principles of abduction. 
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Polanyi’s concept of personal knowledge articulates 
epistemologically that within the field of intelligence the work of the analyst 
is too diversified for there to be a single overarching ‘top down’ approach 
to understanding knowledge claims as a product (Bang 2017; Chang & 
Tetlock 2016; Gentry 2016; Herbert 2013, p. 653; Kerbel 2008). According 
to Polanyi, since there is no ‘scientific method’, the scientist must draw on 
their personal knowledge, which importantly posits that knowledge claims 
must sufficiently acknowledge the role of the ‘knower’. This is the central 
argument underpinning the idea of a bottom-up understanding of what it 
means to ‘know’ something. Knowledge claims are affirmed by the 
‘personal coefficient’ of the analyst’s personal knowledge, which according 
to Polanyi, is a fundamental feature of what it means to ‘know’ something 
(Polanyi 1962a, p. 267). Polanyi’s arguments in relation to the authority of 
science as a valid form of inquiry and way of understanding knowledge 
claims as an enterprise further highlights the bottom-up way of perceiving 
knowledge as a product. According to Polanyi, the ‘authority of scientific 
opinion’ is ‘essentially mutual’, being ‘established between scientists, not 
above them’ (Polanyi 1969, p. 56, emphasis in original). The authority of 
knowledge claims can therefore be characterised as being bottom-up, 
according to Polanyi’s view. This perspective has a bearing on the 
intelligence analysis discipline by offering an alternative way of 
considering a broad range of epistemological issues, principally in relation 
to what it means to ‘know’ something.  
Just as there are epistemological considerations regarding the 
process of solving problems, as examined in Chapter 3, these ways of 
knowing carry over to what is known as a knowledge product. More 
precisely, the methodology and ‘skilful performance’ not only shapes how 
knowledge is generated, but also provides an epistemological basis for 
understanding the knowledge as produced. Whilst this is generally 
acknowledged within the intelligence field regarding ‘mindsets’ and 
‘conceptual models’ (Allison 1969, p. 273; Muller 2007; Pherson & Beebe 
2015; Richards & Pherson 2010; Wirtz 2012, 2014a), Polanyi’s 
contribution to this recognition is in relation to clarifying the primacy of the 
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knower within knowledge claims. As Polanyi makes clear, since science is 
an enterprise that combines the logic of deduction, induction, and 
empiricism within the production of knowledge, it becomes a matter of 
emphasis regarding how the knower understands knowledge claims 
(Doing 2011; Gelwick 2005; Henry 2010; Polanyi 1966b). In relation to 
intelligence analysis as a ‘knowledge-building’ enterprise, knowledge 
claims should sufficiently acknowledge the knower, according to Polanyi’s 
understanding.  
The outline of the distinctions between analysis and synthesis, as 
observed in Chapter 1 by Ed Waltz, served to highlight that the process by 
which problems are solved influences or shapes the knowledge produced. 
As Waltz argued, analysis operates by searching for presumed effects 
(possible solutions) backwards, or looking for causes that could produce a 
certain effect. Once the causes are known for producing a certain effect, 
the process amounts to the validation of a hypothesis. In contrast, 
synthesis proceeds by a position of theoretically generating plausible 
causes, by constructing or assembling the cause-to-effect chain – aiming 
to prove a hypothesis (Waltz 2003, p. 160). With reference to the School 
of Athens, there is Aristotle pointing towards the earth, representing 
analysis by referring to the evidence as the primary means to understand 
the effect-to-cause. In contrast Plato, who is pointing towards the heavens, 
represents the synthesis – the solution is in some respects considered to 
be already ‘known’ and the evidence is explained with reference to the 
overarching accepted theory or model (cause-to-effect). Polanyi’s 
epistemology, involving his concept of personal knowledge, contributes to 
this discussion with an understanding of knowledge as a product; 
specifically, the need to acknowledge that there is always a ‘personal 
coefficient’ (or bottom-up) affirmation of knowledge claims (Polanyi 1962a, 
1969).  
To tether these discussions around the broad top-down or bottom-
up perspectives for understanding knowledge as a product, it would be 
useful to examine an example in the intelligence field. The CIA’s post-
mortem analysis surrounding the Cuban Missile Crisis provides a suitable 
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example of clearly observing some of the epistemological limitations with 
the top-down understanding of knowledge claims. In Sherman Kent’s 
words, ‘We missed the Soviet decision to put missiles into Cuba because 
we could not believe that Khrushchev could make a mistake’ (Kent 1964). 
Sherman Kent’s dismissal of the flawed analysis and report of the Cuban 
missile estimate ‘proved that the CIA was right and it was Khrushchev who 
had been in error!’ (Agrell & Treverton 2015, p. 72). Kent defended the 
methods, logic and reasoning behind the analysis. It was reality that was 
at fault; no amount of observations and inductive logic – before or after the 
result – could challenge Kent’s conviction that the process and logic which 
led to the (failed) analysis was not incorrect or at fault. This is because 
Kent’s epistemology emphasised the top-down understanding of 
knowledge. Specifically regarding the generally accepted conventions and 
rules regarding how international leaders could (or should) understand 
what is in their best interests. Such normative arguments spring from the 
top-down approach to understanding knowledge as a product. In this 
sense, clues and evidence that do not ‘fit’ with the accepted logic are 
demonstrably dismissed.  
The key point here should not be that intelligence analysts can get 
it wrong, since it is a given this is inevitable (Betts 2009; Bruce & George 
2008; Marrin 2004; Pherson 2013; Smith 2014; Wastell 2010). The facts 
and clues can at times be interpreted in an indefinite variety of ways, as 
can be observed by Michael Hayden’s (former Director of CIA and NSA) 
quip: ‘If it were a fact, it wouldn’t be intelligence’ (Hayden cited in Jervis 
2010, p. 1). The real issue at stake relates to the basis from which 
knowledge claims are understood as knowledge ‘products’. In the case of 
the Cuban missile crisis, the incorrect intelligence report (in terms of the 
knowledge produced) was the outcome of mistaking provisional 
knowledge for actual knowledge (Agrell & Treverton 2015, p. 66). The 
comments by Sherman Kent in relation to the post-mortem report tellingly 
reveals that the top-down position for understanding knowledge claims, 
which emphasises established rules and maxims for comprehending the 
security environment, has an important bearing on understanding what it 
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means to ‘know’ something. Polanyi’s concept of personal knowledge 
contributes towards epistemologically understanding the centrality of the 
knower within knowledge claims, or the bottom-up way of viewing 
knowledge claims. In this sense, Polanyi’s concept of personal knowledge 
provides an epistemological account for recognising some of the perils of 
understanding knowledge claims because of orthodox, or seemingly 
established rules or maxims (the top-down model).  
The concept of personal knowledge, which is characteristically a 
bottom-up way of understanding knowledge claims, has a bearing on 
some contemporary challenges facing criminal intelligence analysts. For 
example, it can be argued that the epistemological challenges facing 
criminal intelligence analysts in relation to emerging cybercrimes partly 
indicate that the top-down established or traditional ways or rules for 
investigating these crime types are not useful. Specifically, the difficulties 
facing criminal intelligence analysts regarding identifying suspects in the 
cybercrime ‘virtual’ world, prioritizing avenues of inquiry, or attributing 
evidentiary guilt of an alleged offender, all require a clear understanding of 
what it means to ‘know’ something, in this case within the virtual online 
space (Collins & McCombie 2012; Décary-Hétu & Dupont 2012; Lanier & 
Cooper 2016; Leppänen & Kankaanranta 2017; Lyda & Hamrock 2006; 
Smith & Ingram 2017; Wall 2007). Polanyi’s concept of personal 
knowledge, which emphasises a ground-up approach to understanding 
knowledge claims, based on the experiences of the practitioners in the 
local tradition, may serve to more clearly understand the challenges facing 
law enforcement in the cybercrime field.  
The bottom-up approach emphasises the value within knowledge 
claims of intuition and ‘hunches’ and modes of thinking which engage in 
non-formalised logic (Gigerenzer & Brighton 2007; Dreisbach 2011; 
Ferguson 2012; Horan 2007; Lahneman & Arcos 2017; Lerner 2007; Vrist 
Rønn & Høffding 2012). With respect to understanding ‘intuition’ with ‘tacit’ 
knowledge, Polanyi used the terms at times interchangeably (Polanyi 
1963, p. 274). In some areas Polanyi made the point that the process of 
knowing could involve intuition, yet importantly acknowledged that such a 
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form of knowledge is characteristically ‘tacit’, of being difficult to articulate 
completely (Polanyi 1963, p. 139). 
This mode of thinking which elevates tacit knowledge and the 
understanding of the knowledge produced, was promoted by Carmen 
Medina, who was responsible for making a series of key knowledge 
sharing innovations within the CIA.8 Medina argued that for analysts to 
keep abreast of the fast-changing security environment they must be 
adventurous and be intuitive (Medina 2002, p. 3). Polanyi’s view 
contributes to this argument, by further articulating the way the knowledge 
produced by the investigator is closely related to the engagement of their 
tacit and personal knowledge (Polanyi 1962a). Importantly, Polanyi 
cautions that the scientist, and by extension the intelligence analyst, 
should be aware that induction and empiricism is often overstated within 
the path to making discoveries (Polanyi 1962a, p. 177). With respect to 
contributing to the discourse within intelligence analysis of what it means 
to ‘know’ something, Polanyi presents the view that ultimately the person 
involved in the process of problem-solving must draw on their personal 
knowledge and there should be a sufficient acknowledgement of the 
knower within understanding the knowledge products. This concept of 
personal knowledge further builds on arguments raised in Chapter 3 
regarding the process of skilfully solving problems. As Polanyi articulates, 
there is a nexus between tacit knowing (or how we know as a process) 
and the need to recognise the personal knowledge of the knower within 
knowledge as a product (Fischer & Mandell 2009; Lemaitre 2017; 
Massingham 2016; Polanyi 1962a, 1966b; Wright 2016). 
Genuine knowledge and belief  
The intelligence profession, like the broad field of science (Agrell & 
Treverton 2015; Rasanen & Nyce 2013), maintains that there is an 
important distinction between inferences characteristically based on ‘belief’ 
                                            
8 Carmen Medina was one of the leading instigators of Intellipedia, an online collaborative tool akin to Wikipedia, 
which is considered one of the most significant advancements for the intelligence community in the United 




and judgments founded by ‘genuine knowledge’ (Wing 2000). One of the 
analyst’s core task involves ‘distinguishing genuine knowledge from mere 
belief,’ requiring a ‘demonstration of a clear connection between 
judgments and beliefs’ (Herbert 2006, p. 667). Herbert claims that the 
analyst requires a systematic effort to achieve this task of distinguishing 
between knowledge and belief. Otherwise, the analyst could succumb to 
‘layering’ and ‘analytic bias’, the outcome of the ‘repacking of . . . highly 
processed judgments for later use as plain and simple facts’ (Herbert 
2006, p. 669).  
This raises the question regarding the difference between what one 
‘knows’ and what one confidently ‘believes’. As Herbert asked, ‘How does 
someone delimit a relevant articulation of what he or she does not know?’ 
(Herbert 2006, p. 667). Polanyi’s contribution to this discussion is that 
there is always the personal participation within acts of understanding, but 
this does not make such understanding subjective (Polanyi 1962a, p. 1). 
Polanyi, like the Psychologist Carl G. Jung, attempted to bridge the 
tension between the inner subjective experience and outer scientific ways 
of producing knowledge (Hall 1982, p. 1). In Polanyi’s words, ‘The act of 
knowing includes an appraisal; and this personal coefficient, which shapes 
all factual knowledge, bridges in doing so the disjunction between 
subjectivity and objectivity’ (Polanyi 1962a, p. 17). Along the spectrum of 
knowledge as a product, Polanyi claims there are three types, being the 
following: objective, subjective and personal. Polanyi explains the 
distinction between objective and subjective knowledge by way of outlining 
the nature of a theory, as being ‘something other than myself’ (Polanyi 
1962a, p. 4). The more a set of rules can be articulated and laid out in 
writing, the more it is characterised as a ‘theory’ (Polanyi 1962a, p. 4). The 
accuracy of a theory or lack thereof is independent of the individual 
examining or utilising it. Polanyi uses the analogy of a theory as similar to 
a map – which the scientist can use to find their way through uncharted 
territories. The accuracy of the map is independent of the user, and as 
such can be considered a form of knowledge that is outside the individual 
and is ‘objective’. ‘Objective’ forms of knowledge, such as a map, are 
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impersonal (Polanyi 1962a, p. 4). Such an understanding of ‘objective’ and 
impersonal knowledge can be observed especially within the ‘hard’ 
sciences, such as physics and chemistry (Gillispie 2016; Karpenko & 
Claggett 2017; Weber 2017).  
Polanyi diverges from the usual distinctions of understanding 
‘objective’ and ‘subjective’ forms of knowledge to what he proposes as 
personal knowledge. This form of knowledge is neither objective nor 
subjective. Since the scientist submits to the requirements within their 
field, independent of them, personal knowledge is not subjective; and 
since the knowledge created by the practitioner’s actions is directed partly 
by their own efforts, the knowledge produced is not objective either 
(Polanyi 1962a, p. 300). It is a commitment to uncovering the truth that 
can safeguard the personal knowledge of the scientist from being merely 
subjective (Polanyi 1962a, p. 65). This sentiment is captured well by 
Polanyi’s explanation of the ‘heuristic passion’, an important aspect of 
personal knowledge: 
Intellectual passions do not merely affirm the existence of harmonies 
that foreshadow an indeterminate range of future discoveries, but can 
also evoke intimations of specific discoveries and sustain their 
persistent pursuit through years of labour. The appreciation of scientific 
value merges here into the capacity for discovering it; even as the 
artist’s sensibility merges into his creative powers. Such is the heuristic 
function of scientific passion (Polanyi 1962a, p. 143). 
Polanyi made the distinction between our personal commitments 
and our subjective states, in which we endure our feelings. This is the 
nexus that constitutes the personal, which is neither subjective nor 
objective (Polanyi 1962a, p. 316). According to Polanyi’s view of science 
involving personal knowledge, the approximations to the truth can only be 
considered and understood by believing in an objective reality (Polanyi 
1962a, p. 322). Polanyi’s concept of personal knowledge springs partly 
from his view of perception, which involves an active commitment and 
exercising of skill (Polanyi 1962a, p. iv). Polanyi’s logic of personal 
knowledge re-conceptualises the traditional epistemological distinctions 
between ‘genuine knowledge’ and ‘belief’ – which has a bearing within 
intelligence analysis regarding what it means to ‘know’ something.  
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With respect to understanding the value of the knowledge product, 
some intelligence scholars have cautioned against the use of non-
systematic heuristics within intelligence analysis (Dreisbach 2011; Herbert 
2006, pp. 675–679; Pherson & Beebe 2015; Richards & Pherson 2010), 
due to the potentially unreliable knowledge produced (Dreisbach 2011, p. 
758; Ferguson 2012; Martin et al. 2011a; Martin et al. 2011b). Other 
scholars have argued that systematic methods of analysis may discourage 
‘gut instinct’ and can generate ‘sterile’ knowledge products and lack 
imagination (Sims cited in Johnson 2010, p. 399). Polanyi’s concept of 
personal knowledge contributes to recognising more completely the value 
of non-systematic heuristics for solving problems and understanding the 
knowledge produced (Polanyi 1957, p. 103). This is because, according to 
Polanyi, the generation of knowledge products cannot always be based on 
or relied on by formulated (or top-down) precepts, since no definitive 
propositional precepts or rules may exist (Polanyi 1964, p. 33-4).  
It is not surprising that intelligence analysis as a field has sought to 
align itself as a discipline with science, since science and intelligence alike 
are concerned with both ‘verification’ and ‘falsification’ of knowledge 
claims (Agrell & Treverton 2015; Hicks 2013; Marrin 2011b; Legrand & 
Vogel 2012; Wirtz 2012). Efforts within the intelligence field to align the 
discipline of analysis with the aims of science, notably of ‘falsification’, 
have been promoted by several intelligence scholars (Lillbacka 2013, p. 
307; Marrin 2017; Mathams 1988; Pherson & Beebe 2015; Prunckun 
2015; Richards & Pherson 2010). With respect to the acknowledgement 
that different types of logic play a significant role in shaping the knowledge 
produced (Allison 1969, p. 273; Gaudet 2013; Hudson 2009; Turner 2014), 
this has a bearing regarding how the knowledge produced can be 
understood. Induction involves the process of discovery and the 
verification of a generalisation, depending on the availability of data and 
observations (Mathams 1988, p. 17; Tang 2017; Ylikoski 2017). Deduction 
is aimed towards the development of universal rules within a closed 
system (such as mathematics, physics). Yet, since intelligence analysis 
rarely deals with closed systems for analysis, it has been acknowledged 
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within the intelligence field that there should be some caution for engaging 
in deduction (Jensen 2018; Mathams 1988, p. 17; Miller 2011; Wirtz 
2012). This acknowledgement is largely the reason why some advocates 
of structured methodologies argue that intelligence analysis, in terms of 
the knowledge produced, can only approximate the discipline of science 
(Khalsa 2009; Marrin 2011b, p. 21; Marrin & Clemente 2005, p. 711; 
Spielmann 2014). Yet, as Polanyi makes clear, central to understanding 
knowledge claims within science is sufficient acknowledgement of 
personal knowledge, partly because there are no ‘rules’ in science. 
Because of this, the scientist, according to Polanyi, must draw on their 
personal knowledge to make decisions regarding, for example, whether 
evidence or clues are to be accepted or dismissed. 
Polanyi’s contribution to this discussion regarding the role of 
different types of logic in understanding knowledge claims can be 
observed in his treatment of empiricism in the understanding of knowledge 
claims within science. These arguments presented by Polanyi have a 
bearing on both the national security and law enforcement fields of 
intelligence analysis, since these areas utilise empirical observations for 
developing and understanding knowledge claims (Dupont 2017; Evans & 
Kebbell 2012; James et al. 2017; Peters & Cohen 2017; Silverman 2007). 
With respect to the national security field, the centrality of empiricism can 
be observed with reference to the existence of large intelligence-gathering 
systems. Such systems are driven in part because of the belief that with 
more information and data collected the pieces of the puzzle will more 
clearly reveal the answers (Kevin O'Connell cited in Agrell & Treverton 
2015; Eck, Clarke & Petrossian 2013; Treverton et al. 2006, p. 14). 
Polanyi challenges the epistemological basis for according undue 
credence to the alleged central role of empiricism and the logic of 
induction in science. As Polanyi observed, ‘The part played by new 
observations and experiments in the process of discovery in science is 
usually over-estimated’ (Polanyi 1964, p. 29). Such a view stands against 
the conventional understanding of science, as promoted by Karl Popper. 
Popper argued that the human mind is naturally inclined to think 
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inductively, which provides the opportunity to find regularity in the world, 
yet generates unreliable knowledge, whereas the logic of deduction is 
contrary to the natural process of thinking (Popper 1966 pp. 23–27, 37–44, 
66, 98, 104–105).  
This popular view of science and how the knowledge produced by 
such a ‘scientific’ basis can be observed within intelligence literature. For 
example, Professor David Carter stated that the knowledge produced by 
intelligence analysis, like the discipline of science, involves the use of 
‘…inductive and deductive reasoning…’ (Carter cited in Marrin 2012c, p. 
531). Polanyi referred to two statements to outline this popular view of 
induction within the philosophy of science: ‘The philosopher of science is 
not much interested in the thought processes which lead to discovery…’ 
(Reichenbach cited in Einstein 1949, p. 289); or ‘The gist of the scientific 
method is…verification and proof, not discovery’ (Mehlberg 1955, p. 127). 
Polanyi argued that philosophers of science extensively refer to induction 
as an intellectual instrument for making discoveries and understanding 
knowledge claims, but when they at times realise that this is not how 
discoveries are made, or how knowledge claims are understood, they 
dismiss these instances by relegating such criticisms to psychology 
(Polanyi 1962a, p. 14). Polanyi opposed this popular view of science with 
respect to the logic of induction and empiricism to make discoveries and 
comprehend knowledge claims. This has an important epistemological 
bearing on intelligence analysis in terms of understanding what it means to 
‘know’ something. Specifically, Polanyi more accurately represented the 
role of empiricism and induction within science, which recasts how to 
understand knowledge products within intelligence analysis.  
Polanyi’s argument that scientific discoveries and the knowledge 
produced cannot be accounted for with reference to the accumulation of 
empirical observations and inductive logic articulates a similar position as 
understood from the intelligence profession regarding the limited value of 
empiricism and induction within understanding knowledge claims (Eck, 
Clarke & Petrossian 2013; Evans & Kebbell 2012; Wood et al. 2017; 
Zegart 2009). For example, as Roberta Wohlstetter observed regarding 
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the case study of the intelligence failure of Pearl Harbor, such a failure 
occurred despite the possession of arguably9 sufficient data and 
information about Japanese military movements and intercepted 
communications. Yet, analysts were not able to separate the ‘signals’ from 
the ‘noise’ (Wolhstetter 1962), or generate a clear picture of what the 
existing information and data amounted to.  
The analysts failed to produce ‘quality analysis’ as understood by 
O’Connor and McDermott; more specifically, analysts did not sufficiently 
synthesise the information to understand the security environment in 
context (O’Connor & McDermott 1997b; Silver 2012). Polanyi 
epistemologically articulates that empiricism and induction, whilst they 
serve a useful purpose up to a point, do not completely capture what it 
means to ‘know’ something, which requires sufficient recognition of the 
personal affirmation of knowledge claims (Polanyi 1962a).  
Other leading figures within the intelligence field, such as Carmen 
Medina from the CIA and former US Secretary of Defence Colin Powell, 
have recognised the limitations of knowledge as a product that has been 
based on an undue reliance on empiricism and induction as a way of 
generating knowledge claims. Medina outlined and criticized the emphasis 
at the CIA on aggregating data and looking for new developments (based 
on empiricism and induction) which could provide insight (Medina 2002, p. 
24). Within a similar spirit, Colin Powell, shortly after taking office, 
cancelled the production of The Secretary’s Morning Summary, the daily 
compilation of updates of overseas developments. Powell wanted ‘think 
pieces’ instead, which could provide more valuable knowledge in relation 
to contextualizing knowledge claims within the security environment 
(O’Connor & McDermott 1997a, p. 12) and therefore promote a clearer 
understanding (Johnson 2010, p. 401). Taken together, Polanyi’s 
contribution to this discussion relates to his emphasis on what it means to 
‘know’ something, with the individual knower being centre stage. Polanyi 
challenged the orthodox understanding that science generally progresses 
                                            
9 It is widely recognised within the intelligence field of the principle of ‘hindsight bias’, of the view that most 
events will appear clearer after the event has occurred.  
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along by empirical observations and inductive logic. In this sense, 
Polanyi’s discussions regarding the nature of science and knowledge 
claims provides an enriched epistemological account of the criticisms 
raised by some within the intelligence field, notably of Powell and Medina, 
regarding the challenges to the value of empiricism and induction for 
understanding the security environment. To better understand knowledge 
claims, in the manner Medina and Powell intended, Polanyi’s articulation 
of personal knowledge outlines a foundation for sufficiently acknowledging 
the knower within knowledge claims. This concept provides a nuanced 
epistemological basis for recognising the ‘personal coefficient’ within 
knowledge claims and more completely recognising knowledge as a 
product (Doing 2011; Henry 2010; Polanyi 1966b). 
Tradecraft: training and education 
Training and education for any profession or field of study can be 
understood as being aimed towards refining the process of skifully 
performing tasks and also the delivery of a quality end product (Giurgiu, 
Barsan & Mosteanu 2015; Pirolli 2006). Training and eduction are 
therefore directed towards developing the means, or the process of 
knowing, and the ends, or how the practioner comes to ‘know’ knowledge 
claims. It is the latter aim of training and education that this chapter will be 
focussed on.  
With respect to how intelligence analysis is understood as a 
discipline, there are important considerations regarding what guiding 
principles should inform the teaching and learning of this profession. Part 
of the challenge behind deciding on such principles relates to the 
acknowledged ambiguity surrounding how analysts develop questions and 
arrive at judgments, based partly on an absence of empirical research 
(Cooper 2005; Fingar 2011a, p. 131; Herbert 2013; Vandepeer 2016, p. 
29). This lack of understanding has implications for how to train analysts, 
specifically regarding the development of training programs and mentoring 
arrangements for assisting analysts (Heuer 1999; Lowenthal & Marks 
2015; Phythian 2009). Some scholars of intelligence analysis have argued 
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that the profession should move away from models of teaching and 
learning which emphasise the ‘craft’ by way of ‘apprenticeship’ under 
analytic ‘masters’ (Cooper 2005, p. 17; Marrin 2008, p. 139) to a more 
systematic and formal model. Polanyi challenges the argument that the 
teaching and learning of a profession can develop without the sufficient 
engagement of the skilled master in the field. Polanyi emphasised that the 
learning of a tradecraft, or the skilful exercising of a profession, requires 
training and education under (ideally) gifted masters of the field. Polanyi’s 
understanding of ‘masters’ in the field is not dissimilar to how the 
intelligence profession understands someone as being an ‘expert’. The 
‘expert’ can be distinguished from ‘novices’ as understood within the fields 
from the military, to law enforcement and national security (Taylor et al. 
2013, p. 479). For the purposes of this thesis the broad understanding of 
‘expertise’ and ‘master’ will be understood as a ‘skillful execution of 
knowledge and skill to achieve effective action’ (Fiore, Hoffman & Salas 
2008, p. 2). In this sense, the ‘master’ Polanyi refers to is an individual 
who has developed expertise and embodies the aptitudes, knowledge, 
and acumen for solving problems competently within a tradition (Johnson 
2003).  
 The law enforcement literature which explores the investigative 
practice and skills of detectives reveals competing positions regarding the 
nature of such work (Brunger, Tong & Martin 2015; Reiner 2010). Of 
particular interest in terms of the knowledge and skills involved in the 
practice of criminal investigations is how such knowledge and skills are 
developed. Especially since intelligence analysis involves the skill of 
perception, of knowing what to look for and generating a clear 
understanding of the information and data, Polanyi’s position regarding the 
development of the skill of perception has some bearing for the 
intelligence analysis field. According to Polanyi, the capacity to correctly 
perceive objects is a skill acquired via a process of learning, practice, and 
experience (Polanyi 1969, p. 106). The refinement of the practitioner’s 
skill-set within a tradition involves the development of their personal 
knowledge. In this regard, Polanyi’s concept of personal knowledge 
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contributes towards a deeper understanding of how the analyst learns to 
perceive what it means to ‘know’ truth claims, by exercising their personal 
knowledge. Since the practitioner, according to Polanyi, skilfully integrates 
the collected information and data and generates their own personal 
understanding of it, such an understanding constitutes the creation of new 
knowledge. Personal knowledge in this regard represents the skilful 
creation of new knowledge, being ‘personal’.  
The transmission of a skilled craft, involving unspecifiable tacit 
elements, cannot be entirely taught by propositional knowledge, according 
to Polanyi. The apprentice must submit to the master practitioner because 
they trust their ways of solving problems, ‘…even when you cannot 
analyse and account in detail for its effectiveness’ (Polanyi 1962a, p. 53). 
This is because part of the development of the practitioner’s personal 
knowledge, in particular what it means to understand truth-claims, can 
only be achieved with respect to the transferring of ‘tacit’ knowledge, by 
way of example by the master. Whilst the intelligence field has observed 
the value in learning from (ideally gifted) experts in the field (Alschuler 
2007, p. 3; Campbell 2011; Devine & Loeb 2014; Jensen 2011; Shaw 
2007, p. 42), Polanyi provides a more complete epistemological standpoint 
for robustly understanding this requirement within the development of the 
practitioner’s personal knowledge.  
Polanyi placed greater emhasis on understanding the practice of 
science as a ‘craft’, involving the individual exercising their ‘practical skills’ 
within a ‘skilful performance’, as examined in Chapter 3. With respect to 
understanding the discipline of intelligence analysis, especially with 
regards to what it means to ‘know’ something, Polanyi posited the 
requirement to sufficiently acknowledge the knower within the knowledge 
generated. This nuanced understanding of knowledge claims, involving 
the personal knowledge of the practitioner, epistemologically contributes to 
arguments raised within understanding intelligence analysis as a 
discipline. For example, Mathams, writing of intelligence analysis in 
Australia, observed that analysis is ‘… no simple or routine activity but a 
highly skilled and subtle task’ (Mathams 1982, p. 8). With respect to the 
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learning of this profession, Robert Sinclair in his article Thinking and 
Writing observes that within the Directorate of Intelligence within the CIA 
there is the acknowledgement that analysis is a ‘craft’, most of which is 
learnt on the job (Sinclair 2010, p. 5). Polanyi adds to this, by clarifying 
that learning within a craft requires the individual to practice the tasks 
themselves, along with learning the ‘art’ which cannot be specified in 
propositional knowledge, since no prescription for such art exists; hence, 
the need to learn such knowledge from observing and emulating as an 
apprentice under gifted masters in the field, if possible (Polanyi 1962a, p. 
55). Polanyi emphasises that the development of the skills required to 
perform a task adeptly within a tradition comes from the refinement of their 
personal knowledge, which is key to understanding knowledge claims and 
expertise within that tradition. Sinclair, in his writing of expertise, implicitly 
hints towards the personal dimension of knowledge which is partly tacitly 
known to the practitioner (Sinclair 2010, p. 5): 
A centipede was happy quite 
Until a frog in fun said, “Pray, which leg comes after which?” 
This raised its mind to such a pitch 
It lay distracted in a ditch 
Considering how to run. 
 Polanyi provides a more epistemologically detailed account for why 
an individual, even an accomplished expert, may be incapable of 
describing in words or graphically represent how they know certain things. 
As Polanyi clarifies,  
The words I have spoken and am yet to speak mean nothing: it is only 
I who mean something by them. And, as a rule, I do not focally know 
what I mean, and though I could explore my meaning up to a point, I 
believe that my words (descriptive words) must mean more than I shall 
ever know, if they are to mean anything at all (Polanyi 1962a, p. 252).  
Polanyi argues that our ability to articulate ideas linguistically is 
partly a function of our inarticulate intelligence (Colapietro 2011, p. 53; 
Fennell 2016; Jha 2011; Meek 2011; Mullins 2013). With respect to 
learning within a discipline, Polanyi emphasised the need for the individual 
to learn ‘on the job’ by practice (Polanyi 1957, p. 95). Polanyi gives the 
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example of learning to solve mathematical problems, a skill developed 
principally by practice (Polanyi 1957, p. 95). Polanyi’s nuanced arguments 
around the tacit aspect of learning contribute to the broad recognition 
within science and the intelligence field that expertise is partly developed 
by practice (Alschuler 2007; Carson 2009; Evans & Kebbell 2012; Giurgiu, 
Barsan & Mosteanu 2015; Kreuzer 2016; Ouagrham-Gormley 2014; 
Taylor et al. 2013). Polanyi’s inversion of the traditional hierarchy of what it 
means to ‘know’ something – with an emphasis on personal and tacit 
knowledge, rather than impersonal and propositional knowledge – 
provides an alternative epistemological perspective regarding how to 
perceive the development of expertise within a discipline (Fennell 2016; 
Fothe 2012; Mullins 2013). This contributes towards a deeper 
understanding of the tacit aspect of learning the tradecraft of intelligence 
analysis as a discipline. 
Polanyi’s discussions of the development of expertise within a 
profession presents some epistemological insights into similar aims with 
intelligence analysis, regarding the practitioner expertly making 
discoveries and verifying knowledge claims. According to Polanyi, 
expertise in a field requires learning the ‘rules of the art’, which the 
individual practitioner assimilates by integrating such rules within their 
‘practical knowledge’ (Polanyi 1962a, p. 50). Throughout the process of 
learning, Polanyi stressed that the development of expertise comes from 
the art of practicing heuristic reasoning within the field (Polanyi 1957, p. 
96). The value for developing expertise in this manner was outlined by the 
son of Michael Polanyi, John Polanyi (who received the Nobel Prize in 
Chemistry in 1986). John Polanyi observed the central importance of 
developing a refined sense of curiosity as the hallmark of an expert 
scientist.10 As John Polanyi observes, ‘So, yes, we do turn over stones, 
but the art is to pick the right stone’ (Polanyi 2002). Sherman Kent, a 
seminal figure within the intelligence profession, made a similar 
observation regarding the challenges facing the historian for choosing the 
most suitable topic to study. In Kent’s words, ‘Everywhere he looks, he 
                                            
10 A video presentation by John Polanyi uploaded on May 2010. An excerpt from this video on his website, 
which can be accessed online at: http://sites.utoronto.ca/jpolanyi/videos/. 
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sees possible ground, and his very freedom to look everywhere is one 
reason why he sees no point in digging at any given spot’ (Kent 1967, p. 
13). Kent adds that ultimately the decision rests with the inquirer’s ‘natural 
preferences’. Michael Polanyi was convinced that the way the inquirer 
decided on which stone to pick up, or which line of research could be most 
valuable, was a key aspect of the nature of science. Polanyi expanded on 
this aspect, by emphasising that these decisions involved skill, particularly 
of a ‘tacit’ nature, which required development and practice under rigorous 
training within a tradition. It is this training and practice which refines the 
practitioner’s skill, which forms aspects of their personal knowledge. As 
Polanyi observes,  
The capacity for making discoveries is not a kind of gambler’s luck. It 
depends on natural ability, fostered by training and guided by 
intellectual effort. It is akin to artistic achievement, and like it, it is 
unspecifiable but far from accidental or arbitrary (Polanyi 1962a, p. 
111).  
According to Polanyi, the development of expertise within a tradition 
can be assisted with a master-apprentice relationship. Whilst this 
relationship has been acknowledged in the learning of expertise in the 
intelligence field (Devine & Loeb 2014; George 2010; Johnson 2010; 
Pherson 2009) – especially with respect to the recognised skill of choosing 
suitable lines of inquiry as a means for navigating through volumes of data 
(Bruce 2008; Chi, Glaser & Farr 2014; George 2010; Mudd 2015; Wastell, 
Clark & Duncan 2006) – Polanyi provides a more complete 
epistemological explanation as to why this relationship is important for the 
learning of a tradecraft. According to Polanyi, since what it means to 
‘know’ something involves ‘tacit knowledge’ (since all knowledge claims 
have ‘tacit’ epistemological roots), it follows that expertise in some areas 
partly depends on sufficiently observing masters in the field and rigorous 
practice (Polanyi 1969, p. 195). The primacy of an apprenticeship for 
developing expertise is because the master themselves may not be 
completely aware or conscious of how they know certain things, since they 
understand knowledge claims, at least partly, in a ‘tacit’ fashion.  
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Polanyi’s contribution to this acknowledgement is that the reason 
this master-apprentice learning process is indispensable is due to the 
development and transmission of tacit knowing. As the practitioner within a 
local tradition is not always aware of how they perform certain tasks, since 
a propositional prescription may not exist for it (Polanyi 1966b, p. 4), 
Polanyi stressed that the refinement of expertise in a field requires a 
master-apprentice relationship, which is reflective of the optimum 
measures for ‘tacitly’ understanding knowledge claims or what it means to 
‘know’ something. Polanyi epistemologically articulates and builds upon 
findings, particularly within the Knowledge Management field, that indicate 
how some activities of practitioners in diverse fields involve perceptual 
abilities and skills of a ‘tacit’ nature, revealing that what is ‘known’ cannot 
be reduced (at least not completely) to formulated propositional rules or 
routines for learning (Giurgiu, Barsan & Mosteanu 2015; Martin, Philp & 
Hall 2009; Massingham 2004; Petranker 2005; Styhre 2008, p. 13; Von 
Krogh, Ichijo & Nonaka 2000). Models of learning within intelligence 
analysis designed to develop expertise that promotes propositional 
knowledge (Agrell 2002; Chang & Tetlock 2016; Dahl 2012; Johnson 
2007; Marrin 2008; Marrin & Clemente 2006, pp. 642-665) without 
sufficient acknowledgement of tacit knowing may lead to an incomplete or 
impoverished understanding of what it means to ‘know’ something, 
according to Polanyi (1964, p. 85).  
Within some quarters of the intelligence field, there are those who 
elevate propositional knowledge whilst downplaying the value of tacit 
knowing both with regards to the learning and practice of intelligence 
analysis. This position can be observed in the following study into the 
‘analytic culture’ in the US intelligence community. 
As long as intelligence analysis continues to be tradecraft, it will remain 
a mystery…the lessons learned in tradecraft, unlike those of other 
disciplines, often occur without being captured, tested, or validated… 
data collected … indicated… general methods that could be formalized 
indicate that this process would then lead to the development of 
intelligence analysis as a scientific discipline (Johnson 2005, p. 20). 
Polanyi challenges this idea that the master-apprentice process of 
learning expertise within a tradition can be substituted by formalised 
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education and propositional knowledge. Polanyi refers to the medical 
profession as an example of the importance of the master-apprentice 
model of learning expertise within the educational process of the medical 
student (Polanyi 1962a, pp. 56-73). Whilst some intelligence scholars 
have observed that the field of intelligence analysis can be characterised 
as being a ‘craft’ (Gentry 2016; Marrin 2005, p. 1; Marrin & Clemente 
2005; Modern Intelligence Analysis 2011) ‘operating within an 
apprenticeship system’ (Cooper 2005, p. 6), Polanyi’s views stand in 
contrast to those who argue for the need to move away from master-
apprentice relations for learning expertise within intelligence analysis. 
Agrell is another who argued for the need of the intelligence field to evolve 
from a tradecraft to a profession. As Agrell observes, ‘If a modern 
profession is characterized by the transformation from improvisation and 
master-apprentice relations to formalized education and training programs, 
then intelligence analysis has come a long way’ (Agrell 2002, p. 3). Agrell 
further observes,  
The work of a profession is not the successful miracles of the gifted 
amateurs or the skilled craftsmen but a systematic employment of 
knowledge, where methods are visible and verifiable, their employment 
can be tested, and the results can be predicted (Agrell 2002, p. 3).  
Polanyi disagrees with this position, observing that  
it is of the essence of a tradition to remain unformulated, and traditions 
can therefore be transmitted only by the personal apprenticeship of 
succeeding generations to the example of their elders (Polanyi 1962a, 
p. 32).  
These discussions regarding the pedagogical foundations of the 
discipline of intelligence analysis have implications regarding the set of 
skills the ‘expert’ analyst should possess. For example, Richard Betts 
noted that there are two kinds of analysts, those of the linear-thinking kind, 
and those who generate ‘exceptional thinking’ – who are more capable of 
anticipating the unusual (Betts 2007, pp. 64-65). Betts observed that even 
though it may be useful to encourage ‘out of the box’ analysis, the problem 
remains as to when to listen to these thinkers and when to stick with the 
conventional analysts (Betts 2007, p. 134). Polanyi contributes to this 
observation with his arguments regarding similar challenges present within 
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science, specifically in relation to the decisions facing the scientist as to 
whether they have struck upon an original theory or line of inquiry which 
may bear fruit in the future, or whether they are piecing together parts of a 
puzzle which are not related (Polanyi 1957). Polanyi further adds to this 
dilemma, arguing that the way through such problems is for the tradition 
from which the practitioner operates to be encouraged to respect the truth 
(or at least an attempt to discover it), and intellectual values and virtues 
that can create new knowledge and understanding of the world (Polanyi 
1962a, p. 216). Such a view has some bearing on the intelligence field 
with respect to pedagogical considerations of the tradecraft. 
The Popperian way of understanding knowledge claims within 
science, of moving ‘from observations and evidence to explanation’ (Waltz 
2014, p. 2), is a view which finds some support within the intelligence 
literature (Agrell & Treverton 2015; Hicks 2013; Phythian 2017; Prunckun 
2014, p. 68; Tang 2017). For example, the ideal of falsificationism as the 
principle underlying science is championed by other intelligence scholars 
(Marrin 2017; Pherson & Beebe 2015; Phythian 2017; Heuer, Pherson & 
Beebe 2009; Smith 2017). Polanyi emphasised that the personal 
commitment of the practitioner is key to understanding science, which 
more completely acknowledges the personal dimension of knowledge 
more generally. The world ‘out there’ becomes intelligible, not by following 
some ‘scientific method’, or falsificationism as such, but by virtue of the 
relationship between observations and linking that to the practitioner’s 
inner personal knowledge (Polanyi 1962a; Scott 1985, pp. 64-8). This 
relationship is key to understanding science and provides a framework for 
how the analyst could view themselves with respect to solving problems 
and understanding their knowledge as a product.  
As outlined in the 9/11 Commission and government reports in the 
alleged WMD program in Iraq under Saddam Hussein, there has been a 
clear requirement for improved objectivity within analytical assessments 
(Butler 2004; Parliamentary Joint Committee on Law Enforcement 2013; 
Flood 2004). With respect to this aim within the intelligence field, Polanyi’s 
concept of personal knowledge presents a way for understanding 
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knowledge claims and the development of expertise that re-casts the 
classic distinction between knowledge, which is either objective or 
subjective. According to Polanyi’s concept of personal knowledge, a more 
accurate representation of knowledge claims is that they involve, to 
varying degrees, personal affirmations. Without sufficiently acknowledging 
the ‘knower’ within knowledge claims and the refinement of expertise 
within a tradition amounts to an impoverished or limited epistemological 
understanding of what it means to ‘know’ something, according to 
Polanyi’s outlook.  
Conclusion 
Intelligence analysis can be characterised as an epistemological 
enterprise, which aims to develop a clear understanding of knowledge 
products. Polanyi’s perspective of what it means to ‘know’ something 
serves to recognise some fundamental epistemological considerations 
regarding knowledge as a product. Specifically, Polanyi’s concept of 
personal knowledge contributes towards a deeper epistemological 
understanding of recognising knowledge as a product within the discipline 
of intelligence analysis. Polanyi emphasised that there should be sufficient 
acknowledgement within knowledge claims of the ‘personal coefficient’ or 
the knower within the knowledge as a product. Polanyi’s treatment of the 
concept of personal knowledge provides an expanded range of ways for 
exploring what it means to ‘know’ something regarding intelligence 
analysis products. Polanyi’s perspective inverts the traditional 
epistemological hierarchy, which typically values propositional knowledge 
over more ‘tacit’ or ‘personal’ ways of understanding knowledge claims. 
This epistemological position contributes to the intelligence discipline by 
providing a firmer outline of the personal dimension of knowledge as a 
product. Closely related to this acknowledgement of the personal 
dimension of knowledge is the manner by which the practitioner develops 
their own personal knowledge and expertise. The refinement of the 
practitioner’s expertise, according to Polanyi, may often require a master-
apprentice relationship. This way of understanding the development of 
expertise, which emphasises the ‘tacit’ transference and refinement of the 
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individual’s personal knowledge from the master to the apprentice via 
emulation, offers a novel intellectual landscape for considering 
pedegogical aspects of the discipline of intelligence analysis. Polanyi’s 
concept of personal knowledge challenged the view that knowledge that 
defies complete clear articulation is necessarily the product of ‘…shabby 
thinking and imperfect knowledge’ (Kent 1967, p. 47). Whilst one’s 
personal knowledge and expertise may be elusive and defy complete 
articulation in propositional form, it is still a valid form of understanding 
something, according to Polanyi (Blum 2010; Fennell 2016; Polanyi 
1962a; Wright 2016). Taken together, Polanyi’s discussions regarding 
what it means to ‘know’ something offers the intelligence analysis 
discipline a nuanced and detailed epistemological understanding of the 




Chapter 1 detailed the different views around the ‘knowledge-building’ 
activities of intelligence analysis. These views draw attention to 
epistemological considerations regarding what is known, the reliability of 
knowledge claims, and what these judgments signify in relation to more 
clearly understanding the security environment. Intelligence literature, from 
the national security field to law enforcement, reveals discernible efforts 
towards aligning intelligence analysis with scientific principles and 
practices. Discussions regarding the intelligence cycle, along with broader 
debates in relation to whether intelligence analysis is an ‘art’ or a ‘science’, 
or some combination of both, is indicative of the sustained interest within 
the study and practice of intelligence analysis regarding how to broadly 
understand the nature of intelligence analysis as a discipline. As outlined 
in Chapter 2, Polanyi’s insights into the practice of science, drawn from his 
own experience in the profession, provides his own authentic account of 
the nature of science. Polanyi’s interrelated and dynamic concepts of tacit 
knowing and personal knowledge provide a novel way for exploring the 
discipline of science and importantly offers a way for the intelligence field 
to surmount the tensions between perceiving the tradecraft of analysis as 
either a ‘science’ or an ‘art’. Polanyi’s perspective of science offers a 
series of epistemological arguments for overcoming such notional divides 
between the ‘art’ or ‘science’ of intelligence analysis. Polanyi contributes 
towards a better understanding of the discipline of intelligence analysis by 
offering a more in-depth and nuanced understanding of both the ‘process’ 
of skilfully solving problems and the ‘product’, or what it means to 
epistemologically ‘know’ knowledge claims.  
Whilst broadly speaking, it can be observed that there are two 
forms of knowledge, being ‘explicit’ and ‘tacit’, Polanyi argued that there is 
no strict distinction between explicit and tacit knowledge. This is because, 
according to Polanyi, the tacit structure of knowing characterises all types 
of knowing including both propositional and non-propositional (Polanyi 
1962a, p. 56). For example, perception, observation, acquisition of skills, 
use of tools, craftsmanship, theorising and verification of theories all 
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contain some ‘tacit’ structure (Polanyi 1969, p. 128). Polanyi posited that 
both explicit and tacit knowledge are valid types of knowledge, since they 
can be relied upon to solve problems and guide research. This has a 
bearing on the field of intelligence analysis by sufficiently acknowledging 
and elevating the role of tacit knowing within the process of the analyst 
solving problems, along with the centrality of the analyst as a ‘knower’ in 
understanding knowledge claims.  
As examined in Chapter 3, Polanyi’s concept of tacit knowing offers 
a nuanced way for more completely understanding epistemologically the 
process of solving problems, which illuminates similar epistemological 
considerations within the process of intelligence analysis. Sufficient 
acknowledgment of the primacy of tacit knowing is fundamental to more 
accurately appreciate the process of solving problems within intelligence 
analysis. Since tacit knowing as a type of knowledge is elusive, defying 
complete articulation linguistically or graphically, Polanyi claimed we can 
only understand it in relation to how it operates within a performance. In 
this sense, Polanyi offers a robust epistemological account of the process 
of solving problems, which serves to articulate the generally 
acknowledged aspect of ‘know how’ for solving problems within the 
intelligence field. Polanyi’s discussions regarding tacit knowing with 
respect to a ‘skilful performance’ emphasises the ‘practical skills’ involved 
in this process. This is because, according to Polanyi, the ‘skilful 
performance’ partly depends on the ‘tacit powers’ of the practitioner, a 
form of knowing which escapes complete articulation, but does not 
undermine the capacity of the practitioner to perform the task. Polanyi’s 
technical and detailed examination of the scientist skilfully using tools to 
assist with solving problems develops a rich understanding of how to 
perceive epistemological considerations regarding the use of SATs within 
the process of intelligence analysis. Importantly, Polanyi’s framework for 
understanding the process of a skilful practice, involving the practitioner’s 
tacit knowing, highlights the centrality of these epistemological issues 
facing the intelligence analyst and expands the discourse in this area. 
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The intelligence failures of the mistaken assessment of Saddam 
Hussein’s alleged stockpiling of WMDs or the attacks of 9/11 have driven 
some responses within some Intelligence Communities (noticeably in the 
US) towards institutionalising standards of analysis, including the use of 
SATs, in order to improve the accountability, transparency and reliability of 
intelligence assessments. Such institutional aims are motivated out of 
avoiding intelligence failures in the future, by requiring the process of 
intelligence analysis to become more ‘rigorous’ and transparent. The 
potential problem with applying ‘rigour’ to the analysis of a problem is 
whether it leads to over-compartmentalisation, which could then follow into 
the negative aspects of ‘destructive analysis’. Whilst there could be 
benefits to the use of SATs for managing some issues within the process 
of analysis, particularly from a cognitive point of view, Polanyi’s concept of 
‘destructive analysis’ details some of the epistemological perils regarding 
analytical tools or methods which may promote or lead to over-
compartmentalisation within the process. By the standards of intelligence 
analysis, a key goal is to ‘connect the dots’, or skilfully integrate the 
information and data together to develop a coherent picture of the security 
environment. With respect to Polanyi’s ideas around a ‘skilful performance’ 
and tacit knowledge, it is questionable whether SATs may assist in the 
process of solving problems for intelligence analysts. Polanyi’s arguments 
regarding the potential perils of ‘destructive analysis’ provide a detailed 
account of the dangers of adding undue ‘rigour’ to the process of analysis, 
which may lead to pointing out the ‘trees’ without sufficiently (and tacitly) 
integrating them to perceive the ‘forest’ overall in context. These 
arguments around ‘destructive analysis’ further offers a more general way 
of understanding the personal features of the intelligence practitioner 
performing their analysis. 
Polanyi’s concept of ‘indwelling’ provides a detailed epistemic 
account of what is involved in the ‘know how’ within the process of solving 
problems. As discussed in Chapter 3 in relation to the concept of tacit 
knowing, one of the fundamental aspects of this concept is not just that we 
know things but cannot completely articulate them, but the relationship 
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between tacit and explicit knowledge. According to Polanyi, the scientist 
‘dwells’ in their problem (1962, p. 11) in the process of solving problems. 
Within this process, the practitioner switches their attention between ‘focal’ 
and ‘subsidiary’ awareness – just as when reading, the reader becomes 
‘focally’ aware of the words on the page, but this process involves 
transitions to interpreting the meaning of those words that partially 
involves ‘subsidiary’ awareness. In this regard, according to Polanyi, the 
process of knowing involves an epistemological orientation, which is 
characteristically a ‘from-to’ relationship. In the process of reading text, we 
move ‘from’ the words ‘to’ their intended meaning. According to Polanyi, 
we cannot be simultaneously aware both ‘focally’ and ‘subsidiarily’, since 
these ways of knowing are mutually exclusive (Polanyi 1962a, p. 56). A 
‘skilful performance’ involves a ‘from-to’ epistemological orientation, 
integrating our ‘focal’ with our ‘subsidiary’ awareness, a process that is 
itself ‘unspecifiable’ since it is largely ‘tacit’ (Polanyi 1969, p. 126). The 
concept of indwelling outlines how the scientist, in the process of solving 
problems, moves from their focal attention to their subsidiary awareness. 
This is how tacit knowing, specifically the practitioner’s ‘subsidiary’ 
awareness, relates to their explicit knowledge, or more precisely their 
‘focal’ attention. The concept of indwelling captures the way tacit knowing 
relates to explicit knowledge, according to Polanyi, by the scientist 
transitioning their attention from focal to subsidiary awareness. Polanyi’s 
treatment of this process (of the scientist switching between their ‘focal’ 
and ‘subsidiary’ awareness) provides a more epistemologically enriched 
understanding of the process of knowing whilst solving problems. With 
respect to the acknowledgement in intelligence analysis that the process 
involves ‘know how’, Polanyi contributes by articulating more precisely 
how we know. This insight of Polanyi to the field of intelligence analysis 
highlights, in a detailed and nuanced way, how to better understand the 
process of knowing as involved in the practice of analysis. 
Polanyi’s views of science contribute towards discussions regarding 
how to understand the nature of intelligence analysis, specifically in 
relation to the process of solving problems, involving tacit knowing within 
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the skilful performance. Transitioning from these discussions regarding 
how we know as a process within solving problems, Chapter 4 examined 
the way Polanyi’s concept of personal knowledge provides an enriched 
view for the intelligence analysis profession to understand what it means 
to ‘know’ something as a knowledge product. Polanyi’s re-casting of what 
it means to ‘know’ something can be understood with a reference to 
another lesson of the cholera outbreak in London in the nineteenth 
century.  
John Snow was a central figure with respect to developing an 
understanding of cholera and how to reduce the infections from spreading. 
Like Polanyi, John Snow was a keen observer, possessing a prodigious 
intellectual talent that favoured a ‘consilience’ approach to understanding 
some issues – or the capacity to develop an understanding of one field, 
from taking insights into other seemingly unrelated fields. John Snow 
came to recognise that a new perspective was needed to more completely 
understand and address cholera. Specifically, the new way of seeing 
would require moving beyond the medical understanding of the symptoms 
of the individual sufferer, towards a bird’s eye view of how humans 
behaved within segments of London (Johnson 2006b, p. 98). This 
switching of attention, from the individual to the group, revealed to John 
Snow how cholera was spreading to new human hosts through the 
contamination of certain water supplies. In a similar manner to John 
Snow’s re-orientation for understanding the nature of the problem of 
cholera, Polanyi’s concept of personal knowledge presents a re-orientation 
towards understanding the nature of what it means to ‘know’ something. 
This has an important bearing on the intelligence analysis discipline. 
Polanyi’s standpoint posits that in order to fully appreciate propositional 
knowledge claims (externalised claims) it is necessary to sufficiently 
acknowledge the ‘tacit’ (internal) and ‘personal’ affirmation of such 
knowledge products. For there to be ‘knowledge’ there must be a ‘knower’. 
This personal dimension within how something is known, as Polanyi 
discussed, should be sufficiently acknowledged within knowledge claims 
made by intelligence analysts. 
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With respect to the fact that the pursuit of knowledge is the key 
concern of the intelligence analyst (Tang 2017, p. 664; Vandepeer 2014, 
p. 27), Polanyi’s insights into the practice of science and the nature of 
knowledge offers a framework for advancing the epistemoligical discourse 
within intelligence analysis. Necessarily this involves theoretical 
considerations regarding the process of knowing, as explored in Chapter 
3, and the product of knowledge as examined Chapter 4. As outlined in 
Chapter 4, Polanyi’s concept of personal knowledge provides detailed 
technical account for discussing what it means to ‘know’ something as a 
knowledge product within intelligence analysis. Since Polanyi argued that 
there are no set ‘rules’ or ‘scientific methods’ within science, the 
practitioner must draw on their personal knowledge for deciding what 
evidence or clues to accept and those to discard. With respect to the 
development of the scientist’s skill, Polanyi emphasised that the ‘rules of 
the art’, or the maxims within the field, do not determine the correct 
practice of a task. Such ‘rules of thumb’ must be learnt and integrated 
within the individual’s personal knowledge. Polanyi argued that towards 
this end, of integrating the ‘rules of the art’ of science within the 
individual’s personal knowledge, requires both the individual to practice 
the tasks and learn by submitting to the master in the field. This 
apprentice-master relationship allows for the transmission and learning of 
tacit skilful practices, the ‘rules’ for which the master themselves are 
sometimes not completely aware of. This is because, according to Polanyi, 
the skilful performance of a task draws on the tacit knowing of the 
practitioner, a form of knowledge that defies complete articulation into 
propositional knowledge. In this broad sense, Polanyi’s discussions 
regarding how the scientist develops their personal knowledge, including 
the importance of the master apprentice relationship in this process of 
learning the craft, sheds light on the importance of this relationship, which 
is applicable to the field of intelligence analysis.  
Polanyi’s model of learning and teaching can be characterised as 
being bottom-up, by attributing the development of skills primarily to 
individuals adequately practicing tasks, along with submitting and learning 
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from masters within the tradition. This model of learning emphasises the 
necessity to acknowledge the development of the practitioner’s personal 
knowledge within a tradition, which importantly includes their ‘tacit’ 
knowledge. This contribution to the field of intelligence analysis is by 
sufficiently acknowledging in a more detailed epistemological sense the 
centrality of the development of tacit knowing within this discipline. 
Polanyi’s unpacking of the fundamental issues around the process 
and the product of skilfully solving problems advances the discourse within 
the intelligence analysis discipline on such epistemological matters. 
Specifically, Polanyi offers a way for more completely representing and 
explaining the process of skilfully solving problems, involving the 
practitioner’s tacit knowing. Polanyi situated the individual ‘knower’ as 
being central to knowledge claims, which adds to the discourse on what it 
means to ‘know’ something as an intelligence product. He also 
emphasised that the ‘personal coefficient’ in relation to knowledge claims 
is no mere imperfection of knowledge, but a ‘vital component’ of what it 
means to ‘know’ something (Polanyi 1962a). It is not the intention within 
this thesis to claim Polanyi offers the definitive answer as to how to 
understand science and related epistemological topics. Polanyi’s 
arguments are to be understood as a perspective, to provoke discussion, 
not an offering of the ‘truth’ on these matters. Polanyi’s arguments around 
the personal and tacit aspects of knowledge should also not be 
understood as the basis to only trust one’s own judgment and not 
sufficiently recognise the knowledge of others within a field. Rather, to 
appreciate that the intelligence analyst’s personal knowledge is an 
important feature of knowledge-claims and knowledge more generally. 
Polanyi’s perspective on science contributes a more nuanced and 
technical way to explain and comprehend a series of key epistemological 
issues in relation to the discipline of intelligence analysis. Polanyi’s 
arguments regarding the personal and tacit features involved in the 
practice of science, which are furthermore key considerations in relation to 
knowledge more generally beyond science, answers the thesis question. 
Polanyi offers a perspective for more completely understanding and 
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discussing some of the most enduring epistemological issues within the 
discourse of intelligence analysis, principally by elevating the centrality of 
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Thanks for your note.  I am happy that you have read, and seem to have 
appreciated, my book.  How did it come to your attention?  Why read it 
(although you are right to have done so!) in particular, given your focus of 
study?  It is a factual story, one of relative and limiting and skewed perceptions, 
of paradigms, of leadership and its pitfalls, of terrorism, of organizational 
“enclosed realities…”  But, there is a lot there, that few perceive, frankly, or care 
about.  That is okay, in a way (sort of):  the tale of torture, error, terrorism, and 
moral, public, and personal duty is enough for people to wrestle with, and each 
of those issues is important in itself. 
  
Polanyi?  I know of him only through his relatively minor involvement, as I recall, 
in the Manhattan Project; or, more accurately, in Britain’s nuclear efforts prior to 
the US taking over the principle effort.  But, his influence on Kuhn and Hayek is 
key!  Kuhn is in the pantheon of seminal influences on my life; along with 
Montesquieu, Thucydides, Machiavelli, Locke, Tocqueville, and Aron.    
  
As you may have noted, I sought to write on a number of levels:  Of course, there 
is the straightforward narrative, the derring do tale of torture, terrorism, and 
error.  Most will remain there, and that is important and okay.  But I also sought 
to convey how perceptions become a paradigm, that the paradigm is held in 
many ways unconsciously, and that it defines "truth" and bounds perception, so 
that reality is actually external to the paradigm.  I do hold that there is an 
objective reality, or truth; but also that the truth can be multiple, as it depends 
for many aspects of existence on obligatory choice.  If one does not choose, all 
knowledge is meaningless and unintelligible - inchoate series of facts.  There 
must be a narrative thread to perception, lest society and individual life be 
impossible, and completely nihilistic.  Yet, our minds and perceptions, too, are 
subject to the Heisenberg Principle:  by analyzing, by becoming aware, by 
observing and defining through senses and thought, anything, we limit it.  In so 
doing, reality and life become real and not just an inchoate, undefined potential 
reality, but in defining they are limited – certainly the perceptions and beliefs we 
have are thereby limited.  And so, we are trapped in a partial reality; but only by, 
in a sense, becoming conscious of ever more partial realities, all based 
on choice and therefore perspective, can one approach – surely never achieve – 
comprehensive understanding and objective truth.  
  
Most people don’t care about this and find it high-falutin, pretentious, and 
meaningless over-intellectualization of life, and our daily tasks.  In most 
instances, most people are right; and I am a dreamer; and we all know dreams 
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are not reality…whereas we must live here on earth, in reality.  But, that obliges 
us, if we do not surrender, to seek reality.  We know it is multiple. 
  
More precisely to your questions:  It was not files full of SIGINT that said CAPTUS 
was a danger.  The issue has nothing to do with HUMINT, SIGINT, or other INT.  It 
was all-source intelligence:  years of human, technical, analytical 
assessments.  The issue was one of consciousness, perception, paradigms of 
thought, institutional orthodoxy.  Recall what I wrote in the paragraph 
above:  “perceptions become a paradigm, that the paradigm is held in many 
ways unconsciously, and that it defines "truth" and bounds perception, so that 
reality is actually external to the paradigm.”  There was a mountain of reporting 
about CAPTUS, years of work by many officers.  The counter-terrorism center’s 
assessment was that he was a bad guy, and a critically important and senior 
one.  That was the expert, reasoned view; therefore it was the reference point of 
truth, to be disproven, perhaps, but the truth.  In general, facts that did not 
confirm the conviction were taken to be evidence of error in thinking or 
fact.  Think of me as Galileo, and the Counterterrorism Center as the 
Church.  Think of all of Kuhn’s work, as described in The Structure of Scientific 
Revolutions.  What happens when someone challenges orthodoxy?  I am explicit 
about this point in my book:  one is branded an apostate.  One burns apostates 
at the stake.  Facts are not even secondary.  Facts are dangerous to “truth,” as it 
has been defined.  People believe the paradigms and are threatened by any 
challenge to orthodoxy.  Challenging beliefs is challenging truth.  Challenging 
truth is to err.  Ergo, anything not orthodox is in error.  What?  Radar reports of 
incoming aircraft, at 6:00 AM on December 7, 1941?  Well, no planes should be 
flying at that hour, so therefore the report must be erroneous.  What?  Multiple 
reports of German troops crossing the border of the Soviet Union, the morning 
of June 25, 1941?  But we have a treaty with Germany.  The reports cannot 
therefore be accurate.  What?  Reports of German armor in the Ardennes the 
morning of May 10, 1940?  But we know the Ardennes are impassable to massed 
armor.  Our experts say so.  The reports, therefore, are ignorant and wrong… 
  
I challenged orthodoxy.  I was not part of the inside expert clergy, one of the 
guild of terrorism experts.  What I reported, assessed, and argued, would undo 
years of work, the lives and reputations of dozens, even hundreds of officers, of 
the entire institution – of one of the touted signal successes and triumphs in the 
War on Terror.  That simply cannot be accepted; for the entire edifice would be 
revealed as fraudulent and wrong.  Deluded.  In particular, my assessments 
challenged the priesthood, and in particular one priestess, the high priestess of 
our counterterrorism paradigm; the woman known to the world as “Maya,” 
from Zero Dark Thirty.  I did not describe this element adequately in my book, for 
a number of reasons.  She alone, more than  Wilmington, vetoed my actions and 
assessments.  Because they undid all her work, and the entire edifice of the War 
on Terror.  Voilà.  That’s it.  That’s why my assessments – which I knew then and 
we all know now are 100%, without exception, accurate.  Except…even still, the 
clergy, Maya, the CIA counterterrorism guild, refuse, sincerely refuse, to accept 
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my perspective.  They do not believe me; but they see themselves as arguing 
facts.  It is as Keynes said:  theory progresses, funeral by funeral…. 
  
What use will you make of this?  What is the title of your thesis?  When will you 
finish it?  What will you do with it?  What do you intend to do with 
yourself?  How did I – my book – come to your attention?  What other sources, 




Glenn Carle      
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Appendix 2: Email from Philip Mudd 
Date: 7.06.17 
Hi Owen, 
I am not a huge fan of structured techniques, with some basic 
exceptions.  One would be ensuring a structured conversation about 
questions -- something I outlined in the book.  The other is ensuring analysts 
are systematic about what they believe is important to assess before they 
study a problem.  For example, what do you need to know to assess a terror 
group?  I see lots of analysis that focuses on sets of variables that are too 
small.  "XYZ terror group staged two attacks last week; they're on the 
rise."  That's bad analysis. 
I would also push for structure on adding simple statistical measures to some 
analysis.  A lot of analysis will look at a bit of data and draw sweeping 
conclusions -- "Assad's military lost two towns this week; they're 
slipping."  Analysts should ensure they ask a simple question before they go 
down this road:  what sample size of military activity do we need to see before 
we can make an assessment of how the military is doing?  Surely, that sample 
size has got to be more than one week's worth of losses. 
Philip  
 
 
